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Abstract 
I argue that if one accepts the existence of a multiverse model that posits the existence of all 
possible realities, and also wants to maintain the existence of a God who exemplifies 
omnipotence, omnibenevolence and omniscience then the brand of God that he should ascribe 
to is one of deism rather than the God of classical theism.  Given the nature and construct of 
such a multiverse, as well as some specific interpretations of the divine attributes, this points us 
to a God who is inactive in the natural world, not one who is.  This deistic conception of God 
not only sits better with the idea of a multiverse and is also compatible with many arguments 
for theism, but it also responds to certain arguments for atheism better than the classical 
conception of God.  I ultimately argue that deism ought to be given consideration as a plausible 
alternative conception to the classical conception of God, given the acceptance of a multiverse.    
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 The Project and Its Origins 
In this project I argue for the plausibility of a deistic God, rather than the God of classical 
theism, given the existence of a particular kind of multiverse.  Furthermore, I argue that the 
alternative of a deistic God has some aspects that make it preferential to the God of classical 
theism, specifically in dealing with certain arguments for atheism.  The ideas discussed in this 
research project did not grow out of some long-held burning question that was within me, 
rather they evolved out of several different lines of thought and interests that I explored over 
the past several years.  The initial thoughts for this research project was to explore and 
ultimately argue for the plausibility of deism as an alternative to classical theism.  To 
demonstrate how a deistic conception of God could fare better against particular arguments for 
atheism than the classical conception of God could.  As will be seen, that idea and discussion is 
still maintained and carried out in this project, but it has been expanded upon.  In carrying out 
the research for the superiority of deism over classical theism, I still felt that there was an 
aspect missing, that is, there still needed to be a reason to accept deism in favor of classical 
theism other than simply because it may provide a better response to certain arguments for 
atheism.  There needed to be some prior reason that called for a deistic God rather than the 
God of classical theism, allowing for an ontological view that would not be adopted simply as a 
means to reply to certain objections, but for an ontological view that would be adopted on 
independent grounds and would subsequently be able to satisfactorily address many objections 
in ways better than classical theism. 
 The route of providing independent justification for deism came via the multiverse, and 
the impact of the multiverse aspect of this project is twofold.  Firstly, discussion of the 
multiverse serves as an independent method of conferring plausibility and entailment on the 
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idea of deism.  This adds a certain level of credibility to the adoption of deism as a whole, and 
provides us with more reasons to accept deism than simply because deism may reply to certain 
arguments for atheism in a more effective way than does classical theism.  Secondly, through 
the addition of the multiverse aspect, the overall theory that I propose covers far more ground 
than it otherwise would have had it contained solely a discussion of deism.  Interest in 
alternative conceptions of God is growing within the philosophy of religion, but deism is still 
one of the alternative conceptions that goes largely undiscussed, so the appeal of a project that 
only discusses deism, while useful, would be towards a very narrow section of the wider group 
of philosophers or religion.  The multiverse is one of the most highly-discussed topics within the 
philosophy of religion at the moment, and through adding that dimension this project is able to 
appeal to a far broader group of philosophers.  So, in the search for independent justification 
for an under-discussed alternative conception of God I turned to the highly-discussed 
multiverse, and through this I was able to construct a research project that explores an under-
discussed area of philosophy in a way that still appeals to a broader spectrum of philosophers 
of religion. 
 
1.2 Structure 
I begin by presenting a survey of the current multiverse discussion, in Chapter 2, from both the 
philosophical and scientific perspectives.  Through this, I show that the multiverse is a serious 
ontological view being researched by a good number of reputable individuals across different 
disciplines, and that it ought to be given substantial consideration. I also highlight the variety of 
different types of multiverse that are currently being discussed by philosophers and physicists, 
emphasizing the range of different multiverse options that are available, while also noting that 
there does seem to be a general consensus on the existence of the multiverse, but that the 
debate arises in terms of determining the makeup of that multiverse.  Furthermore I go on to 
specify the kind of multiverse model that I will go on to operate with for the remainder of this 
research project as a model that calls for the existence of all possible universes - one roughly 
similar to modal realism.    
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Moving into the third chapter, I outline several of the difficulties that the theist faces 
and needs to deal with in accepting a multiverse theory that calls for the existence of all 
possible universes.  Some of these difficulties will not be exclusive to theists, rather they will 
apply to anyone accepting that particular brand of multiverse theory but they are problems 
that the theistic proponent of the multiverse will have to face, nonetheless.  Section 3.2, 
addresses the overall thesis of this research project, and details how the theistic acceptance of 
a multiverse theory that calls for the existence of all possible universes entails a deistic God 
rather than the God of classical theism.  And finally, Section 3.3, discusses how various accounts 
of free will and determinism play out in the multiverse when there is a deistic God, showing 
how various conceptions and combinations of free will and determinism are compatible with 
the deistic multiverse theory that I ultimately argue for. 
Chapter 4 begins with a discussion on the vague nature of the deistic God, and some of 
the potential reasons behind that lack of clarity throughout history.  Because of the lack of 
explicit divine attributes or interpretations of these divine attributes within the historical 
literature of deism, which is discussed in Section 4.1, I take the overall conception of the deistic 
God to be open, save for the fact that He does not intervene in the natural world.  Moving into 
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 I discuss my interpretations of omnipotence and omnibenevolence, which I 
take to be the most important divine attributes of the deistic God for the purposes of this 
project.  In Section 4.4 I discuss omniscience, timelessness, immutability and necessity, as these 
are some of the divine attributes that do not seem as crucial the overall deistic conception as 
those discussed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 but still need to be addressed in a discussion such as 
this.  Finally, Section 4.5 discusses how each of the particular interpretations of the divine 
attributes discussed up to that point ultimately factor into the overall conception of the deistic 
God that I present and argue for. 
Chapter 5 is divided into two parts. In Part I, sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, I discuss the 
teleological argument, the ontological argument and the cosmological argument in order to 
show how a deistic conception of God is compatible with these common arguments for the 
existence of God.  In Part II, sections 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6, I discuss the problem of divine 
hiddenness, the problem of evil, and problems with miracles as several of the stronger and 
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more well-known contemporary arguments against God’s existence that generally pose 
problems for the classical theistic conception of God.  Finally, in section 5.7 I discuss how a 
deistic conception of God may be able to get around some of the difficulties that classical 
theism faces in dealing with these arguments.   
In Chapter 6 I present a possible alternative to the kind of deism that I propose.  This 
alternative is called noninterventionist special divine action, but I refer to it as epistemic deism, 
and go on to explain why such a change in terminology is warranted.  I detail the nature of 
three different noninterventionist special divine action theories, as presented by Nancey 
Murphy, Thomas Tracy, and Bradley Monton, and I discuss why and how each of these three 
theories can all be reduced to epistemic deism.  I go on to describe how epistemic deism as a 
whole is ultimately an unviable ontological view and why it is substantially inferior to the kind 
of deism that I argue for in this project. 
Finally, in Chapter 7, I discuss some potential difficulties and further lines of thought 
that the multiverse deist will need to address at some point, but that are ultimately not within 
the scope of this project.  I begin by revisiting several difficulties for the theist in accepting a 
multiverse theory without accepting deism that were discussed in Chapter 3.  Moving through 
the remainder of the chapter there are discussions on difficulties that may arise for the 
multiverse deist from explaining a deistic God’s role in creation of the universe, the need to 
determine the location of a deistic God within the multiverse, the need to abandon the idea of 
a personal relationship with God as the greatest possible good, reconciling the idea of a non-
active God with the biblical accounts of an active God and, finally, accounting for the various 
miracles and religious experiences that have been reported throughout history.  The aim of this 
chapter is simply to mention some of the other lines of research that can be carried out, as a 
result of the work that has been done in this project to this point.   
In conceiving of and completing this project, while I made several arguments for the 
existence of a deistic God and for some particular interpretations of His nature, the overall goal 
is simply to open the discussion of, what I feel is, an under-discussed ontological view.  Coming 
into this project I felt that deism could have been a plausible ontological view with some 
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potential upsides and, in moving through my research, I think that I have not only confirmed 
that feeling, but was also able to point out specifically why it is plausible, where the upsides to 
deism are, and bring to light some areas where it is potentially weak as an overall view.  My 
hope is that, in bringing up this under-discussed topic of deism, and discussing it in relation to 
the multiverse, which is one of the most active areas in the philosophy of religion today, I can 
rekindle some sort of interest in this ontological view as a plausible alternative to classical 
theism.  This work will, hopefully, serve as the starting point for much more research and 
discussion on deism, either as it relates to the multiverse, or as a stand-alone ontological view. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Chapter 2 
The Case for the Multiverse 
In the past several decades there has been an increasing amount of work done, both by 
philosophers and scientists, addressing multiverse theories and their relevant hypotheses.  
From the philosophical side, multiverse theories have been motivated by a variety of factors, 
have been argued for in various ways, and have come in a variety of structures.  Be they 
independently motivated, put forth by theists as a response to the some arguments from 
atheism, or put forth by atheists as an objection to some arguments for theism, and whether 
the multiverses that they discuss comprise an infinite number of spatio-temporally 
disconnected universes, a finite number of spatio-temporally disconnected universes, or have 
any other kind of composition, a great number and variety of multiverse theories have been 
discussed by and amongst thinkers.  Because of the number of varying and divergent multiverse 
accounts that have been discussed over time, even if we grant that a multiverse exists, there is 
still an equally large amount of competing views regarding the nature of the possible universes 
that are supposed to populate this multiverse.  Of course, when discussing something of this 
nature, just exactly what “possible” means is a crucial question that must be answered, and one 
that can spawn an entirely separate discussion altogether.  
 Just as the discussion of multiverses has gone on in the philosophical world, so too has 
the discussion in the scientific world.  Scientists have carried out work in attempts to determine 
the plausibility of different structures and compositions of competing multiverse theories.  
Similar to the models and compositions discussed by philosophers that are alluded to above, 
scientific models have been set to determine many aspects of the multiverse discussion, as 
well.  Scientists now engage themselves in providing answers for what could have been before 
the Big Bang, what will happen if and when our current universe ceases to exist, whether it is 
even really possible to conceptualize and construct a multiverse, what the existence of a 
multiverse would mean for us in this universe, what the possible compositions and physical 
constants of other universes may be, and the like. 
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 As I have put it thus far I may have given the impression that there is a clear divide 
between the work of philosophers and the work of scientists when it comes to exploration of 
multiverse theories, but this is not the case.  Philosophical work on the multiverse and scientific 
work on the multiverse are not mutually exclusive and the two can and often do influence one 
another, with each side borrowing and implementing information from the other, blurring the 
lines between the two disciplines.  While the two sides are looking at the same ideas it is the 
methodologies by which they go about exploring these ideas that differentiate the two.  So 
while philosophy, at one extreme of the spectrum, may be limited to making theoretical cases 
for a multiverse via inductive or deductive reasoning using a variety of previous knowledge, 
assumptions and postulations, physicists, at the other end of the spectrum, have the ability to 
engage in actual experimentation and field studies to ascertain answers to questions about the 
plausibility and nature of different multiverse theories.  Of course, as this is on a continuum, in 
the middle we will find differing accounts that appeal to varying degrees of hard science and 
philosophical outlooks, blending the two together.  The philosophy of science, and the 
philosophy of math, for example, both lie closer to the middle of the continuum and can 
contribute to the multiverse debate through the philosophical examination of different 
principles of science and math that are being used by the scientists in their approaches.1 
 This particular chapter aims to do several things, all primarily in the way of setting the 
stage and providing a bit of context for what will come to be discussed in further chapters.  In 
Section 2.1 I discuss the philosophical case being made for a multiverse.  I discuss several of the 
predominant multiverse views and their motivations, outlining the methodology and structure 
behind these multiverse theories.  In Section 2.2, I do the same for scientific approaches to the 
multiverse.  This subsection, again, discusses the methodologies and structures of various 
proposed multiverse models, but this time from the scientific perspective.  These two 
subsections, however, do not provide an evaluation of any of the theories proposed, rather 
they will serve simply to bring some of the recent and predominant work on the multiverse to 
                                                          
1 One particular area where this can be seen is in the discussion of actual infinites, which can be applied to 
whether or not a multiverse can contain an infinite number of universes rather than merely an extremely large 
finite number of universes.  Some examples of work on infinites can be seen in Shapiro (2011), Tapp (2011) and 
Gabriele (2012). 
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your attention.  Of course, the degree of plausibility of the competing multiverse accounts vary 
slightly, or perhaps even greatly, but that is not of prime importance in this case.  What is 
important is the plausibility and worthwhileness of the multiverse discussion in its entirety.  
Finally, in Section 2.3 I discuss the multiverse pursuit as a whole, and its overall plausibility 
given both philosophical and scientific approaches.  While my aim in this subsection is not to 
confirm or disconfirm the truth of the existence of a multiverse, it is to show that the 
exploration of the discussion as a whole is worth continuing and advancing regardless of 
whether or not you subscribe to a particular multiverse account.   
 
2.1 The Philosophical Case for the Multiverse 
The role of this section is to serve as an introduction to some of the prevailing views in the 
world of multiverse-thought, outlining several of the predominant and well-known 
philosophical arguments for the multiverse.  This is not intended to serve as a full-fledged 
survey paper, as other substantial survey papers and edited volumes on the multiverse have 
already been written by others.2  Furthermore, the limitation of my discussion of various 
philosophical views is due to the fact that any broader exploration of competing viewpoints is 
simply irrelevant to the overall aim of this section, which can be achieved through the 
discussion of just several accounts.  The aim here is simply to provide a brief introduction to the 
variety of multiverse theories that exist within philosophy, and to demonstrate that there is no 
single model to which the philosophical community as a whole subscribes.  The variety of 
multiverse accounts present within philosophical discourse leads me to two conclusions; (1) 
that there are a number of highly intelligent academics working on different aspects of these 
ideas so we ought to afford, at least the initial idea of a multiverse, a certain level of plausibility 
and worthwhileness,3 and (2) that the sheer number of different accounts means that there is 
                                                          
2 For more in-depth survey pieces or additional discussions and accounts of the philosophical multiverse see Kraay 
(2012), Kraay (2015), Stewart (1993), Draper (2004), Forrest (1996), O’Connor (2008), Parfit (1998) and McHarry 
(1978) 
3 I understand that this may appear to be an appeal to authority, but I make no claim regarding the acceptance of 
any claims regarding the multiverse.  I simply want to point out that there is a substantial amount of serious work 
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more likely to be one that strikes the reader as more plausible than others, meaning that even 
in the case that the reader rejects the vast majority of philosophical multiverse accounts there 
still exists the possibility that he finds one as plausible and ascribes to it.  Now, let us move on 
to the discussion of some of the philosophical views.  
 Motivated to respond to the argument from evil, Jason Megill puts forward his account 
for the plausibility of a multiverse (Megill, 2001).  While he does not explicitly outline exactly 
just what his multiverse would look like (i.e. how it would be formed, what it would consist of, 
etc.) he provides reasons for believing that a multiverse may exist, regardless of the particular 
composition-brand one may subscribe to.  That is to say, the reasons that he provides are 
consistent with a variety of different multiverse compositions.  The sole detail regarding any 
attribute of the multiverse discussed is the possibility of a threshold of inclusion that suggests 
that only universes that contain more good than evil will be created by God and thus will be the 
only universes contained within the multiverse.  While he does not argue explicitly that this is 
the required threshold, it remains his sole discussion of and suggestion for what may constitute 
the composition of the multiverse (Megill, 2011, p. 133).  Megill goes on to allude to several 
different scientific views about the multiverse, both to  act as evidence for his claim that belief 
in the multiverse is a plausible position to accept, and to demonstrate that, even within the 
scientific community, there is no single viewpoint on just what a multiverse may look like.4  
Megill gives five reasons for the acceptance of the plausibility of the multiverse: (1) that his 
premise that a multiverse is possible is so weak that it is plausible, (2) it has not been 
conclusively shown that a multiverse does not exist, leaving it epistemically possible that there 
is one, (3) that it is entailed by several current theories in physics, (4) given that it is entailed by 
current theories in physics it cannot be denied by some of the most likely opponents, and (5) 
that denial of the multiverse theory would strengthen the theist’s position by leaving God’s 
creative act as the only possible explanation for the fine tuning, thus making such a denial 
imprudent for the atheist (Megill, 2011, p. 131). 
                                                          
being done in the area and that, given that, we should not completely dismiss the idea of a multiverse as entirely 
implausible and outlandish as some might be tempted to do. 
4 See Vaidman (2008), Section 1, Tegmark (2003), Jacobs (2009), Section 2a for more detailed discussion. 
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 While the structure and overall argument forwarded by Megill differs, both in its 
motivation and in the kind of multiverse that it proposes, from the argument in a paper by 
Donald Turner (Turner, 2004).  Much like Megill, Turner argues for a multiverse5 that is 
composed only of universes6 with a “preponderance of good over evil” (Turner, 2004, p. 158).  
So, while Turner acknowledges the possibility of a multiverse containing every logically possible 
universe, he argues that if his account is to stand up to the problem of evil then the threshold 
below which God chooses not to create any universes is the balance between good and evil.  
That is to say, on Turner’s account, no individual universe will contain more evil than good, and 
thus no universe in the multiverse will be on-balance bad. 
 A further alternative viewpoint on the multiverse is presented by Hud Hudson where he 
suggests, rather than the series of spatio-temporally isolated universes that are typically 
proposed in multiverse theories, what he calls a hyperspace (Hudson, 2005).  Hudson’s 
hyperspace is essentially an additional dimension to the three dimensions of time-space that 
we are accustomed to.  Hudson describes his hypothesis of a plenitudinous hyperspace by 
saying that “spacetime is a connected manifold with more than three spatial dimensions, yet 
the manifold can be partitioned into subregions which vary independently with respect to their 
cosmic conditions” (Hudson, 2005, p. 40).  So while the language used to describe Hudson’s 
hyperspace varies from the language of other multiverse theories, the end product still seems 
to be quite similar: a series of universes, or regions, that exhaust a wide variety of cosmic 
conditions.  In discussing his hyperspace model in relation to the fine-tuning argument, Hudson 
says the following: 
…given the fine-tuning, the hypothesis of a plenitudinous hyperspace should of 
itself lead us to very high expectations that the cosmic conditions will be life-
permitting.  Why?  Presumably because, on the assumption of a sufficiently rich 
plenitude, there will be enough distinct regions in which the physical 
parameters differ independently to render it unsurprising that at least some of 
them fall in the life-permitting range (Hudson, 2005, p. 41-42). 
 
                                                          
5 Which he calls a cosmos. 
6 Which he calls simple universes. 
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So while this is a specific discussion of hyperspace that is preferential to a three-dimensional 
conception of time-space with relation to the fine-tuning argument, it does a good job in 
illustrating the composition of Hudson’s account.  The two prime elements that differentiate 
Hudson’s account from others seem to be that, first, Hudson’s account speaks of different 
regions being found in different dimensions of space-time rather than simply different 
universes being found in different spatial or temporal locations that other multiverse accounts 
appeal to.7  In having a series of different universes existing at different space or time locations 
there does not appear to be any need to invoke an extra dimension of space-time to 
accommodate for the existence of other universes, but this is not the case for the hyperspace 
account.  And secondly, while many other multiverse accounts often maintain that different 
universes within the multiverse are spatio-temporally isolated from one another, it is not the 
case that the same isolation is necessary or present between regions in Hudson’s account, in 
that it seems to leave open the possibility for accessing one dimension from another or one 
region from another.  Of course, the practical implications of crossing such dimensional or 
regional lines is a completely different discussion but, that aside, there does not seem to be 
anything inherent in the hyperspace account that precludes such a traversal.   
 Coming from different motivations, Klaas Kraay proposes a unique multiverse account 
that he sees as a response to the “best possible worlds” objection to theism (Kraay, 2010).  
Kraay argues that the best possible world need not be equated to a single universe, and that 
the best possible world can actually be a set (possibly an extremely large or infinite set) of 
universes.  Given the nature of God, an unsurpassably good being, He would create all of the 
universes that are worth creating (Kraay, 2010, p. 360).  That is to say, given some vague 
threshold of goodness that determines whether a particular universe is worthy or unworthy of 
God’s creation and sustenance, for any universe above that threshold, God would create and 
sustain it.  The total collection of all of these universes that are worthy of creation and 
sustenance would then collectively comprise our world.  A world which contains a number of 
worthy, spatio-temporally disconnected universes.  Kraay calls this the “Theistic Multiverse” 
                                                          
7 While his discussion is typically confined to discussion of a 4th dimension of time-space, it is compatible with any 
larger finite number of space-time dimensions. 
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(TM), and in TM, “God creates and sustains all and only those universes which are worth 
creating” (Kraay, 2010, p. 363).  Because of the nature of God and the structure of this world, 
Kraay concludes that if one accepts various principles that he has put forth8 “are plausible, and 
if TM is logically possible, the theist must maintain that the actual world is TM, and that it is the 
unique best of all divinely actualisable worlds” (Kraay, 2010, p. 364-5).  So on this account, 
Kraay argues not only that a multiverse is a logically possible world, but that the theist ought to 
accept that it is the actual world, and subsequently that it is the only possible world, 
simultaneously rendering it the best possible world. 
 The final account to be discussed in this section is one that I am currently developing.  If 
it is plausible that free will is the greatest possible good,9 and God is all-loving and perfectly 
good, then it seems that God would be required to maximize the amount of free will in the 
universe.  Since free will is not something that can be measured qualitatively, since my free will 
cannot be better than your free will, it must be measured quantitatively.  That is to say, for God 
to maximize the amount of free will in the universe, He must quantitatively maximize the 
number of instances that free agents exercise their free will.  Imagine that each free choice 
made by each individual in our universe counts as one unit of good.  So, my choosing to have 
granola for breakfast is one unit of good, my choosing to put strawberry yogurt on that granola 
is a unit of good, my choosing to eat my granola and yogurt from a particular bowl is a unit of 
good.10  Similarly, I could have chosen to have oatmeal for breakfast, I could have chosen to put 
brown sugar on my oatmeal, and I could have chosen to eat it straight from the pot in which I 
made it.  Supposing that these two different breakfast scenarios are mutually exclusive and the 
only options available, I could have only actualized 3 of 6 decisions, and thus only garnered 3 
units of good while leaving 3 units of good untouched.  In order to create a maximally good 
universe, however, God must have it so that no units of good are left untouched.  For this to 
happen, another universe in which I decide to eat brown sugar oatmeal out of a pot for 
                                                          
8 See Kraay (2010), Section 4. 
9 This is essentially taken as an extension of free will theodicy which argues that free will is a higher-level good, but 
I go the extra step in asserting that it could be the greatest possible good.  See Plantinga (1965). 
10 It can generally be argued that the kinds of free choices that free will theodicy values are those that are morally 
significant, but I make or require no such distinction here. 
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breakfast must be actualized somewhere.  For this particular example, the existence of these 
two universes would exhaust the number of free choices available, thus maximizing the number 
of units of good that are enjoyed between the two, which creates a maximally good multiverse. 
 Of course, the example just presented is extremely simplistic and limited in scope, but is 
introduced simply  to illustrate how this multiverse model works at its most basic level.  We 
could imagine a similar situation in which eating Froot Loops, eating a bagel, and not eating 
breakfast at all are all available free choices and that for each one of these options there is an 
actual universe where it is actualized.  Similarly, this process would be carried out for each free 
choice made throughout the lifetime of each individual, and so too would each possible 
collective conjunction of free choices between other free agents.  This would result in an 
enormously large number of distinct universes that ultimately exhaust every possible free 
choice and combination of free choices, leading to a multiverse that has realized the greatest 
possible amount of units of good.  A multiverse that realizes every potential unit of good is a 
maximally good universe, one that a perfectly-good and all-loving God would be compelled to 
create.      
 Some may argue that even if God is required to create a maximally good universe and, 
even if it is also true that free will is the greatest possible good, we need not appeal to a 
multiverse model to reconcile the two.  We could simply imagine one universe in which there 
are enough free agents actualizing enough free choices in order to exhaust and gain all possible 
units of good.  Surely this would create a maximally good universe without the use of a 
multiverse.  In response to an objection such as this, while there is no doubt that a single-
universe model such as this would yield a good universe, perhaps one that satisfies proponents 
of a “threshold” model of greatest possible worlds, I am after a maximally good ontological 
view, and a single universe simply cannot satisfy that since I would leave too many goods as 
potential rather than actual. 
 Another reason that a single-universe model would not satisfy the kind of maximal good 
that I am after is that no matter how good a particular universe may be, enjoying an 
enormously large number of agents who make a variety of free choices, such a universe could 
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always be improved upon with the addition of one more freely acting agent.  The addition of 
one more agent would result in, minimally, one more free choice being made by that agent, 
increasing the overall goodness of that universe.  For any single-universe model, no matter how 
many agents there are, there could always be one more added to increase the goodness of that 
universe, and yet even with that addition of any arbitrary number of agents there would still be 
a multitude of unclaimed units of good because of the inability to actualize each possible free 
choice.  The same cannot be said of the multiverse model outlined above since it, by its very 
nature, exhausts all possibilities of free choices as well as all possible combinations of free 
choices.  So, yes, for any individual universe within the multiverse one more agent could be 
added to create a universe with more good in it, but such a universe already exists elsewhere in 
the multiverse.  Having the existence of such a universe (with that added agent in it) means that 
the goodness is merely realized in another universe, yet still within the same multiverse, which 
is the scope on which the maximal goodness of concern ought to be measured. 
For those who find it difficult to maintain that free will is the greatest possible good 
there are still several possible alternatives that could yield the existence of a multiverse.  In the 
first alternative it seems that we can substitute something such as happiness, joy, or pleasure 
for free will, and the multiverse account may still remain the same.  Surely we can agree that 
there are different types of happiness, and failing that, there are at least different ways of 
attaining happiness.11  This being the case there would seem to be different kinds of happiness 
that are incompatible with each other, such as the happiness or satisfaction felt from eating the 
last piece of your favorite cake immediately, and the happiness or satisfaction felt from saving 
that same piece of your favorite cake for later and enjoying it after a period of anticipation.  
Assuming that the situations that we are talking about both involve the exact same person and 
the exact same piece of cake then it seems that enjoying both of these kinds of happiness is not 
possible since one cannot both be happy that he is currently enjoying the last piece of his 
favorite cake while simultaneously enjoying the anticipation of being able to enjoy his favorite 
piece of cake at a later time. Returning to the previous terminology of “units of good”, with 
                                                          
11 For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to each of these as simply being a different “kind” of happiness. 
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each kind of happiness equating to one unit of good, then in this case only one unit of good 
could be recognized while the other is left as potential.  In order to recognize both units of good 
and create a maximally-good world (or multiverse), a second universe would be needed so that 
both kinds of happiness can be instantiated. 
 The same principle follows for a wide range of other goods such as, for example, justice, 
existence, life, and so on.  For each different good it seems that within it there are multiple 
variations of that good that may not be compatible with each other, thus requiring a multiverse 
in order to realize all of them.  While I will not go on into such detail as to provide examples, as I 
have done with free will and happiness, it stands that such an account is at least plausible, and 
that for any good that is argued to be the greatest possible good a multiverse will be entailed 
by it. 
 Secondly, for those who do not want to maintain that there is a single greatest possible 
good, rather that there are a variety of inherent goods that are on-par with one another or that 
there is a greater goodness held in a variety of goods rather than a flood of one greatest 
possible good, this too could entail a multiverse.  In this case it is not altogether clear that there 
is a single instantiation of a variety of goods is any better than any other instantiation, and 
given the principle of plenitude, it still seems that God would create a multiverse in order to 
realize all possible combinations of goods.  For example, it is not clear that a universe whose 
maximal goodness is composed of 50% happiness, 30% justice and 20% free will is any better 
than a universe whose maximal goodness is composed of 40% life, 25% pleasure and 35% 
honesty.  Whether one universe is better than the other or not, it seems that God would be 
obliged to create both of these universes, and a whole host more, since they are all on-balance 
good, and more of a good thing is a better thing.  The universes that God would create would 
be ones that exhaust every possible composition of every inherent good that yields an on-
balance good universe, thus resulting in a maximally-good multiverse.  Again, while the 
individual universes themselves will not yield maximal-goodness, they comprise a multiverse 
that is maximally-good. 
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2.2 The Scientific Case for the Multiverse 
As with the case in philosophy, much work is going on in the sciences (primarily physics, for our 
purposes) regarding multiverse theories.  Tim Wilkinson notes that “[a]t the coal force of 
science…it is usually extra-ordinarily difficult to find even one theory that fits the facts.  In the 
current context, we do have a few competing theories, but all imply broadly the same thing: a 
multiverse” (2013, p. 94), meaning that while a survey of the literature seems to suggest that 
there is scientific consensus on the existence of a multiverse the debate arises in just what kind 
of multiverse we happen to be a part of.  For the scientific community the question is not 
whether a multiverse exists, rather there are questions about the composition of the 
multiverse, the origins, the physical constants of the multiverse and the individual universes 
within it, and so on.  Similar to Section 2.1 and the treatment of philosophical discussions of the 
multiverse the following is a short introduction to several ideas within physics regarding the 
multiverse.12  While I do not generally go into detail regarding the methodology and 
justification for the various multiverse accounts presented (since they are typically quite 
complex and laden with mathematical jargon) I present the concluding prediction of each 
theory.  The reason for including a section on the scientific perspectives of the multiverse, in 
this overall philosophical discussion, is twofold.  In the first case, scientific approaches to the 
multiverse provide us with just that, a different approach, bringing to light different 
conceptions of the composition, formation, and general structure and nature of the multiverse.  
The second reason is that, while philosophical approaches to the multiverse may be logically 
consistent and conceivable, scientific approaches seem to have that extra level of justification 
given that they not only have to be logically consistent but physically plausible as well.  That is 
to say, I think that any philosophical view of the multiverse, no matter how strong it may be, 
can be strengthened and given more credibility if it is supported by a scientific account of the 
multiverse. 
 Max Tegmark composed a paper that serves as somewhat of a survey paper, not of 
particular scientific theories of the multiverse, but of the different and more general types of 
                                                          
12 For additional scientific perspectives on the multiverse see Smolin (1997), Steinhardt & Turok (2007), Wallace 
(2012), Linde (2000), Veneziano (2006), Ellis (2011) and Carr (2007). 
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multiverse theories available within physics (Tegmark, 2007).  Tegmark argues that most (if not 
all) current scientific multiverse theories taken seriously propose or predict multiverses that fit 
into one of four distinct categories, or levels, as he calls them.  Each level, beginning with level 
1, progressively varies more and more (with regards to the physical constants, laws of nature, 
etc.) from our universe.  Similarly, as the levels progress up from 1 to 4 the multiverse theories 
that fall under them become increasingly debated and less easily-accepted.  That is to say, level 
one is the multiverse model that contains individual universes that are most similar to ours, and 
is also the multiverse model that garners the fewest objections and sparks the least debate 
within the scientific community whereas the level 4 multiverse is the model that contains 
individual universes that vary greatly from ours and is also the multiverse model that is met 
with the highest levels of scepticism.       
Tegmark’s Level 1 multiverse is a series of parallel universes that maintain the same (or 
very similar) physical constants as our universe but realize all initial conditions.  That is to say, 
all possible realities, given our physical constants, are actualized in some other parallel 
universe.  A universe in a multiverse such as this would look very similar to the one that we are 
currently in, save for different initial starting conditions.  So, for example, while another 
universe would enjoy extremely similar physical constants and laws of nature as ours, it would 
have a different initial starting point, making it, perhaps, at a point in development 2000 years 
behind our universe, or perhaps 2000 years ahead of our universe.  The universes within this 
multiverse are inaccessible to other universes, and due to the rate of expansion and the 
distance between the universes, it would not be possible, says Tegmark, for one to ever travel 
between universes. 
The level 2 multiverse is essentially composed of an “infinite set of distinct Level 1 
Multiverses, each represented by a bubble…some perhaps with different dimensionality and 
different physical constants” (Tegmark, 2007, p. 105).  Each bubble contains a distinct parallel 
universe that displays not only initial conditions different from those of the next bubble, but 
also different physical constants and laws of nature (Tegmark, 2007, p. 107).  So this second 
level is similar to the first in its makeup, the difference coming in the potential variations of 
physical constants and laws of nature.  On this level it simply seems that there is the possibility 
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of a greater number of universes than on level one, since there is a wider range in which the 
physical constants of each universe can fall, thus yielding more possibilities, and more 
universes.  Also differentiating this level from level 1 is that, on this level, all universes appear 
to exist simultaneously, which is a detail that does not seem necessary on level 1. 
Tegmark’s level 3 multiverse, I think, is better understood in relation to the first two 
levels rather than through pure explication of it.  The level 3 multiverse, while it adds no new 
storylines beyond levels 1 or 2, varies in how these storylines come to be.  Whereas in level 1 
and 2 the universes are far apart, in level 3 they are all spatially very close, so to speak.  This is 
because rather than being a series of disconnected independent universes in the levels 
previously discussed, on this level the universes are merely different branches of the same tree.  
Tegmark does not explicitly describe whether or not these different branches are able to 
causally interact with each other, and I would expect him to say that they do not, but that they 
are still interconnected in some sense.  On levels 1 and 2, we can think of our counterpart 
selves doing other than we are doing here in some distant universe, whereas on level 3 our 
counterpart is simply on another “quantum branch in infinite-dimensional Hilbert space” 
unknown to us simply by our epistemic limitations (Tegmark, 2007, p. 112-3), and this seems to 
indicate that these different branches may be connected yet causally isolated from one 
another.  
Finally, the level 4 multiverse “involves the idea of mathematical democracy, in which 
universes governed by other equations are equally real. This implies the notion that a 
mathematical structure and the physical world are in some sense identical.  It also means that 
mathematical structures are ‘out there’, in the sense that mathematicians discover them rather 
than create them” (Tegmark, 2007, p. 116).  This seems to entail a variety of universes that are 
widely divergent from the one that we are currently in, resulting in a seemingly infinite amount 
of universes that would be unrecognizable to us.  The universes in the Level 4 multiverse 
contain “different fundamental physical laws” (Tegmark, 2007, p. 121), which means that the 
range of individual universes that we could see on this level far surpasses the range of universes 
that we could see in levels 1-3.  Not only would we be able to have all possible storylines be 
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realized, as is the case for levels 1-3, but we would be able to see all possible storylines that are 
compatible with each possible set of fundamental physical laws.  
So, while Tegmark does not exactly propose any new scientific account of the 
multiverse, what he does do is set up a framework by which we can differentiate and classify 
existing or future scientific multiverse accounts.  Tegmark’s levels of classification allow us to 
see just how far particular multiverse theories range from what we know about our own 
universe, as well as allow us to see how different some multiverse theories are from other ones 
in terms of what they call for with regard to physical constants of the universes that they 
contain. 
The second scientific approach to the multiverse that will be discussed is one similar to 
Tegmark’s level 3 multiverse discussed above, and is proposed as an answer to the problem 
that the “Schrödinger’s Cat” thought experiment posed for what we can claim about our 
knowledge of the physical world (Norris, 1999).  This particular account was put forth by David 
Deutsch (1997), and subsequently discussed by Christopher Norris.  Of Deutsch’s account, 
Norris says 
On this account – in brief – every possible outcome of every wavepacket 
collapse is simultaneously and actually realized through constant branching of 
alternative quantum worlds that are all of them equally ‘real’ though only one 
of them is epistemically accessible to any individual observer at any particular 
time.  For the observer must likewise be thought of as having previously split 
into a whole multitude of observers, each of them consciously inhabiting a 
‘world’ whose history is itself just one among the manifold world-versions that 
have eventuated up to the point through the exfoliating series of wavepacket 
collapses.  Thus he or she will have any number of counterpart ‘selves’ 
distributed across those worlds and each possessing a lifeline which, if traced 
back far enough, will rejoin his/her own at some crucial point just before their 
paths forked off into henceforth divergent and non-communicating series 
(Norris, 1999, p. 312-3).  
Furthermore, Deutsch does not want to limit these other worlds to maintaining our physical 
constants or laws of nature.  While it is not explicitly stated just how far the laws of nature and 
physical constants of these other worlds or universes may vary from those in ours, I think that it 
would be safe to say that Deutsch may have in mind the kinds of variations found in Tegmark’s 
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level 3 and 4 multiverses.  In short, Deutsch’s account says that we need to adopt “the 
multiverse theory and assuming that all possibilities have been realized in one or another of the 
multiple worlds that diverge at every point where some particular world-specific 
event…happens to occur” (Norris, 1999, p. 314).  Of course, just what exactly constitutes a 
possibility for Deutsch depends highly on his range of allowable divergence between the 
physical constants of our universe and those of other universes, but the principle still remains 
regardless of the lack of an explicit explanation. 
 The final scientific account to be mentioned here is that of A.D. Linde, who argues for a 
kind of self-reproducing multiverse (Linde, 1987).  This brand of multiverse account can be seen 
as one in which not all universes contained within the multiverse are actualized or exist 
simultaneously, rather they all come to exist (generally one-by-one) over a period of time.  
Linde’s account, argues, in particular that “…the large-scale quantum fluctuations of the scalar 
field…generated in the chaotic inflation scenario lead to an infinite process of self-reproduction 
of inflationary mini-universes.”13  He suggests a “model of an eternally existing chaotic 
inflationary universe…”14  Linde goes on to cite scientific and mathematical reasons for how this 
particular multiverse model is predicted.  Of this prediction, Linde explains that  
In our case the universe infinitely regenerates itself, and there is not global ‘end 
of time’.  Moreover, it is not necessary to assume that the universe as a whole 
was created at some initial moment…The process of creation of each new mini-
universe…occurs independently of the pre-history of the universe…Therefore 
the whole process can be considered as an infinite chain reaction of creation 
and self-reproduction which has no end and which may have no beginning 
(Linde, 1987, p. 172-3). 
So in this case the universe goes on regenerating itself eternally with, in theory, every possible 
universe instantiation eventually being realized at one point or another within this string of 
eternally self-reproducing universes.  While Linde does not specify the exact process through 
which these individual universes come to pass in and out of existence (their lifespan, so to 
speak) he does make several suggestions that allow him to show that his model is consistent 
                                                          
13 See Linde (1987), Abstract. 
14 See Linde (1987), Abstract. 
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with various competing scientific theories regarding exactly just how such a process may be 
feasible.   
 
2.3 The Intersection Between Scientific and Philosophical Approaches to the Multiverse 
As I have presented it, it may seem as if scientists and philosophers are working independently 
and in isolation of one another on matters of the multiverse, but this is not the case.  
Increasingly, philosophers are adopting and importing scientific work into their theories both to 
guide the arguments that they initially set out to make, andto serve as important tangible 
evidence for the cases that they go on to make.  It is no longer the case that multiverse theories 
are relegated to pure speculation and loose inductive reasoning, rather now philosophers have 
substantial evidence from the scientific community to support their views regarding the nature 
of our existence, something that was once a far loftier ambition.  That is not to say, of course, 
that the scientific views being employed by philosophers are without controversy themselves.  
Just as various philosophical views face rival theories and conceptions, as we have just seen, so 
too do the scientific theories.  We have just noted several different kinds of scientific theories 
that conclude in widely divergent types of multiverses, assuredly with each one being argued 
for by many experts in the field while simultaneously being argued against by many experts in 
the field.  Scientific approaches to the multiverse will also sometimes borrow ideas from 
philosophical explorations, using various philosophical models to craft their hypotheses in the 
initial stages of experimentation to explore the possibilities and entailments of a multiverse.  It 
is not often the case that experiments of this sort will simply begin with no aim, rather there 
must be an idea present, something that is being searched for, an inquiry for which some 
answer is sought…these are the thing that philosophy can and does supply for the scientific 
world.  Those aforementioned lofty philosophical projects serve as initial starting points for 
mathematicians, physicists and other scientists to begin their work, to aim to confirm or 
disconfirm some idea or thought.  This is the role that philosophy plays in the science of the 
multiverse. 
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One of the bigger questions or obstacles to be dealt with when dealing with navigating 
between scientific and philosophical discussions of the multiverse, or in any discussion of the 
multiverse for that matter, is the task of figuring out whether the various sides of the discussion 
are even talking about the same thing.15  There are two key distinctions between scientific 
accounts of the multiverse and philosophical accounts of the multiverse that will need to be 
clarified before any meaningful discussion can go on between the two.  The first distinction to 
be made, one which actually contains a wide variety of further distinctions that must be made 
within it, is that of semantics.  The multiverse discussion, unlike some other philosophical or 
scientific discussions, does not yet seem to have within it a precise set of terms that carry with 
them precise definitions of how they ought to be used in various contexts.  One of the most 
common cases of this is distinguishing between terms such as “universe” and “world,” with Tim 
Wilkinson noting that “[c]onfusingly, philosophers and physicists use ‘possible worlds’ and 
‘possible universes’ interchangeably” (2013, p. 89).   In some cases “universe” is taken to mean, 
and is used to refer to, the totality of all things in existence.  That is to say, nothing can exist 
outside of the universe (except perhaps God, on some accounts, but this is not important for 
our purposes quite yet).16  In some cases with this usage of “universe”, “worlds” are considered 
to be smaller self-contained, often disconnected, sections within the “universe”.  Each “world”, 
in this case, would exemplify a different way that things could have been, and collectively all of 
the “worlds” would compose the larger “universe”.  On other accounts, it is the exact opposite, 
with the “world” being taken as the term to connote the totality of existence, and a variety of 
“universes” that make up this world.  With this is mind, it is not always altogether clear just 
how to compare and discuss various multiverse accounts that, while they may be using the 
same exact terms, will suffer from semantic incongruence.  Similarly, various scientists and 
philosophers will coin their own terms to describe different levels of encompassment of the 
“worlds” or “universes” that they aim to discuss, so these too must be navigated and, in a 
sense, translated in order to undertake an accurate comparison amongst other accounts.  
Moving forward, the way that I will employ these terms will be as follows.  When I speak of a 
                                                          
15 This is also touched on by Kraay (2010, p. 359-60). 
16 This will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
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multiverse I am referring to a collection of universes (at least two) that, together, comprise the 
totality of all that is in existence.  When I speak of universes I am referring to spatio-temporally 
and causally disconnected units that comprise the multiverse.  Universes are entirely self-
contained and, for those beings and objects existing within their respective universes, 
represent the confines in which all causal relations can take place.  And finally, when I speak of 
a world, I am referring to the totality of all that is in existence.  In some cases this will equate to 
a universe, and in some cases it will equate to a multiverse, and this will vary depending on the 
particular ontological view being discussed.  For a single-universe model, the world will consist 
of that single universe, whereas on a multiverse model the world will consist of all of the 
universes that form the multiverse.  
Somewhat tied in with issues of semantics, and a potential influence of the differences 
that we see within the terminology of the discussion, are the motivations from which 
philosophical accounts and scientific accounts of the multiverse come.  On the one hand, 
scientific approaches to the multiverse are often concerned with justifying or delving into 
accounts of how the various universes that comprise the multiverse can come to pass in and 
out of existence.  That is to say, scientific accounts are generally concerned with exploring the 
physical constants, laws of nature, mathematical structures, and the like, of these possible 
universes to determine whether or not their existence is even physically possible.  Building on 
whether these individual universes are physically possible or not, the scientific approach will 
also go on to investigate by what process it is possible that these universes come into existence, 
what relation they may have with one another, whether it is possible that multiple universes 
exist at the same time, whether or not it is plausible for them to fit together into a multiverse, 
what the structure of this multiverse would be, and so forth.  Scientists are concerned less with 
the contents of various universes than they are with the structure of the multiverse as a whole.  
They tend to focus purely on the aspects concerning the physical plausibility of various 
multiverse models. 
 Philosophical accounts of the multiverse not only concern themselves with different 
aspects of the multiverse than do scientific accounts, but they also begin with and are often 
motivated by very different goals.  Philosophical multiverse accounts tend often to be 
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motivated be a desire to provide a response to various atheistic arguments.  Philosophers can 
appeal to multiverse accounts in attempts to block various arguments for atheism, with these 
arguments for atheism generally being some version of the problem of evil or the problem of 
no-best-world.  On the other hand, philosophers may also appeal to multiverse theories in 
order to undercut theistic arguments for God’s existence, namely, the fine-tuning argument.  
Given these motivations, the philosophical multiverse account is generally concerned not so 
much with determining how the universe came to be, as the scientific account is, rather it is 
more concerned with evaluating the overall value of various aspects of the multiverse.  That is 
to say, evaluating the overall value of particular universes within the multiverse, or the 
multiverse as a whole, and determining whether or not certain universes ought to be 
considered as worthy of being part of the multiverse, or at least as being possible parts of it.  It 
should be noted that the common employment of multiverse theories by the philosopher as a 
response to some objection can be seen as detrimental to itself, in some cases, with some 
philosophers seeing the multiverse theory as an ad hoc response to some particular argument.  
And that seems to be one of the bigger differences between scientific and philosophical 
multiverse accounts.  While philosophical accounts are often mounted as a theistic response to 
deal withsome atheistic objection to the existence of God (or as an atheistic response to some 
theistic argument for the existence of God), scientific accounts generally appear to be more 
independently motivated.   
 
2.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen the differences between several philosophical multiverse 
accounts, as well as the differences between several different scientific multiverse accounts.  
Furthermore, we have seen that, while philosophical and scientific multiverse theories may 
come from different motivations and argue for different kinds of multiverses, the two 
disciplines do not operate independently of one another, with each side often taking and 
employing information and ideas from the other for their own theories.  The result of this 
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information and idea-sharing is a wide range of divergent multiverse theories, varying in terms 
of composition, value, make-up and origins, among other things.   
 Overall, the aim of this chapter was to present an overview of some of the prevailing 
multiverse views at work today, and to demonstrate not only that there is a broad range of 
ideas at play, but also that these views ought to be given serious consideration when 
considering the adoption of an ontological view. 
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Chapter 3 
The Theist and the Multiverse 
 
As we have seen, the case being made for multiverse theories is in full-force from a variety of 
different perspectives and motivations and also seems to have a level of credibility and 
plausibility backing it.  Coming both from the philosophical arguments and from the scientific 
experimentation and research, it seems that there is a very strong case for the existence or, 
minimally, the plausibility of a multiverse with the only questions remaining being related to 
what particular kind of multiverse we happen to be a part of.  It seems that, this being the case, 
theists could reasonably be willing to accept the existence of a multiverse as an ontological 
view.  But if this is to happen, what exactly does it mean for the theist?  Does adopting such an 
ontological view harm or hurt him in any way?  Is it compatible with his theological beliefs?  
What are the potential drawbacks for a theist in adopting a multiverse view?  These are some 
of the issues that any theist would have to consider before the adoption of a multiverse 
account in preference to a single-universe account, and these are the issues that will be 
discussed in this chapter. 
 Section 3.1 outlines several of the difficulties that the theist will have to face and 
account for in accepting a multiverse theory.  Some of these difficulties will not apply 
exclusively to theists, rather they will apply to anyone considering the acceptance of a 
multiverse.  With that in mind, however, each problem discussed in this section will be one that 
has to be faced by the theistic-minded multiverse proponent, nonetheless.  Section 3.2 details 
how the theistic acceptance of a multiverse theory that calls for the existence of all possible 
universes entails a deistic God rather than the God of classical theism.  And finally, in Section 
3.3, I discuss how various accounts of free will and determinism play out in the multiverse in 
light of a deistic God, showing how various conceptions and combinations of free will and 
determinism are compatible with the deistic multiverse theory that I ultimately argue for. 
 Before beginning, I think it is necessary to define exactly what I mean when I refer to 
theists, or the theistic God.  As I want this definition to be as inclusive as possible it will be quite 
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broad yet still set us up with a conception that is narrow enough to understand, grasp and 
implement.  I will first begin with an outline of the God of which I will be discussing, and then 
from that one can take a theist simply as one who believes in the existence of such a God.  The 
kind of God that I will be discussing is the traditional “3-O” God of Judeo-Christian theism, a 
God possessing (among other things) omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence.  The 
three omni-attributes are the most important for our concerns here, so the God discussed will 
usually be one having these attributes.  Of course, the interpretations of what exactly each of 
these particular divine attributes entails can be widely divergent but, for our purposes at the 
moment, the particularities and details of the attributes themselves can be set aside, rather the 
main consideration is that God possess these attributes, regardless of their particular 
interpretation.  To be considered a theist one does not need to practice any active worship of 
this God, be of a particular denomination or organized religion, or anything of that sort, the 
simple act of belief is enough to qualify some individual as a theist, in this sense.  Being a theist 
is simply an ontological status or view, one that is distinct from any religious practice.  While it 
may seem a bit out of place to discuss the attributes of and belief in the God of classical theism 
here, given that the overall project being presented is trying to make a case for a deistic God, I 
feel that such a brief mention is necessary.  The adoption of the God of classical theism, at this 
point, begins the work with a set of attributes that He is traditionally thought to possess, so 
that following the discussion of the attributes of the deistic God that will come to be presented 
the reader can reflect back and see that the differences between the two interpretations of 
God are quite minimal.  The attributes of the deistic God that I will ultimately come to argue for 
do not vary at all from any of the attributes of the God of classical theism, rather I will simply 
require that we envision some of them in particular ways, and this will hopefully illustrate that 
if one is inclined to believe in the God of classical theism then he can perhaps be persuaded to 
believe in a deistic God without much amendment to his current beliefs, as the two are not 
quite as different as some may believe them to be. 
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3.1 Theistic Concessions in Accepting a Multiverse Theory 
Each of the different multiverse models has potential drawbacks for the theist who wants to 
accept it.  Of course, the degree to which the drawbacks will affect the theist will vary 
depending on the particular multiverse theory of which he is a proponent and the particular 
ways in which he interprets the 3-O divine attributes, but they will exist, nonetheless.  In the 
first case some multiverse theories will entail the actualization of a whole host of universes that 
theists would not necessarily want to acknowledge as existing given the nature of their 
omnibenevolent God, so this is something that the theist will have to consider.  In the second 
case, multiverse theories will often take away from or discount the design argument, which is 
generally an argument put forth by theists to argue for the existence of God based on the 
unlikeliness that this universe could have arisen purely out of chance.  This argument, however, 
is generally strongest when applied to a single-universe ontological view, and would seemingly 
not work for the theist who is a proponent of a multiverse theory.  And in the final case, for 
multiverse theories that call for the actualization of all possible states of affairs,17 there is an 
ethical issue that the theist must deal with.  Multiverse theories that call for the actualization of 
all possible states of affairs raise interesting ethical problems since it seems an agent can 
remain indifferent to whether he ought to perform a good moral action or a bad moral action 
since whatever he does not do will be actualized in some other universe.  This final difficulty is 
not exclusive to theists, as it will equally apply to all those who adopt a multiverse theory of this 
model, but it is a difficulty that the multiverse theist will still have to face.   
 A substantial number of multiverse theories, especially those coming from the scientific 
perspective, argue for a multiverse that contains or exhausts every metaphysically possible 
universe.  If we are to limit our discussion to scientific multiverse models, then it seems that 
most of them entail the actualization of all possible universes, be their actualization and 
existence simultaneous to one another, be it as part of an infinite series of big bangs and big 
crunches, wavepacket collapses, or some other cyclical model.18  Included within these 
actualized universes, then, would be a whole series of universes that either contain no sentient 
                                                          
17 I assume that all multiverse theories of this type also call for the existence of individual counterparts. 
18 See Deutsch (1997), Norris (1999), Linde (1987). 
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life, no life at all, great amounts of evil and suffering, or that are just on-balance “bad”19 
universes.  The existence of many of these universes is potentially at odds with the conception 
of an omnibenevolent God that many theists hold, given that many theists would argue that 
only universes that meet certain criteria would be created by God.  Surely there is nothing 
overtly illogical about the existence of such “bad” universes, and there is no clear contradiction 
between them and the existence of God, but it still remains that some theists may not want to 
concede the existence of, say, multiple universes containing an immense amount of pain and 
suffering, or universes in which there is no sentient life whatsoever.  Furthermore, theists may 
not even want to concede that the existence of such universes is possible, and this is where the 
tension lies.  While there is no explicit contradiction between the existence of God and the 
existence of all logically and metaphysically possible universes within a multiverse a 
contradiction could arise given certain specific interpretations of God’s attributes and His 
nature. 
 The scientific multiverse accounts presented are generally concerned not with the 
content of the universes, rather they are concerned purely with the physical constants and 
ways by which these universes can come into existence given quantum mechanics and laws of 
nature.  The concern of physicists and mathematicians is not with the moral content of these 
universes, whether they are good or bad in relation to some arbitrary scale of worthiness, 
rather they are merely concerned with the sheer existence of the universes.  The theist, on the 
other hand, may place large importance on the content of the universes, being concerned with 
things such as ethical considerations, overall goodness, and the like. Because of this, the 
scientific approach to the multiverse in most, if not all, cases entails the existence of far more 
universes than does the theistic one.  The theist who aims to adopt a multiverse view and to 
incorporate the scientific case for that multiverse will then be forced to reconcile this 
difference, which may be seen as a drawback for theists in accepting multiverse theories.  
Essentially, a concession with regard to the scope of universe inclusion within the multiverse 
will need to be made, either on the theological side or on the scientific side.  Proponents of the 
                                                          
19 There are a variety of ways in which a universe can potentially be labeled as “bad” but the specifics of this are 
not of tremendous importance here. 
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theistic multiverse may try to deal with this difference by inserting a threshold, such that any 
universe that falls below this threshold given whatever value and method of measurement is 
being used, is not even a possible universe and thus would not be actualized at any point within 
the multiverse.  This approach, however, demands that the theist justify his threshold.  He must 
also provide reasoning as to why this particular threshold is more suitable than other potential 
thresholds that are placed at other locations.  This will not entirely solve the problem for the 
theist though, since the scientific models would call for very different thresholds and would set 
out very different definitions of possible, so still the problem remains for the theist that 
scientific multiverse models entail the existence of far more universes than theism would 
generally like to acknowledge as possible.  So many universes that the theists may not want to 
accept as possible that it may even prove to be damaging to the theist’s particular conception 
of God and how He operates. 
 The second potential drawback for the theist is that the multiverse theory undermines 
the design argument.  Design arguments typically argue, in one way or another, that the 
universe appears to have been intelligently designed, which entails an intelligent designer, and 
that this intelligent designer is God (Ratzsch, 2010).  The arguments generally “…involve 
reasoning from seemingly purposeful features of the observable world to the existence of at 
least one supernatural designer” (Manson, 2003, p. 1).  One particular example of such an 
observation and inference may be that the physical constants required to produce and sustain 
life fall into a very narrow range, and based on the fact that we see life in this universe, one can 
argue that it could not possibly be the case that all of these things simply came together by 
chance, but that the creation of something as complex as our universe would have required 
significant design and intent.20  It is important to note that many design arguments do not 
explicitly posit the existence of God, rather they point to the existence of just some 
supernatural designer, and that a further step is needed to identify that supernatural creator as 
God (Manson, 2003, p. 1).21  Design arguments, however, are typically used, and generally work 
                                                          
20 This is more of an example of the fine-tuning argument from design, but there are other variations of the design 
argument, such as the cosmological and eutaxiological arguments (Manson, 2003, p. 2). 
21 With that in mind, we will still assume that step – that if there is a supernatural designer then it would be God, 
for our purposes. 
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better with, single-universe models rather than multiverse models.  This is because such 
arguments appeal to the uniqueness of our particular universe, arguing that the chance of such 
a universe coming to exist as it has is virtually impossible without some sort of intent and 
creator behind it.  Many multiverse theories, however, claim that since all possible universes 
have or will be actualized at some particular place or time then the existence of a universe such 
as ours is not only highly likely, but inevitable.  For example, for proponents of cyclical 
multiverse models, it would simply be a matter of time before, at some point in the infinite 
sequence of universes coming into and going out of existence, our particular universe with all of 
these life-supporting features should come to exist.22  So, while the multiverse is not a direct 
challenge to the theistic view, it does undermine one of the stronger arguments that theists 
often appeal to in making the case for the existence of God.  On most multiverse accounts 
there simply is no need to posit the existence of God to account for the apparent design of our 
universe since the existence of a universe just like ours is inevitable and is simply one of the 
wide variety of possible universes that has been actualized. 
 Finally, in the case of the ethical problem that the theistic proponent of multiverse 
models that entail the actualization of all possible states of affairs faces, the theist will have to 
explain just how a traditional conception of morality can be maintained or whether it needs to 
be maintained at all, in such a multiverse model.  The issue is that, for an agent, his motivation 
for doing morally good acts may become diminished, trivialized or altogether lost since, 
whether he does the morally good act or not, it will be actualized in some universe within the 
multiverse by either himself or one of his counterparts.  Robert Adams captures the sentiment 
of this problem in writing that any particular agent in any particular universe could reasonably 
ask himself “What is wrong with actualizing evils, since they will occur in some other possible 
[universe] anyways if they don’t occur in this one” (1979, p. 195).  Likewise, an agent’s refusal 
to commit some morally evil act will only make it so that that evil does not occur in his 
particular universe, which will further entail that that same evil that he refused to actualize will 
be actualized by one of his counterparts in some other part of the multiverse.  The possible 
                                                          
22 White (2003) discusses various aspects and possibilities of this line of thought. 
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conclusion that stems from this is that it appears to trivialize all of our ethical considerations 
since whatever we do, or don’t do, will simply entail the opposite outcome in some other 
universe.  On this, the motivation to perform morally good actions is seemingly lost since the 
agent could simply adopt an “if I don’t do it another version of me will” sort of attitude, as is 
discussed by Adams (1979).  David Lewis, however, replies to such a worry as directed at modal 
realism, but what he says about modal realism can be applied to our case of the multiverse as 
well.  He argues that 
For those of us who think of morality in terms of virtue and honour, desert and 
respect and esteem, loyalties and affections and solidarity, the other-wordly 
evils should not seem even momentarily relevant to morality.  Of course our 
moral aims are egocentric.  And likewise all the more for those who think of 
morality in terms of rules, rights and duties; or as obedience to the will of God 
(Lewis, 1986, p. 127). 
Of course, such a reply is not readily accepted by everyone, and Yujin Nagasawa thinks that the 
kind of reply provided by Lewis does not adequately solve the problem.  Of such a reply, 
Nagasawa writes 
However, if the multiverse model in question is correct, it is difficult not to 
extend our concerns to other possible universes in our context because even if 
people in other possible universes are morally irrelevant to what we do in our 
universe they nevertheless exist and form part of God as the totality 
(Nagasawa, 2015, p. 188).23  
While ethical and moral issues of the kind faced by modal realists will have to be 
addressed by any multiverse theory, this is something that the theistic defenders of multiverse 
theories will find particularly hard to deal with.  A theistic multiverse account has the added 
layer and factor of God, and how ethics and morality relates to Him, to navigate whereas non-
theistic multiverse accounts do not have this hurdle to deal with and thus can potentially avail 
themselves of many more possible responses. 
 
                                                          
23 Here, Nagasawa is discussing the ethical issue in relation to multiverse pantheism, but it is still easy to see how 
such a response works in our context. 
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3.2 The Multiverse Entailment of Deism 
Now that several of the potential drawbacks that theists may face in accepting particular 
multiverse theories have been discussed, the attention now turns to how and why I think that 
the adoption of a particular kind of multiverse theory may entail deism, if the proponent of the 
multiverse theory aims to maintain the existence of God.  For purposes of clarity I would like to 
specify the kind of multiverse model that I will be referring to, moving forward.  It appears that 
most of the strongest multiverse theories put forth by both science and philosophy entail the 
existence of all possible universes.  There are two distinctions that differentiate all of these 
theories from one another, however.  The first being that each theory proposes its own 
conception of how these universes exist in relation to one another.  That is to say, these 
theories will vary in their explanations of the degree to which the universes within the 
multiverse are spatio-temporally distinct and isolated from each other, how and when the 
universes come to exist, how these multiple realities come to be actualized, and other similar 
factors.  The second way in which these multiverse theories vary is in their conceptions of what 
exactly constitutes “possible” when referring to a possible universe.  Some theorists may argue 
that only universes that contain sentient life are possible, some will argue that only universes 
that possess a certain amount of goodness or happiness are possible, some will argue that any 
conceivable and logically-possible universe is possible, while others will argue that only 
universes in line with particular physical constants are possible.  The variations amongst what 
ought to confer possibility upon a universe are wide and divergent, and this remains one of the 
most debated aspects of the multiverse discussion.  When referring to the multiverse for the 
remainder of this project, unless otherwise indicated, the type of multiverse that is being 
referred to is this general kind that includes and exhausts all possible universes.  That is to say, 
multiverses that entail the actualization, by whatever means and processes, of every possible 
universe, be it simultaneously, cyclically, part of an infinite sequence or whatever.  The key is 
that the multiverse models to which I refer when using the term “multiverse” are those that 
include, in some capacity, the actualization of all metaphysically possible universes.  The 
individual conception of the relations of the universes to one another,  and the conception of 
what exactly constitutes a possible universe, are not of extreme importance in this case, since 
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all types of these multiverse theories ultimately entail the same preference of a deistic God 
over the God of classical theism.  So, while in this discussion, I will be speaking of an “all-
possible realities exist” kind of multiverse that is akin to modal realism (Lewis, 1986), this is 
done simply for the purposes of inclusion.  What this means is that if my arguments seem 
plausible on this most extreme account of the multiverse, then surely it will plausibly transfer 
onto other brands of multiverse that happen to fall within this highly inclusive multiverse 
model.  What I mean by “fall within” is that on the account that I am employing, very little (if 
any) restrictions are placed on what entails a possible universe, so any multiverse model that 
does propose any sort of definition that excludes some universes as impossible would be a 
multiverse that necessarily contains fewer universes than does my inclusive model.24  Any of 
those restrictions would then have to be argued for on their own basis, independently of my 
deistic argument.  For example, suppose that the inclusive multiverse model contains 10,000 
individual universes within it, and through all of these universes every possible universe has 
been actualized.  Now, suppose we take another multiverse model, let us call it Multiverse A, 
that includes a threshold claiming that only those universes that include sentient beings are 
truly possible, and thus are the only ones that can be included in the multiverse.  Given this 
threshold, Multiverse A may contain only 5,000 individual universes.25  Similarly, we can 
imagine another multiverse model, Multiverse B, that accepts as possible only those universes 
that contain sentient beings and that are also on-balance good, this model would contain only, 
perhaps, 3,000 individual universes.  So, if my proposed arguments work on the level of the 
inclusive multiverse, since I make no claims as to whether a threshold for conference of 
existence really exists or, if it does exist, where it should be, any other multiverse models, such 
as Multiverse A or Multiverse B, would simply yield less individual universes for my proposal to 
range over.  This is not a problem at all.  The differences between multiverse models, for the 
scope of this project, are only that each one will include a different number of individual 
                                                          
24 Just as the number of possible universes in Tegmark’s level 1 multiverse is less than the number of possible 
universes in his level 4 multiverse.  The same idea is at play here. 
25 The exact figure is not important.  The only thing of importance to note is that the figure will be smaller than 
that of the one within the inclusive multiverse. 
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universes within in, and I have simply chosen the model that entails the largest number of 
individual universes within it to allow for my argument to range as far as possible. 
 The adoption of such a multiverse theory, for anyone who desires to maintain the 
existence of God, appears to be an ontological view in which this God would not be required to, 
or even feel compelled to, act in the natural world in any way aside from the initial act of 
creation.  The reason for which an active God would be superfluous on a view such as this is 
because, given the fact that every possible universe is/was/will be actualized at some particular 
time or place, this would entail that every possible state of affairs is/was/will be actualized as 
well.  Given this, everything possible will happen in some universe at some time or in some 
place, so God’s action would seemingly be pointless and unnecessary since He would simply be 
forcing the actualization of some particular state of affairs in one universe at one particular 
time over another at another particular time.  It could not be the case that God loves one 
universe more than another and that this would cause Him to carry out some act on some 
particular universe (though we may want to think that we are the most important, the words 
‘our universe’ are simply indexical).  Since God is all-loving, and His love is inexhaustible, there 
is no reason to think that God loves any one universe more than any other, and it is perhaps 
even an incoherent notion to suggest its possibility.  Of course, whether it is even possible to 
think of God being infinitely loving yet still loving one thing more than another is a whole 
discussion in itself, but one that would require substantial thought and is not of immediate 
concern for our purposes here.  But the simple position here is that God loves all of His 
creations equally and maximally, so while it may be nice to think that He loves us more than 
others, this is simply not the case.  To suppose that God love us more than other universes and 
that He ought to actualize certain good states of affairs in our universe rather than others is 
simply an indexico-centric mindset, for lack of a better term. 
 While we cannot truly claim to know or understand what would motivate God to act in 
the natural world, I think that we can safely make the modest claim that if God is to act in the 
natural world it is to bring about some state of affairs that would not otherwise come to be 
were He not to act.  It would be to actualize some good (ideally) that otherwise would not be 
realized, to prevent some evil that would not have otherwise been prevented, or to actualize 
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some other state of affairs that is in line with His desires.  Desiring such things of God, perhaps 
even expecting them of Him, involves desires or expectations that are not just ones that work 
best inside a single-universe model; rather, they are nonsensical outside such a model. 
 As has been discussed, the multiverse model that we are using here is one that includes 
enough universes so that each possible state of affairs is actualized across the multiverse at 
some particular spatial location or at some particular point in time.  No claims have yet been 
made with regard to exactly what constitutes “possible” but that is not of tremendous 
importance yet.  For the purposes of this discussion I like to assume the most inclusive, 
plausible form of what “possible” entails, generally referring to the idea of logically possible, 
but other multiverse models that employ a different ideal of possibility (as many theistic 
models would and do) are generally compatible with what I go on to argue.  Furthermore, 
because this is a theistic multiverse model that we are working with, it will be assumed that 
God is the creator of each and every universe contained within the multiverse, as well as the 
creator of the multiverse itself.  He is responsible for all that exists. 
 Now, given the nature of the multiverse that we are working with as well as the modest 
definition of what exactly it means for God to intervene in the natural world we can also think 
of what exactly it means for God to be perfectly good or omnibenevolent in our case.  While in 
some cases the deistic God may be seen as being quite basic, and being a God of whom we can 
make no claims, aside from claiming that He created all that exists, that is not the case in this 
account.  I do not employ a deistic conception of God that is essentially basic.  The deistic God 
that I propose shares more of the same attributes as the God of classical theism than it does 
with an essentially basic God.  I will go into significantly more detail regarding the conception 
and attributes of the God that I propose in Chapter 4, but for now all we need to focus on is the 
very basic sense in which I attribute perfect-goodness and omnibenevolence to Him.   Again, a 
modest definition, one that I think is generally acceptable to most theists will be used.  Here, 
when speaking of God, omnibenevolent or perfectly good and all-loving simply entail that He 
desires to maximize goodness and His love for and across all of His creations.  This does not 
suggest that He act in any particular way or that He do particular things, since there will be 
many different interpretations of just what exactly goodness and love mean and just exactly 
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how that goodness and love are to be achieved or demonstrated, but whatever those 
interpretations may be it still remains that God is fundamentally aimed at maximizing that 
goodness and maintaining that love.  What this entails, for our purposes, is that God loves, 
equally and maximally, each and every universe within the multiverse (as well as the multiverse 
as a whole), and that He is fundamentally aimed at creating and maintaining the maximal 
amount of goodness possible within each universe in the multiverse.   
 If it is the case that the multiverse is composed of universes that collectively exhaust all 
possible states of affairs, that God’s actions are done with the purpose of actualizing some 
possible state of affairs that otherwise would not have occurred, and that God’s all-loving 
nature entails that He loves each of His universes equally and maximally, then this poses several 
problems for the theist if he has hopes of maintaining a conception of God that includes any 
sort of intervention in the natural world.  In either case, it seems that God’s intervention in the 
natural world does not quite fit into the multiverse theory, either because it is simply not 
warranted or because it would be counter to a particular aspect of God’s nature. 
In the first case, God’s decision to actualize one state of affairs in a particular universe 
would be superfluous since that state of affairs is/was/will be realized in another universe 
within the multiverse without His intervention.  That is to say, there would seem to be no 
reason for God to intervene in the natural order of a particular universe in order to actualize 
some particular event that would already be actualized in some other universe somewhere else 
or at some other time without His intervention.  For God, each and every possible event will 
come to pass naturally without His intervention, and if He desires to see such an event pass, 
then all He needs to do is locate, either spatially or temporally, the universe in which it will 
come to pass.  While this may seem counterintuitive to say, God ought to, essentially, be 
indifferent to when and where this state of affairs will come to pass, so long as it comes to pass.  
We, on the other hand, will not be indifferent to when or where a particular event shall come 
to pass since we are confined to our particular universe and only have limited extension in time, 
but this is merely indexical, and involves factors that cannot and will not guide God’s actions in 
any way.  Setting aside competing views regarding God’s conception of time and space, it 
simply does not appear that God would be moved to need to see some particular state of 
38 
 
affairs actualized right here or right now, since these two concepts (on most accounts, I think) 
apply only to us, and not to God.  For example, let us suppose that a freely-acting agent, let us 
call him Griffin, is in a tricky situation in universe U¹.  Griffin is trapped beneath a large boulder 
with nobody around to help him.  He is trapped in such a way and the boulder is so large that 
he will not be able to free himself by his own strength or determination.  If Griffin is somehow 
able to be freed from beneath the boulder he will go on to recover from whatever injuries he 
has sustained and continue to lead a normal and productive life, but if he is not able to be freed 
from underneath the boulder then he will die within a very short period of time. 
Without delving too much into the details of what kinds of actions God is able to 
perform (this will be given more consideration shortly) there does not appear to be anything 
precluding God from intervening to save Griffin from his untimely death.  That is to say, there is 
no inherent logical impossibility in God exercising His omnipotence and simply having the 
boulder lifted up and off of Griffin, allowing him to move forward and live the rest of his life.  
For God though, having created a multiverse in which every possible state of affairs is 
actualized in some universe at some time and place, there simply would not seem to be any 
motivation for Him to intervene to save Griffin, since somewhere in the multiverse there would 
be another universe in which all of the states of affairs leading up to this moment are exactly 
the same, except where Griffin’s counterpart is somehow freed from underneath the boulder 
by natural methods not requiring any divine intervention.  Furthermore, there are actually a 
great many universes in which Griffin’s counterparts are freed from underneath the boulder by 
natural means, since there are a wide variety of states of affairs in which he is freed that are 
possible.  For example, there is a universe, U², where the boulder simply rolls off of him, there 
is a universe, U³, where a friend comes by and helps remove the boulder, there is a universe, 
U⁴, where the boulder crumbles apart and allows Griffin to remove himself, and so forth.  In 
each of these universes Griffin’s counterpart is able to carry on with his life.  For God to 
intervene in U¹ to save Griffin makes no difference in the scheme of the overall multiverse, for 
there are already a multitude of other universes in which Griffin counterparts are saved. 
Furthermore, again, since all possible states of affairs are actualized across the multiverse, 
God’s intervention to save Griffin in U¹ would not yield any more good than simply allowing the 
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natural course of events to play out since it would simply shift the burden of Griffin’s death by 
boulder onto some other universe.  That is to say, if Griffin does not die because of this boulder 
in U¹, then it will simply be his counterpart in U², U³, or U⁴⁵, or any other universe who will.  
While the occurrence of whether or not this happens in a particular universe may be important 
to us, since we happen to live in a particular universe, it makes no difference to God, who is a 
resident of no particular universe.  Because it makes no difference to God in which particular 
universe certain states of affairs come to pass, there lacks any motivation for Him to intervene 
in order to actualize any state of affairs in any particular universe at any particular time.  There 
simply is no need to invoke God’s intervention in order to actualize events that will already 
come to pass naturally. 
In the second case, much similar to the first, it seems that even if God were to act in a 
universe to actualize some particular state of affairs that otherwise would not have occurred 
there is still an immensely large number of other universes in which that possible state of 
affairs also would not have occurred, so God’s decision to act in any one particular universe 
would seem arbitrary.  Continuing on with our previous example of Griffin being trapped under 
a boulder, there are an extremely large number of universes in which Griffin (or one of his 
counterparts) is trapped under a boulder, so it would seem arbitrary if God were to intervene in 
only one universe, or to intervene in even in a small number of universes while leaving the 
other Griffin’s to be crushed to death.  The decision for God of which universe(s) to intervene in 
would have to be arbitrary.  Arbitrarily making decisions and acting on them seems to be 
something inconsistent with God’s nature since, given His omniscience, He would have to know 
of any possible factors that would cause Him to act in a favorable manner towards one universe 
over another. 
Perhaps God’s particular love of us, in our universe, would cause Him to act in certain 
ways: to remove certain evil states of affairs that persist for us, for example, some may argue.  
If, however, God has equal and maximal love for all of His universes then that love cannot be a 
motivating factor.  If God has an equal amount of love for each and every universe then there is 
no difference between our universe and any of the other universes, if we are to evaluate them 
in such a way.  That is, we cannot say that God would act in one universe rather than in another 
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because He simply loves the first universe more than the second.  If God’s love is equal and 
maximal for all of His creations, as I take it to be, and we are evaluating God’s love qualitatively 
rather than quantitatively, to speak of God loving some particular universe more than another 
is simply nonsensical and we cannot take these varying degrees of love held by God towards 
different universes to differentiate between them because there simply is no difference when 
evaluating them based on how much God loves them.  Surely, if one universe holds more 
“lovable inhabitants” than the next it could be plausible to say that God loves the first universe 
more than the second if we are evaluating God’s love quantitatively – since there are simply 
more inhabitants to love in one universe than there are in the other.  But, in this case, God’s 
love is being evaluated purely qualitatively and we cannot say that the love given by God to one 
of these two universes is qualitatively different from the love given to the other universe.  
Given this inability to differentiate between universes, God would then be left with two 
options.  He can either (1) arbitrarily decide which universe to perform a particular intervention 
within, or (2) refrain from intervening in any universes at all.   
When speaking of God, one would be hard-pressed to find any theist who would claim 
that God ever makes any sort of arbitrary decisions, with the theist often pointing towards 
God’s omniscience as an explanation.26  For if there are any factors that would motivate God to 
act in a particular way, God would know about them, and appeal to them.  In the case of divine 
intervention within an individual universe in the multiverse however, God does not know of any 
motivating factors because there are simply none that exist to know about.  While there may be 
motivating factors for us from our perspective, such as our desire to minimize suffering, to 
maximize happiness and pleasure, these motivations that would seemingly call on God to act in 
our universe are merely indexical.  There are potentially an infinite number of others and 
personal counterparts contained in a potentially infinite number of other universes who are all 
wanting of the same things and subject to the same indexical motivating factors that result in 
an expectation or desire for God to intervene.  For God, there is no notion of indexicality that 
applies to him with matters such as these, so He faces no issues relating to preference that 
                                                          
26 While not in the exact same context, Forrest (2012) argues that God is not able to act arbitrarily. 
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would persuade Him to act in one way or another (at least none in the sense that we are talking 
about here).  Given that there are no motivating factors present for God, since all motivating 
factors would be equal across all universes within the multiverse, God’s decision to intervene 
would then have to be arbitrary, which is something contrary to His nature.  We cannot say that 
God would act in an arbitrary manner, making decisions and acting in ways for no reason at all.  
In cases where no reason guides Him it simply seems much more likely to suspect that God 
would just refrain from acting altogether.   
Such a claim regarding motivated action does not apply solely to God, rather it is a 
simple claim that we can see evidenced in our everyday life.  Humans, animals, anything 
capable of action, will act only out of motivation.  Of course, what counts as motivating factors 
and how certain beings will react to them will vary, but the principle remains.  If I am not 
motivated by fear to scream out of fear then I will not scream out of fear, if a dog is not 
motivated to sleep by fatigue then it will not sleep, if a bird is not motivated by thirst it will not 
drink.  Similarly, if God is not motivated by anything to act in the natural world, then He will not 
act in the natural world, and it is simply not clear that any motivations that would move God to 
act in the natural world have been identified, given the multiverse model.  The only plausible 
motivation left would be the desire to intervene purely for the sake of intervention but this, 
again, simply does not seem in-line with the overall nature of God. 
 
3.3 Some Considerations of Free Will and Determinism in the Deistic Multiverse 
One issue surrounding the discussion of any kind of deistic multiverse thought concerns how 
exactly one is to interpret deism in relation to determinism and free will.  This is a very 
important point of discussion for the simple fact that it may not be entirely clear how free will 
and determinism factor into deism.  Deism itself is compatible with both free will and 
determinism, but while deism is certainly compatible with deterministic viewpoints it certainly 
does not entail determinism and, similarly, while deism is compatible with libertarianism it 
certainly does not entail it either.  The same can be said of multiverse accounts.  Specific deistic 
viewpoints will surely vary in their treatments of the free will and determinism debate but, 
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generally speaking, there is no inherent entailment or preclusion either way.  The deistic 
multiverse view that I forward is compatible with a range of points along the libertarian to 
determined continuum of how the multiverse, and its inhabitants, operate.  The discussion 
below touches on four different possibilities of how the multiverse operates.  If we are to 
imagine that we are speaking of free will and determinism appearing on a continuum, with the 
ability to display ultimate freedom being the extreme at one end of the continuum and ultimate 
determinism being the extreme at the other end of the continuum then we can imagine that 
any freedom present in the world would fall somewhere on that continuum.  Below I outline 
several different possibilities of how a deistic multiverse can be composed, with regard to free 
or determined universes, and discuss how they are compatible with the deistic multiverse that I 
forward.  Of course, each of these different accounts of free will and determinism will come 
with its own share of problems and objections, particularly when being discussed in conjunction 
with divine attributes, but to engage in a full-fledged discussion of the nature of free will and 
determinism or of any of these difficulties is beyond the scope of this section and overall 
project.  The aim of this section is simply to show that multiverse deism is compatible with a 
wide range of views related to free will and determinism, and to show how such views may play 
out in a deistic multiverse.  
The first scenario is one that I refer to as the libertarian scenario, and is one in which the 
multiverse allows for the total exercise of free will for those creatures who possess it. God 
created the multiverse and each universe within it, while at the same time allowing for the 
creation of creatures who display the ability to have and exercise free will.  Such a multiverse, if 
we are to return to looking at a free will and determinism continuum, would appear close to or 
exemplify the “ultimate free will” point of the continuum, with God having put in place no 
deterministic processes anywhere in the multiverse that would impede the freedom of the 
creatures possessing free will.   
 While it is possible that not all creatures in the multiverse to possess free will, our 
concern here is purely for the creatures that do.  In creating the universe, while God may have 
had and continues to have certain desires about the way things should be, He holds the value of 
free will to be greater than His desires.  For example, while God may desire to see a multiverse 
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that contains no moral evil, He places a higher value on the possession and exercise of free will 
than He does on His own desire not to see any moral evil.  It is simply one of God’s desires 
taking precedence over another of His desires: the desire to see His creations displaying free 
will takes precedence over His desire to see a multiverse that contains no moral evil. 
 How such a conception is compatible with a deistic God seems quite evident, in that 
God would have gone about creating the universe in such a way as to allow for those creatures 
that He endowed with the capacities for free will the ability to exercise that free will without 
any subsequent involvement from Him.  Such a multiverse would, essentially, call for an 
inactive God because of the high value that has been placed on the possession and exercise of 
free will (presumably by God), regardless of any negative consequences that may happen to 
arise from that privilege.    
 The main drawback of such an ontological view is that it may pose problems and require 
varied interpretations of some of the divine attributes, namely omniscience.  The proponent of 
this kind of operation of the world will have to present an account of just how, or whether, it is 
possible that divine omniscience can coexist simultaneously with true free will.  The proponent 
will then have to provide further accounts of what kinds of limitations God’s omniscience may 
have, and whether or not that has any bearing on any of the other divine attributes or the 
overall conception of God.  Furthermore, the proponent of this view will also have to explain 
how, despite the appearance of the ability to make free choices in some aspects of life, we 
seem to face a great number of impediments (natural and otherwise) when it comes to 
exercising our will in many other aspects of life.  For example, I may have the desire to fly, to 
walk on the moon or to memorize a long numerical sequence, but for reasons that seem to be 
beyond my control my ability to realize my will is beyond my abilities, and is impeded in quite 
an evident way.  So one who aims to support this libertarian viewpoint must provide an account 
of how these various impediments that seem to limit my freedom do not, in fact, pose a 
problem for him.  Accomplishing such a task is no easy thing, so it is not clear to me that such 
an account of free will is even entirely plausible.  That said, however, if it is the case that a 
proponent of this kind of account is able to provide adequate accounts that allow for him to 
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satisfactorily reply to some of the potential drawbacks mentioned above then the account will 
still be compatible with a deistic multiverse.   
 Despite the fact that we do not appear to enjoy complete freedom in this universe, it is 
possible that the situation imagined in this libertarian account is actualized.  So while the 
proponent of this kind of complete libertarian freedom may not be able to appeal to our 
universe for concrete examples to support his view, that does not entail that it is entirely 
implausible, it simply means that it may not be plausible at this particular time in this particular 
universe.   
The second scenario is one that I refer to as hard determinism.  In this second scenario 
God created the multiverse with a specific plan in mind of how He wanted each and every 
event to take place, both for natural processes and processes involving humans and other 
sentient beings.27  This account does not allow for any kind of free will, so any free will that any 
of God’s creations think that they have or seem to display is merely an illusion.  All of the 
decisions that these creatures think that they freely make are not actually free, rather they are 
determined by God.  This account is more compatible with the straightforward and traditional 
account of some of God’s divine attributes, particularly omniscience.  On this account, unlike 
other accounts that allow for free will, God has complete knowledge of each and every event, 
past, present and future, so that one never runs into problems concerning limitations to God’s 
knowledge.28   
 Such an account of determinism is similar to the account presented by Peter van 
Inwagen in his paper “The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism” (1982).  van Inwagen 
discusses a kind of determinism in which each and every state of affairs that comes to pass is 
determined by the conjunction of both an antecedent state of affairs and the absolute nature 
of laws of physics.  That is to say, the laws of physics determine the state of affairs at time T₁ 
given the conditions of a state of affairs at some time T that immediately precedes T₁.  If we are 
                                                          
27 I use the term “natural process” to differentiate between processes of nature, such as waves coming and going, 
trees growing, and so forth, from any kind of processes that are seemingly initiated by the actions of any sentient 
beings. 
28 Any suggestion that God’s knowledge is limited always gives rise to much controversy.  
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to expand this concept of determinism across all of the states of affairs over time then given 
the state of affairs at the initial starting point of the multiverse (or some specific universe 
within the multiverse) the laws of physics will determine the progression of each of the 
subsequent states of affairs that will ever come to be.  It has been argued that such a 
conception of the operation of the universe can come be formed in one of two ways.  The first, 
is the more commonly conceived idea, and alluded to above, in which God put laws of physics 
and nature in place to guide the processes of the universe.  The way in which the relevant laws 
were set up guarantees a certain path and outcome given the initial starting points.  The second 
reason is that God is pictured as having, at the creation of the universe, imparted to each and 
every particle a kind of “self-sustenance” characteristic (Kvanvig & McCann, 1988, p. 14).  This 
self-sustenance characteristic would allow for the extension and continuation of all particles to 
carry on in a particular way without the subsequent intervention of God.  Of course, the nature 
of this self-sustenance characteristic could be such that it allows for free will and the existence 
of undetermined processes, but so too is it compatible with God’s making the particles behave 
in a fully deterministic way. 
A deterministic account such as this is would exemplify, quite fittingly, the extreme 
determinist point on the free will – determinism continuum and seems to be one that is, at 
least on the surface, most easily compatible with a deistic viewpoint.  Such a deterministic 
viewpoint is compatible with the deistic multiverse in that it would call for God not just to 
create the multiverse in the beginning, but to also determine all subsequent events that would 
ever take place within that multiverse.  Following the creation and determination of the 
multiverse, God would simply have to refrain from intervening in the multiverse in any way.  
This should be no problem, however, since in the initial act of creation God already determined 
all events that will ever come to pass, presumably in a way that He would desire them to come 
to pass, so it is not clear that there would ever be a need for Him to intervene in any way.  One 
could generally assume that such determined events would come to pass due to the presence 
of natural laws put in place by God at the time of creation, and Michael Ruse may have 
something else in mind when he says“…one might well argue that the designer [God] always 
works through laws” (Ruse, 2003, p. 319).  That is, the physical laws put in place essentially act 
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on behalf of God, ensuring His will is done, removing any need for His intervention in the 
natural world. 
Potential drawbacks to views like this, however, come from arguments such as the problem 
of evil.  Atheists could argue that, on this account, God would have had to have not only known 
about or allowed, but determined all of the evil that takes place in the world, both natural and 
moral.  This sort of claim would seriously bring into question whether or not He is a perfectly-
loving and omnibenevolent God, in that all evil that we see across the multiverse would be not 
just permitted by God but fully determined by God.  The proponent of this kind of determined 
ontological view would have to find some way to account for a multiverse that appears to have 
a great deal of gratuitous evil in it as well as a God who has determined, and is seemingly 
directly responsible for, each and every event that takes place. 
In the third scenario, one that I refer to as limited determinism, it is possible that God 
created a multiverse that is both determined and contains free will.  Without getting into an 
extended discussion about compatibilism and incompatibilism, I think that such an account of 
free will and determinism is plausible, and perhaps even more likely than some of the other 
alternatives discussed in this section.  In a universe such as this, God has determined various 
outcomes and events in our lives but He is rather unconcerned with how exactly we go about 
getting to those particular outcomes.  One way to think about it is to say that God, on this 
account, will generally be more so concerned with the “big picture” events rather than the 
“small picture” events that happen between them.  Surely, the division of what constitutes big 
versus small picture events will vary from account to account, but the core ideal here is that 
God is concerned only with, and determines only, certain selected states of affairs within the 
multiverse.  For example, God may determine that I go on to be a great basketball player, but 
He does not determine how and by what methods I decide to practice basketball.  Those 
decisions are left up to me and are my free choices.  Similarly, God may determine that the 
human race will drive itself into extinction by some pre-determined point in time, while leaving 
it open how such an extinction will come to pass.  The extinction can come via world pollution, 
exhaustion of food supplies, war, disease or some other method, but all of the decisions leading 
up to that point remain free for humans to exercise their free will.  Another way to 
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conceptualize such a view is to think of the general path of life, history, or time as a road with 
walls on either side.  As we are traveling down this road we have the ability to veer left or to 
veer right, making our exact path towards each destination slightly varied due to our individual 
free choices, but we are only able to freely choose to veer so far in one direction before we are 
confronted with the walls that guide us in one particular way. 
 One way in which God may choose to facilitate such a multiverse is through the 
introduction of natural laws.  Natural laws, essentially, act as God’s walls on either side of the 
road, allowing us to make free choices within certain bounds and preventing us from using our 
freedom to stray too far in certain directions.  Just as our free will may give us the desire to fly 
or to breathe under water, the natural laws are set up in such a way as to prevent us from 
doing those things (and a variety of other things that we may desire to do). 
 Such an ontological view is compatible with a deistic account because there is no 
requirement for God to act in or on the multiverse at any time following creation.  While God 
may determine certain events or states of affairs that continue to happen within the multiverse 
on a daily basis, all of these things would be facilitated either by the introduction of natural 
laws or through the endowment of the self-sustenance capacity at the time of creation.  These 
natural laws and this self-sustenance capacity, essentially, act as God’s agent, ensuring that 
whatever states of affairs He wants to see come to pass and also allowing for free will to be 
exercised in those states of affairs that God has no particularly strong desires about.  A system 
like this allows for God to determine certain states of affairs in the multiverse while allowing for 
the possession and exercise of free will without violating any of the core principles of deistic 
thought and without requiring any divine intervention within the multiverse. 
 
The final scenario is one similar to limited determinism but instead of just having some 
free events and some determined events coexist in the same universe, there are free universes 
and determined universes that coexist within the multiverse.  As there is nothing inherent in 
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multiverse deism that precludes an assortment of differently-determined universes29 it is 
possible that some universes within the multiverse may be entirely determined (hard 
determinism universes), some universes in the multiverse may be entirely free (universes 
whose events always involve libertarian free will), and still some may contain both determined 
events and events brought about by acts of free will (limited determinism universes).  While 
God may have wanted to have some universes completely determined, some universes 
completely free, and some universes containing both elements of freedom and determinism, 
God created a multiverse that is comprised of a multitude of universes, collectively 
exemplifying a great number of points along the free will – determinism continuum.  While I 
previously argued for the apparent implausibility of extreme libertarian views of free will in our 
own universe, the overall view presented in this section is one in which such libertarian 
universes could exist elsewhere within the multiverse alongside other kinds of universes.  
Despite the apparent implausibility of such libertarian accounts, given the existence of the 
natural laws and physical constants that we see in our universe, there is nothing about 
multiverse deism (in a broad sense) that requires that all universes within the multiverse 
display similar natural laws or physical constants or even that all universes within the 
multiverse display any natural laws or physical constants at all.30   
Since, as we have seen through the individualized discussions of each kind of universe 
above, there is no inherent incompatibility between any of these kinds of universes and a 
deistic ontological view and it does not appear that there is any incompatibility between any of 
these kinds of universes coexisting within the same multiverse, then such a scenario ought 
surely to be compatible with, if not required by, a deistic multiverse view. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
                                                          
29 In fact, there could be cases in which multiverse deism could require such an assortment because some forms of 
such deism may picture all logical possibilities actualized.  
30 This can vary depending on the type of multiverse account being adopted.  The multiverse account that I have 
adopted for our purposes here is that every logically possible universe exists, and there does not appear to be 
anything logically flawed in asserting that universes without natural laws or physical constants can exist within the 
multiverse.   
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In this chapter we have defined, in a very general sense, that the kind of God we are working 
with is the God of Judeo-Christian tradition, exemplifying the three omni-attributes of 
omniscience, omnipotence and omnipotence.  The precise interpretations of any or all of these 
three attributes are not of extreme importance when talking about God, at this point, rather 
the main point of emphasis is merely that He possess them in some capacity.  We have also 
discussed some of the potential difficulties that will have to be dealt with given the theistic 
acceptance of a multiverse theory that calls for the existence of all possible universes.  
Particularly, the disconnect between the types of universes called for to populate the 
multiverse on theism and those called for on scientific approaches, the problem of having to 
deal with the potential multiverse undermining of design arguments and, finally, the moral 
indifference that may arise from the existence of counterparts in a multiverse theory are all 
potential problems for proponents of the theistic multiverse.   
Given the theistic acceptance of the multiverse we have also discussed how the 
acceptance of the God of Judeo-Christian tradition along with the acceptance of a multiverse 
theory that calls for the existence of all possible universes entails the acceptance of a deistic 
God rather than the God of classical theism.  This entailment arises as a result of two factors; 
(1) that any action by God in a multiverse that is comprised of all possible universes is 
superfluous and unnecessary, and (2) that any action taken by God in a multiverse that is 
comprised of all possible universes is arbitrary since He would be in possession of no motivating 
factors to cause Him to act, and for God to act arbitrarily and beyond any type of motivation is 
contrary to His nature. 
 Finally, some considerations with regard to the compatibility of different ontological 
views of free will and determinism with the deistic multiverse were discussed.  It was 
demonstrated that the deistic multiverse, while it entails neither of them, is compatible with a 
libertarian view, a deterministic view, and compatibilist views, both on the scales of single 
universes and in the multiverse as a whole. 
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Chapter 4 
Attributes of a Deistic God 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that if a theist opts for a multiverse ontological view then this 
view entails a deistic God so it is only necessary that I provide an account of just what exactly 
this deistic God is.  That is to say, before one can even begin to consider my argument as 
plausible it must first be spelled out exactly what kind of God I envision and what kind of 
attributes He possesses.  This will help us to see, with more clarity, how the adoption of a 
particular kind of multiverse paired with a particular conception of God entails a deistic 
multiverse rather than a theistic one.  This will also paint a clearer picture of the kind of God 
that I ultimately argue for and the kinds of attributes that He possesses, given the designation 
of deistic.  Through this chapter, I also hope to show how a deistic God and His attributes are 
not too different from the God of classical theism and His traditional attributes (as were 
discussed in Chapter 3), allowing for the gap between classical theism and deism to be 
substantially narrowed.   
The structure of this chapter will begin with a discussion on the overall vagueness of the 
nature of the deistic God, and some of the potential reasons behind that lack of clarity.  Given 
such a lack of explicit divine attributes or interpretations of particular divine attributes within 
deism, which is discussed in Section 4.1, I take the overall conception of the deistic God to be 
rather open to interpretation.  Because of this lack of clarity, moving into Sections 4.2 and 4.3, I 
discuss my interpretations of omnipotence and omnibenevolence, respectively, as they relate 
to the deistic conception of God.  Section 4.4 discusses omniscience, timelessness, immutability 
and necessity, as these are some of the divine attributes that do not seem to have as much of a 
bearing on the overall deistic conception as those discussed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 but still 
must be addressed in a discussion such as this.  Finally, Section 4.5 discusses how each of the 
particular interpretations of the divine attributes discussed to that point ultimately factor in to 
the overall conception of the deistic God. 
 
51 
 
4.1 Introduction to Deism 
In going through literature, of various sorts, on deism it is very difficult to pin down a concrete 
account of just what exactly the nature of a deistic God is and what exactly deism entails.31  
Despite this overall lack of clarity Jonathan Kvanvig and Hugh McCann offer their take on what 
exactly deism entails by saying that 
On this view God is conceived as a sort of cosmic engineer Who, in the 
beginning, created a world that operates according to certain immutable laws, 
including laws of conservation.  Once the universe was in place, it was no 
longer necessary for God to be active in sustaining it, nor is it so today.  He 
may, on some accounts, intervene periodically to cause certain adjustments or 
changes within the universe or its operations, but no continuous activity on 
God’s part is needed simply to keep it in existence.  Although deistic accounts 
of creation usually appeal to immutable laws as the explanatory device that 
allows for God’s inactivity, it is worth noting that a more Aristotelian 
conception of nature leads to a very similar view.  Instead of claiming that laws, 
conceived as relations between types of events, explain how God need not be 
active, one might claim that in creating, God implants a capacity for self-
sustenance in what He creates, and that it is the presence or operation of this 
capacity that absolves God from sustaining the world after His initial creative 
activity ceases.  Indeed, a theory that exempts God from directly sustaining the 
universe by appealing to laws must ultimately ground the truth of those laws in 
the characteristics of the things whose behavior the laws describe, and so must 
in the end appeal to a self-sustaining capacity of the things God creates 
(Kvanvig & McCann, 1988, p. 14).  
Even despite this description of the nature of deism (and the two distinct methods by which 
God could have enacted it), Kvanvig and McCann have still yet to detail any characteristics of 
the deistic God that distinguish Him from the God of classical theism aside from the deistic God 
being precluded from acting in the natural world.  That is, while they have detailed what deism 
entails, nothing substantial is said about the nature of God Himself.   
There are hundreds of books and papers devoted to the discussion of the attributes of 
the God of classical theism,32 coming together to form an expansive body of literature on the 
                                                          
31 Many writings on deism have to do more with the politics of being a proponent of deism rather than with the 
view itself.  Still, some information on deistic ideals can be found in Byrne (1989), and Leland (1755). 
32 Kenny (1979), Pojman (2001), Rowe (2007), Wainwright (1987) to name a few volumes with substantial sections 
on divine attributes.  
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topic, but the same simply cannot be said about attributes of the deistic God.  Very little is 
written detailing the attributes of the deistic God, or saying much about the intricacies of His 
nature.  This could be because many of the deistic writers feared persecution by the church by 
being labeled as atheists so they did not want to explicitly put into writing their particular views 
on God, let alone go into substantial detail about the attributes of such a God out of fear of 
being labelled an atheist (Vailati, 1998, p. ix)(Sullivan, 1982, p. 209).33  On the other hand, 
perhaps very little is said of the nature of a deistic God for reasons of simplicity.  That is to say, 
that a deistic God could possibly be essentially basic and aside from Him being the creator we 
cannot, with any certainty, ascribe to Him any attributes because of our epistemic limitations.  
It has been said that “If there is a God, he is infinitely beyond our comprehension, since, being 
indivisible and without limits, he bears no relation to us.  We are therefore incapable of 
knowing either what he is or whether he is” (Krailsheimer, 1995, p. 122).  But an infinitely 
incomprehensible God is not the kind of God that I envision or call for.   
Since generally emerging in the enlightenment period, in the mid-17th century, precisely 
what has been meant by ‘deism’ has varied over the centuries, from the word being used to 
describe “…the opinions of men who believed in a religion that could be achieved by reason 
apart from Christian revelation” (Sullivan, 1982, p. 206) in the mid-17th century, to Englishmen 
often identifying deism with Unitarianism from the late-17th century through the 18th century 
(Sullivan, 1982, p. 206).  Also, in the 17th century, as mentioned above, deists could be labelled 
or viewed as atheists because they were viewed as “those who deny immaterial things” 
(Sullivan, 1982, p. 209) which would, in essence, make them indistinguishable from atheists, or 
it could otherwise be argued that “…since the ranks of atheism included all who denied God's 
creation or government of the world, they included deists; those who adopted the less 
offensive title were attempting to disguise their real allegiance” (Sullivan, 1982, p. 209).  
Needless to say, many of the descriptions of deism carried with them negative connotations, 
which may be what points towards the general lack of desire to ascribe to deism or to engage in 
substantial discussion about it.  To be fair, amongst these varying accounts of the entailment of 
                                                          
33 Deists were often deemed atheists by the church and state. 
53 
 
deistic thought there were accounts that seem to capture the essence of the kind of deism that 
I have in mind when I speak about it, such as one that describes deism by saying that it 
“…entails an understanding of God’s relation to the created order that denies that He is either 
present or immanent in the world and limits His role to the act of creation and the 
establishment of laws which have since ruled the universe” (Sullivan, 1982, p. 213).  Similarly, 
William Bristow points out the common thread that seems to run through all of the accounts of 
deism when he describes it by saying that  
According to deism, we can know by the natural light of reason that the 
universe is created and governed by a supreme intelligence; however, although 
this supreme being has a plan for creation from the beginning, the being does 
not interfere with creation; the deist typically rejects miracles and reliance on 
special revelations as a source of religious doctrine and belief, in favor of the 
natural light of reason (Bristow, 2010).34  
While these latter two interpretations of deism seem to be much more in line with what I have 
in mind and also carry far less of a negative connotation than some of the other interpretations 
mentioned above, it must also be remembered that all of these interpretations were in play at, 
more or less, the same time across Western Europe, rendering the public discussion of deism a 
risky business.  This is perhaps one of the reasons that there were very few public deists, and 
even fewer of them who were bold enough to put their views regarding the true nature of the 
view and its entailments in writing.  Because of this lack of clarity and specificity expressed by 
the historical deistic literature, both from the deists themselves and from their opponents, 
apart from insisting that the God of deism cannot act inside the natural world after He has 
created it, I am taking the word ‘deism’ to be compatible with a broad spectrum of 
interpretations of the divine attributes possessed by the deistic God.  Through that, I see the 
deistic God being compatible with a wide variety of attributes and interpretations of those 
attributes. 
 Because of the openness of the nature of the deistic God it is not clear that any deistic 
account need adhere to any particular conception of God, and so any deistic account is 
                                                          
34 This and many other definitions of deism will often include something detailing the ability to know of God’s 
existence through reason alone.  I do not make such a claim.  I am only concerned with God’s inactiveness in the 
world, and not how we are to come about believing that He exists. 
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therefore open to detail its account of God in any way it so chooses, so long as it is in 
accordance with the core principles of deism.35  This leaves open many different possibilities for 
the nature of God, ranging anywhere from a super-basic God who has no features that we can 
attribute to Him, to a God who is quite similar to the God of classical theism, about whom much 
has been said.  The deistic God that I will propose is far closer to the latter than the former, and 
this is for several main reasons.  
 The first reason that I opt for a conception of God that does not stray too far from the 
classical conception is for the sake of simplicity and understanding.  I find it far easier to 
conceptualize, understand, and ultimately make the case for a God who possesses a set of 
anthropomorphic attributes, such as the God of classical theism.  It is simply far more 
understandable to discuss a God who possesses a maximal level of many of the same attributes 
that we do than it is to try to understand a highly abstract God of whom we cannot make any 
claims about.  There is simply no need to go about complicating the classical conception of God 
by making a variety of substantial amendments to how we should conceive of His attributes.  
The second reason, closely related to the first, that I have opted to propose the kind of God 
that I do is because there is simply no need to unnecessarily import a variety of amendments 
and qualifications to the classical conception of God.  My overall argument, that a theistic 
multiverse entails deism, works fine without much amendment to the classical conception of 
God, so there is no need to go about complicating the matter by removing or replacing a variety 
of long-standing divine attributes.  Furthermore, to call for the abandonment of many of these 
attributes would draw me deep into the middle of a philosophical debate that I do not 
necessarily want to be in, just quite yet.  To be fair, my account of a deistic God requires that 
certain divine attributes be interpreted and conceptualized in specific ways, but this is 
something that is not particular to my account of God, nor will they be interpretations and 
conceptualizations that are not already in play within discussions of theology or philosophy of 
religion today.  And finally, the third reason for adopting a conception of God that is closer to 
                                                          
35 These, too, are not altogether clear, but for the present purposes they would simply call for the existence of 
God, for Him to be the creator, and for Him to refrain from intervening in the natural order of the world after the 
initial act of creation. 
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the classical conception of God allows for a view that is more likely to be accepted by current 
classical theists, as a transition from their belief system to the one that I propose will not 
require a wholesale abandonment of the God that they have come to believe in.  It would, in 
my view, be pointless to put forth a ontological view that is very unlikely to be accepted or 
viewed as plausible by the people at whom it is directed, so if it is possible to make the view 
clearly distinct yet maintain a number of the core values of the original ontological view for 
which it is being proposed as an alternative then it bodes well for the general acceptance of 
that new ontological view. 
 This discussion of the divine attributes of my conception of a deistic God will concern 
itself primarily with providing accounts for omnipotence, omnibenevolence and, to a lesser 
degree, omniscience since these three are typically considered to be the three essential 
attributes of God.  While I do not wish to discount the overall importance of other divine 
attributes of the God of deism,  omnipotence and omnibenevolence are the two most 
important ones for our purposes, and thus will garner the majority of the discussion.  As they 
are typically thought to be the contingent attributes of God (with the exception of 
omniscience), other attributes such as omniscience, timelessness, immutability and necessity 
will factor into the overall conception of the deistic God, but only minimally at this stage, and it 
is not quite clear that any major issues will arise as a result of holding a particular conception of 
either of those divine attributes so discussion of them will be quite brief.   
 
4.2 Omnipotence 
At quick glance, many could take God’s omnipotence to entail that He can do absolutely any 
task possible – a sort of unlimited and infinite power over anything and everything.  This kind of 
omnipotence, a kind that Rene Descartes argues for, is one that I think is too strong.  Descartes 
argues it is wrong to say or think that God can only do those tasks that can be described in a 
logically coherent way (Frankfurt, 1964, p. 262).  Included within these seemingly impossible 
tasks that God can perform are such things as drawing a square circle, making 2+2=7, and 
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creating a stone so heavy that God Himself cannot lift it (Frankfurt, 1964, p. 262).36  For God, 
argues Descartes, to carry out logically impossible tasks is the ultimate display of His power, 
and since God’s power ought to be unlimited, there is no reason that logical possibilities ought 
to play any factor in determining His abilities.  The kind of omnipotence that I want to attribute 
to a deistic God, however, is still one of the stronger kinds of omnipotence that we can 
attribute to Him, without going so far as to claim that God’s power cannot extend to doing 
what is logically impossible since ‘doing what is logically impossible’ is a meaningless phrase.  
While it does not entail ultimate and unlimited power, the various tasks that God is unable to 
do are tasks that, for God, are not even accomplishable tasks in the first place.  Not being real 
tasks, God’s inability to carry them out poses no threat to being able to attribute omnipotence 
to Him (Mavrodes, 1963). 
 Of the debate surrounding the nature of God’s omnipotence, Nick Trakakis says that 
“[n]o matter how much controversy and debate may currently surround the extraordinary 
attribute of divine omnipotence, there is virtually complete consensus amongst philosophers 
and theologians that Aquinas is correct in saying that ‘anything that implies a contradiction 
does not fall under God’s omnipotence’…” (Trakakis, 1997, p. 55) so I do not choose to move 
forward with a Cartesian view of omnipotence.  The view of omnipotence that I am adopting is 
very similar to, if not the same as, the view forwarded by George Mavrodes (1963) and does 
not argue for the irrelevance of logic when it comes to God’s abilities to carry out certain tasks.  
Mavrodes argues that God’s abilities are limited by logic, in that He cannot carry out tasks that 
are logically impossible.  In addition to that, due to God’s nature, there are certain tasks that, 
while they may be logically possible to carry out for you or me, are not logically possible for 
God.  The example used by Mavrodes is asking whether God can create a stone too heavy for 
Himself to lift, a classic dilemma traditionally used to question God’s omnipotence.  For if God 
cannot create a stone too heavy for Him to lift then, through His inability to create such a stone, 
there is clearly at least one task that He cannot carry out, whereas if He can create the stone 
too heavy for Him to lift, through His inability to lift the stone there is still clearly another task 
                                                          
36 It has been argued that creating a stone so heavy that He cannot lift it is a logical impossibility for God, given His 
nature, even though there is no inherent contradiction within the task.  This will be discussed more, shortly. 
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that He cannot carry out.  So no matter how the question is answered, it seems that we arrive 
at the same conclusion: there is a task that is not inherently self-contradictory that God cannot 
perform, which means that God is not omnipotent.  For Mavrodes, even though such a task 
contains nothing self-contradictory for you or me, for a being whom we already view as 
omnipotent this is a self-contradictory task, and cannot be properly seen as an object of power.  
He calls tasks like this “pseudo-tasks” (Mavrodes, 1963, p. 223) and claims that the inability of 
God, or any omnipotent being, to carry out these pseudo-tasks is not damaging to the doctrine 
of omnipotence. 
 This account of omnipotence, put forth by Mavrodes (1963), is of the type that I adopt 
for the account of the deistic God, but I must also expand on it.  Mavrodes’ account does not 
include much examination of pseudo-tasks, apart from ones commonly discussed: ones such as 
drawing a square circle, or of creating a stone too heavy for God to lift.  I will extend this list of 
pseudo-tasks to include tasks that are not within God’s nature.  That is to say, it cannot be 
considered an object of power to expect God to perform tasks that are not within His nature, 
and thus if He cannot perform tasks that are not within His nature, it ought not to be viewed as 
detrimental to the doctrine of omnipotence.  This will be another case in which certain tasks, 
while they are possible to be carried out by us, since there is no apparent contradiction 
precluding us from acting against our general nature, cannot be carried out by God, since His 
nature is absolute to a maximal degree. 
 One example of something that would be out of God’s nature would be to, as 
mentioned in Chapter 3, act in an arbitrary manner (Forrest, 2012, p. 342).  Given God’s 
omniscience, it would seem that He would have all of the relevant information in any given 
situation, allowing Him to make a clear decision on whether or not to act in a particular 
manner.  God’s decision on whether to act or not would necessarily be guided by some sort of 
motivating factor.37  Arbitrary decisions, however, by their very nature, seem not to be guided 
by any motivating factors whatsoever, and can be seen as decisions made without knowing 
                                                          
37 Forrest (2012) discusses some of the potential motivating factors or “tie-breakers” in these kinds of situations. 
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some particular piece of information that would motivate some particular course of action.38  
That is to say, one who acts in an arbitrary manner is simply ignorant of the information that 
would allow him to make an informed decision that would motivate his action.  In the absence 
of any motivating factors, we would expect that God would perform no actions whatsoever, 
given that He simply has no reason to act, and it is not at all clear that God would act simply for 
the sake of acting.  So to expect God to perform any arbitrary actions is simply not possible, 
since it is not within His nature.  It is not within His nature to act without any motivation, and it 
is also perhaps meaningless to say that an action is arbitrary for God, since it would seem to 
deny Him some sort of information that would allow Him to make a motivated decision, which 
is something that is not possible given His omniscience.  So, for God to act in an arbitrary 
manner, while it may be possible for us, given God’s omniscience and inability39 to act 
unmotivated, is for Him to perform what Mavrodes would call a pseudo-task.  Inability to 
perform it would not mean that God lacked omnipotence.   
 Another example of something that would be out of God’s nature is to act in a less than 
perfectly efficient way.  Given God’s great power and knowledge, not only does He know the 
most efficient way to achieve certain ends, but He also has the ability to do whatever is 
necessary in order to achieve those ends in the most efficient manner. For a being with such 
abilities, it would seem unnatural and unnecessary to go about actualizing some sort of desire 
by any way other than the most direct and efficient way.  Given this, acting in a less than 
perfectly efficient way is something that we ought to include in the realm of actions that are 
not within God’s power to do, but nonetheless poses no threat to His omnipotence.  Let us 
apply this directly to the case of creation and divine intervention.  In creating the world and all 
of the natural laws that govern it, God would have had the foresight and ability to create a 
world that thereafter carried on exactly how He so chose.  That is to say, He could have set up 
the initial physical conditions of the world in such a way as to allow for the natural laws to 
                                                          
38 There is also the thought that making an arbitrary decision can be based on the possession of too much 
knowledge but this is a claim that I disagree with, for reasons that I will not get into here.  To mount a detailed 
discussion of the nature of arbitrariness would be tangential to the current discussion, so I will just move forward 
with the assumption that an arbitrary decision is based on a lack of knowledge.  Forrest (2012) writes about this as 
it relates to Buridan’s Ass. 
39 “Inability”, in this sense, can also be equated to “lack of desire” since anything that God wills is done. 
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guarantee that certain events come to pass exactly as He would have wanted them to.  To 
assert that God needs to intervene in the natural world following its creation in order to 
actualize some state of events that He desires is simply to assert that God is acting in a less than 
perfectly efficient manner.  To say that God intervenes in the natural world is to say the He is 
amending His initial creation, and for a being who could have created the world to play out in 
exactly the way that He wanted, the addition of divine intervention seems to be an unnecessary 
complication signalling something less than perfection.   
Let us explore the concept of divine efficiency through an example that many of us will 
be familiar with.  Let us imagine that Chris and Paul are both in the same upper-level 
philosophy course in their final year of university.  They are both tasked with the final 
assignment of writing a philosophy paper on epistemic justification regarding miraculous 
events.  Let us also imagine that there is some objective marker that denotes a perfect 
philosophy paper, something greater than simply a 100% grade, rather something transcendent 
that make it THE perfect paper.  Now, let us finally imagine that, upon the due date of the 
assignment, both Chris and Paul independently, yet simultaneously, turn in assignments that 
are both identical and exemplify the perfect philosophy paper.  Now, given that two final 
products are identical, how exactly are we to determine which of these two young men 
displayed more power in producing their respective philosophy papers?40  In order to make 
such a decision, given the identical nature of the products, we must explore the process by 
which each product came to be.  In the first case, Chris wrote his philosophy paper in the 
traditional way that many of us are familiar with.  Chris began by writing an outline for his 
paper, a draft, revised the draft by going through and making major and minor changes to his 
ideas, structure and overall presentation, and concluded with an editing stage in which he 
corrected all of the factual, grammatical and spelling errors that remained.  After going through 
this process of construction, revision and correction over a period of time, Chris ended up with 
the perfect philosophy paper which he promptly submitted.  On the other hand, Paul, simply 
sat down at his desk and wrote his paper from start to finish.  He did not go back to make any 
                                                          
40 If we are to limit the evaluation of power to the production of the highest quality philosophy, and we are in a 
position in which we have to decide which young man is more powerful. 
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revisions, he did no editing and simply ended up with the perfect philosophy paper which he, 
like Chris, promptly submitted.  Now, if we are to choose which of these two young men 
displayed more power in writing identical perfect philosophy papers, I would argue that it was 
Paul because of the high degree of efficiency with which he carried out his task.  Surely, to be 
able to write the perfect philosophy paper is a great display of power, by any standards, but to 
write one in the most efficient way possible, namely without having to go back and make any 
corrections or revisions, is a greater display of power.  Given two identical outcomes, the most 
desirable, powerful, and best process of arriving at that outcome will generally be the most 
efficient one.  Just as it is less efficient for us to write a philosophy paper using no punctuation 
and then go back and revise it by adding punctuation afterwards than it is to write a perfect 
philosophy paper in the first place, it is less efficient for God to intervene in the world to 
actualize some particular state of events when He could have initially created the world in such 
a way that that state of events would come to pass naturally anyway.  Now, rather than having 
just one thing govern the operation of the natural world (the natural laws), there is another 
entity that has been added to the equation to account for other aspects of the operation of the 
natural world (God).  To be fair, it would be no extra effort for God to both create and 
introduce natural laws to govern the operation of the world while at the same time choosing to 
actively intervene within it, but this is simply an unnecessary and extra level of complication to 
the explanatory account of the processes in our world.  So, just as Paul ought to be credited 
with the possession of greater power for his display of efficiency, so too must the deistic God. 
 Now, applied directly to our case of the multiverse, this would mean that, in creating 
the multiverse, God would be able to set it up in such a way as to allow for each and every 
event in the multiverse to occur exactly as He so chose (if there happened to be any events that 
He desired to occur at some particular time or at some particular place).  To expect God to 
intervene in the natural order of things is to expect that He take an indirect route41 in bringing 
about those particular desired events, where having taken a direct route (namely, initially 
setting it up so that the events would come to take place without His intervention) would have 
                                                          
41 While God acting would directly bring about an event, E1, in one sense, it is indirect in the sense that it is an 
external force coming in to change the natural course of events that could still have brought about E1. 
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been more efficient and required no extra effort at all.  There is simply no reason to think that 
God would take anything less than a direct route in actualizing His will and, as such, it would be 
against His nature to do so.  Following the reasoning from above, performing such a task is not 
in the nature of God and therefore it is not really a task, rather it is a pseudo-task whose 
preclusion poses no threat to the doctrine of omnipotence.  So, just as we cannot reasonably 
expect God to act in nature we also cannot deem His inability to do so as detrimental to His 
omnipotence.  Of course, the objection can be raised that the most efficient way for any 
process to be carried out is for God to simply intervene and actualize it Himself, rather than 
taking the indirect route of setting up natural laws that then govern the actualization of these 
processes.  The problem with such an objection that calls for simplicity, however, is that there is 
no debate that natural laws are in place and are functioning to facilitate natural processes in 
our universe, and by positing an active God to explain the actualization of some processes a 
second mode of operation now becomes present in our universe.  So, in calling for simplicity 
through the insertion of an active God, such an objection actually muddies the waters by 
adding a secondary mode of actualization to work alongside the evident laws of nature.  This 
additional mode of action would be required only if God’s act of creating the world had failed 
to do everything that would ever be needed.   
 
4.3 Omnibenevolence     
The sense in which I attribute omnibenevolence to God is a very simple and general one.  To say 
that God is omnibenevolent, on my account, is simply to say that He wants the best for His 
creations.  Of course, such a definition is open to wide and divergent interpretation, and this is 
intentional.  Again, one of the aims in spelling out the conception of the deistic God that I am 
working with is to provide an account of a God that is compatible with a wide variety of theistic 
views and interpretations, so it is for that reason that once I have captured the essential feature 
of omnibenevolence then any further qualifications regarding it are to be taken up in dialogue 
elsewhere, as these details are not of crucial importance to the current discussion.  My account 
makes no claims with regard to what is “best” for God’s creations, or even what ought to 
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compose the “creations” to which we ought to give consideration when considering wanting 
the best for them.  All of these matters remain open to a variety of interpretations, and each of 
these possible individual interpretations will have to be argued for on their own accord.  Here is 
not the place to carry out such a discussion as I do not see that any reasonable interpretation of 
either of these two terms will be incompatible with or yield any substantially undesirable 
conclusions for multiverse deism.  With that in mind, however, in order to clarify and paint a 
more explanatory picture of my general account of omnibenevolence I will discuss how the 
addition of several different qualifications to my account will play out within the deistic 
multiverse.  While some of these additional amendments will lead us to make, perhaps, some 
concessions that we do not really want to make, it will be important to remember that these 
additional amendments are simply for the purpose of example and contextualization, and that I 
am not making an argument for any of these additional qualifications, rather I am simply 
demonstrating how further specifications within my general account of omnibenevolence will 
play out in the deistic multiverse for those who accept those particular views.    
 In the first case we can look at various accounts of what the term “best” may entail in 
the assertion that God wants the best for His creations.  This assertion can be interpreted in a 
number of ways.  It is possible that some can see what is best for us as equating to what makes 
us the happiest, while others equate it to what is most just for us, or what provides us with the 
best overall health over our lifetimes, or with the greatest amount of freedom.  Whether “best” 
entails maximal happiness, justice, health, freedom, any other possible good, or some balanced 
combination of all of them, the same principle for omnibenevolence underlies all of them.  
Regardless of what the interpretation of “best” is, it is still the case that God wants the best for 
His creations.  What each of these different interpretations will do, however, is alter the 
makeup of the multiverse.  That is, a multiverse in which God wants the best for all of His 
creations, and “best” is to be interpreted as a maximal level of happiness may look entirely 
different from a multiverse in which God wants the best for all of His creations and “best” is to 
be interpreted as a maximal level of justice.  There is no doubt that some cases of justice will 
yield unhappiness, so universes in which such instances occur may not appear in a multiverse 
where best equates to happiness, and vice-versa. 
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 In the next case, once we have determined what “best” entails, we can look at various 
accounts of what particular creations this concept ought to apply to.42  That is to say, if we are 
to assume, for example, that best entails maximal happiness, then we need to determine to 
whom this happiness will apply.  Whether we take into account only humans when taking 
happiness into consideration, whether we include all sentient beings, plants, and so forth is the 
distinction that needs to be made.  Just as is the case for the consequences of the various 
interpretations of what entails “best”, the different interpretations of what creations this ought 
to apply to will result in a variety of different makeups of the multiverse.  A multiverse in which 
we only take humans into consideration would have a very different makeup than one in which 
we take both humans and other animals into consideration when looking at what is best for 
them.  Again, this is because what is best for humans may not necessarily be what is best for all 
animals.  This would result in varying numbers of universes being included in the multiverse, 
depending on the number of different creatures given consideration for what is best for them.  
The more creatures that we ought to give consideration to will require a higher number of 
universes within the multiverse in order to maximally satisfy them all.  Furthermore, we will 
also need to consider whether considerations of what’s best should apply to certain groups 
collectively or to each individual member of that group.  For example, there may be a 
substantial difference in what is best for the collective human population versus what is best 
for me as an individual member of the human population.  If I happen to be the carrier of some 
terribly infectious disease then it may be best for the entire human population, or at least a 
decent portion of it, that I am quarantined and left to live out the rest of my life in isolation.  Of 
course, this may not be the best thing for me, personally, since it would limit my freedom, 
happiness, and so on.  So this is another level of that debate that will also have to be addressed 
and clarified. 
 What each of these distinctions and interpretations does is, essentially, establish a 
threshold below which, theists think, no universe can be a plausible constituent of the 
multiverse.  So for the theists who believe that “best” entails a certain level of happiness within 
                                                          
42 Aristotle (1998) discusses a similar issue in Book IV of The Nicomachean Ethics when discussing prodigality and to 
whom it applies. 
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a particular universe, any universes that would not satisfy that minimal requirement would not 
be universes that can plausibly be part of the multiverse, since they fall below the threshold set 
for inclusion.  Similarly, if we are to consider only what is best for humans, all universes that do 
not do what is best for humans could not be considered to be plausible parts of the multiverse.  
For example, one could suppose that, if we are working with the interpretation of “best for all 
creations” meaning “happiness for all humans,” any universe that does not contain any humans 
would be precluded from being part of the multiverse.43  So while the overall definition of 
omnibenevolence employed in my conception of God does not entail a threshold44 for inclusion 
within the multiverse, various interpretations of this general definition will entail that a 
threshold be established.  Regardless of the specificities of the interpretation and where the 
threshold happens to appear, they will always be compatible with the overall account, and 
defending those specifications and that threshold will be a task for each theist. 
 There is a potential drawback, however, in accepting the account of omnibenevolence 
that I have given here. Accepting that omnibenevolence entails that God wants the best for all 
of His creatures will, in some cases, commit the believer to skeptical theism.  While I am not an 
opponent of skeptical theism, the fact remains that it is a controversial view within the 
philosophy of religion, and for that reason the fact that this particular definition of 
omnibenevolence entails a certain level of skeptical theism can be seen as detrimental, to 
some.  I will not engage is a discussion here about the overall plausibility of skeptical theism, 
except to say that it does play a role in this sense45.  There are many instances in the world of 
states of affairs that seem to be bad, evil, and gratuitously evil.  If we accept that God wants the 
best for all of His creations then we will also have to accept that these evils are for the greater 
good of something, or that they simply do not matter and cannot aptly be classified as either 
good, evil, or as fitting some other designation – they simply are.  Whether this overall benefit 
or greater good appears within the particular universe itself or in some other universe within 
                                                          
43 Barring some sort of view where existence is not a necessary condition of happiness. 
44 Or at least, if it does, it is extremely low. 
45 See Dougherty & McBrayer (2014), Johnson (2013), Snapper (2011) and Hasker (2010) for some recent 
discussion of skeptical theism. 
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the multiverse, the theist will be forced either to accept skeptical theism, face the problem of 
evil, or provide some further alternative to deal with the problem of evil. 
 
4.4 Other Attributes: Omniscience, Timelessness, Immutability and Necessity 
God’s omniscience is typically taken to entail that He possesses knowledge of every true 
proposition and that since there are true propositions about not only what is the case but also 
about what could be the case, God’s omniscience extends from the actual to the possible 
(Wierenga, 1989, p. 116).  That is to say, “God knows not only what could happen and what will 
happen but also knows what would have happened if things had been different in various 
respects…God knows what free creatures would have done had they been in various alterative 
circumstances” (Wierenga, 1989, p. 117).  Others have argued that this kind of propositional 
knowledge requires that “(i) [proposition] p is true; (ii) [subject] S believes p; and (iii) S has 
adequate epistemic justification for believing p” (Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, 2002, p. 111).  On 
this account, however, certain true propositions cannot be known by an omniscient being since 
they require a special kind of first-person access of the kind that an external omniscient being 
cannot have (Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, 2002, p. 112).  An example of such a proposition may 
be something like “Deandre knows exactly how it feels to be Deandre thinking the things that 
Deandre is thinking.”  Our subject, Deandre, can know what he is feeling and thinking, and an 
omniscient God can know what Deandre is feeling thinking, but the argument is that Deandre 
may have a kind of knowledge about his feeling and thinking that is fundamentally of a different 
type than an omniscient God can have, as a result of his first-person access to this information.  
While this may or may not, in fact, be the case, the definition of omniscience that I shall be 
employing moving forward is similar to the definition provided for omnipotence; namely, that 
God is omniscient in the sense that He knows all that it is possible for Him to know.  As was the 
case for omnipotence this leaves it open for a wide variety of views on omniscience to be 
inserted here.  Since the act of “knowing of,” “knowing about,” or “knowing that” does not 
seem to explicitly require any kind of direct causal relationship in the way of God acting on or in 
the natural world, it is not clear that there will be any significant compatibility issues between 
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any account of omniscience and deism.  It is for this reason that I am not wholly concerned 
about the nature of omniscience, since it does not pose any direct concern with regards to 
direct divine intervention, which is the crux of our overall discussion.  
 Moving into a discussion of God’s eternality or timelessness, Joshua Hoffman and Gary 
Rosenkrantz say that this can be understood in one of two ways; temporally or atemporally 
(2002, p. 97).  In the first case, for God’s timelessness to be understood temporally we can say 
that a being (x) has temporal eternity “if an only if (i) x exists at every time, and (ii) x has infinite 
temporal duration, and (iii) x has infinite temporal duration in both of the two temporal 
directions…” (Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, 2002, p. 97).  In the second case, of atemporal 
timelessness, we can say that being (x) “has atemporal eternity if and only if (i) x does not exist 
in time, and (ii) x is a necessary being” (Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, 2002, p. 97).  From other 
perspectives, Edward Wierenga describes an eternal being as one who has “the complete 
possession all at once of illimitable life” (1989, p. 166), whereas the more popular conception of 
timelessness seems to be Nelson Pike’s interpretation which claims that “[being] x is timeless if 
and only if x lacks temporal extension and x lacks temporal location” (1970, p. 7).  Pike’s 
definition seems to imply an atemporal conception of timelessness and I am, admittedly, 
undecided on whether the conception that I would like to adopt for my deistic God is temporal 
or atemporal.  The reason for this lack of preference is perhaps because there does not appear 
to be any substantial consequence or benefit in opting for one or the other in this case.  Just as 
was the case with the various interpretations of omniscience it is not altogether clear that the 
overall account of a deistic God that I ultimately argue for is incompatible with either of these 
two strands of thought.  With that said, I do have a tendency to prefer an account in which God 
is in time.  The reason for this is because, as discussed by Wierenga (1989, p. 168), for an object 
or being to essentially possess an attribute He must possess it at every successive segment of 
time.  An attribute X cannot be said to be essential to the object if there is a time T₁ where the 
object exists and possesses attribute X and a subsequent time T₂ where the object does not 
possess X.  Similarly, to possess an attribute at all, said attribute must be possessed by the 
object at some time T₁.  If God is not in time, and does not exist at any particular time segment, 
then He cannot possess any essential attributes, or attributes whatsoever, because He has 
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never and will never exist at time T₁.  To make such a claim regarding God is not something that 
I have much desire to do.  Making the claim that God is not within time is to add an extra set of 
considerations that ought to be dealt with, the above just being one example, and it is not 
entirely clear to me what the benefits of such a claim are.  So, while the overall position that I 
put forth may be compatible with a God who is not in time, I do not think that such a step is 
warranted.  
 The particular conception of immutability that is adopted (or not) will be largely 
dependent on the conceptions of timelessness or eternality and omniscience that have been 
adopted to this point or will be adopted in the future.  Returning to our example from above, if 
God is timeless and does not exist within time then He does not exist at or in any particular 
segment of time.  A change in an object can be characterized as the object having attribute X at 
time T₁ and then lacking attribute X at time T₂.  Similarly, a change can be said to have occurred 
in an object if said object lacked attribute X at time T₁ but possessed attribute X at time T₂.  For 
an object, God in this case, to undergo change it would have to minimally possess some 
attribute at a particular segment of time.  Since a timeless God does not exist at any particular 
time segment, He cannot be said to possess any attributes and thus cannot go through any 
changes.  This is one sense in which we can view God as immutable or unchanging.  As 
mentioned above, while the view that I have forwarded is consistent with this account, it is not 
one that I would particularly like to opt for, given the account’s complete denial of God’s 
possession of attributes.  Again, for this reason, I will refrain from positing a particular kind of 
immutability (or lack thereof) in an attempt to maintain as open a conception of a deistic God 
as possible.  With that in mind I do think that the most compatible and consistent route in this 
discussion is to argue for an immutable God, in the sense that given God’s ultimate perfection, 
there is simply no need for Him to change in any regard at any point. 
 Finally, with regard to God’s essentiality, I will not say much more than that, on the 
ontological view that I propose, He is essential.  This simply entails that in our case God 
necessarily exists and is the creator of the multiverse.46 
                                                          
46 More discussion on the necessity of God will come in Chapter 7. 
68 
 
 
4.5 The Role These Attributes Play In Deism 
It is not the easiest task to try to explain how each of these interpretations of the divine 
attributes, discussed in isolation from one another in conjunction with the adoption of a 
particular kind of multiverse theory, entail a deistic God.  It will often be the case that they will 
have to be discussed in relation to one another in order to make it clear just how deism follows 
as the most likely conclusion, and this becomes especially clear through the discussion of 
omnibenevolence, which has to be discussed only as it relates to omnipotence.  Omnipotence, 
however, can generally be discussed on its own without having to appeal to any other divine 
attributes in order to show how it entails deism, but this will serve merely as a starting point.  
Again, while I do not discount the importance of the other divine attributes my discussion here 
will focus primarily on omnipotence and omnibenevolence, as there will not be enough time or 
space to devote detailed discussion to any of the other divine attributes.  The hope is that, 
through the discussion of omnipotence and omnibenevolence, it will be rather clear how some 
of the other divine attributes can and will fit in to the account and either entail deism or, 
minimally, be compatible with and pose no harm to the overall position of deism within the 
multiverse. 
 As we have seen, I have set out the definition of divine omnipotence to entail that God 
has the ability to do any task that is logically possible or that contains no self-contradiction, 
keeping in mind that some things that may be logically possible for us may be logically 
impossible in the context of actionable tasks for God (Mavrodes, 1963).  Among these tasks, the 
most important and relevant ones for our purposes here will be the tasks of God doing 
something that is not within His nature – more specifically, acting in a less than perfectly 
efficient manner, or God acting in an arbitrary manner.  For the sake of space I will not repeat 
the details of the discussions of these two types of action that has been provided above, and I 
will simply begin the discussion on how the aforementioned discussions factor into deism and 
the multiverse. 
69 
 
 Given the structure of the multiverse and that it is comprised of any and all possible 
universes, any of God’s action or intervention within it following the initial act of creation 
signifies a less than perfectly efficient way of bringing about some particular state of events.  
Being an all-powerful being, God could have not only actualized every possible universe in the 
multiverse, but He also could have done so in the most efficient way possible – namely, in one 
single act.  To call for a God who acts in the natural world, in any of the universes within the 
multiverse, throughout time is to claim that God was inefficient in His initial creation of the 
multiverse, and thus to deny either His omniscience or omnipotence, in some sense.  To say 
that God acts throughout history is either to deny God’s creative ability at the point of creation, 
saying that He could not create things exactly as He so desired and has been reduced to making 
periodical amendments to His initial creation, thus denying, or at least unnaturally limiting, His 
omnipotence.  On the other hand, one could say that God needs to act in order to correct, 
guide, or restructure various happenings and goings-on within the multiverse, but this too 
poses problems, in that it places restrictions on God’s omniscience.47  To say that God is 
intervening in the natural order of things as a reaction to some particular event could be 
essentially to say that God is reacting to some particular event that He did not foresee and 
account for at the initial creation, which is clearly to deny God of a certain level of knowledge.  
So in both cases in which we call for a God who acts within the natural order of things we call 
for a God who has severely retarded attributes of omnipotence and omniscience.  If we are to 
maintain God’s omnipotence, as I have defined it, as well as His omniscience and the notion 
that He would always act in the most efficient manner, then deism seems to be the only logical 
possibility.  With intact omnipotence and omniscience God would have foreknown every 
possible outcome for every possible starting point of every universe, as well as had the power 
to create the initial starting points for every universe in such a way as to guarantee that they 
would realize only and all desired states of affairs across the spectrum of universes that He 
created to populate the multiverse.  Finally, being a maximally efficient being, God would have 
done all of this in one single action, requiring no further intervention on His part, in that the 
                                                          
47 This could carry on into a full-fledged discussion of free will and determinism, but it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to investigate and discuss the compatibility of omniscience and free will.  I am aware of this issue, though. 
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most efficient way to bring something about is to do so with one single perfect act.  For God to 
create everything that exists in one single act is not only the ultimate display of power but also 
the ultimate display of efficiency. 
 We have also discussed the notion of acting arbitrarily, and I have claimed that to make 
an arbitrary decision is not consistent with the nature of God since making arbitrary decisions 
are based on a lack of knowledge rather than a possession of knowledge.  To say that God acts 
or has acted in an arbitrary manner is to deny Him some piece or pieces of knowledge that 
would allow Him to make an informed and motivated decision, and this would ultimately deny 
His omniscience.  God would only act out of motivation.  Whether it is possible that God can be 
motivated by anything external to Him is not of concern here, because whether He can or not, 
there still remains the ultimate motivation that would come from within Him, namely His will.  
So let us suppose that God is only motivated by His will (which I think is quite plausible), before 
He would undertake any particular action His will would have to motivate Him to go forward 
with that action.  In the absence of any will to do anything it simply seems that God would 
refrain from acting.  There is simply no motivation presented on or within God to take any 
particular course of action, so He remains idle, rather than just aimlessly undertaking various 
tasks just for the sake of undertaking them.  To do so would be pointless, and something that 
we would expect more of a child or an imbecile than of a maximally powerful and all-knowing 
being. 
 Let us contextualize and situate this idea of motivated action within the multiverse.  
God, or anyone for that matter, acts for the sake of bringing about some possible state of 
affairs.  Recall that the multiverse is comprised of a set of universes that, collectively, exhaust 
all possible states of affairs.  For God to act within any particular universe to bring about some 
particular state of affairs would be problematic on two levels.  The first is that, given the 
number of other universes that would have enjoyed exactly the same historical past as 
whatever universe it is that God is about to act within, God would have to have made an 
arbitrary decision on which universe to act within.  All things being equal, as they appear to be 
in this case, God ought to have no preference for acting in one universe rather than another, so 
we could say that He also has no motivation for action, thus entailing that He ought not to act 
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on any universe at all.  The second problem that arises is that every possible state of affairs is 
actualized at some place within the multiverse already, so the event that He aims to bring 
about via His intervention within a particular universe is already an event that would be 
occurring at the exact same time and in the exact same context elsewhere in the multiverse.  
This entailing that in one universe it would occur via natural methods, while in the other one it 
would have come to pass via God’s intervention.  Again, it is not clear what would motivate God 
to desire to see the same set of events carried out at two different locations in the multiverse.  
In this sense, rather than remaining disconnected and allowing two distinct universes to carry 
on through the natural processes that He put in place (natural laws), His intervention would 
render two universes identical.48  The decision to act on one of the universes to bring this 
about, once again, seems simply to be an arbitrary act based on nothing more than a desire to 
act for the sake of acting, something that it is not clear that God would be motivated to do in 
any sense. 
 The case of omnibenevolence is best discussed as a particular example of some of the 
tasks that have been discussed in relation to omnipotence.  That is to say, the tasks or actions 
that have been discussed up to this point have been of a more general sense, whereas now we 
can further specify them as actions that display God’s maximal love for His creations.  So what 
can be said about actions that display God’s omnibenevolence towards His creatures are really 
of no relevant difference to the types of actions that we have been discussing thus far, they are 
simply a subgroup within the broader definition of actions.  The distinction between 
omnibenevolent actions and other God-actions, broadly construed, is of no significant 
difference here and I will continue on with an example to demonstrate this.49 
 Recall our fictional man, Griffin, from Chapter 3 who, in some universe within the 
multiverse, is trapped under a boulder that he cannot remove from himself.  In this particular 
universe, call it U¹, there is no chance that anybody will come by to help Griffin.  The boulder is 
so large that if it is not removed from Griffin within several minutes he will go on to be crushed 
                                                          
48 Identical with regard to their states of affairs, but perhaps not their causal chains that led to those states of 
affairs. 
49 More will also be said about omnibenevolent actions in the next chapter in the discussion on divine hiddenness.  
72 
 
to death.  We can also suppose that Griffin is, generally a good man.  He has not been perfect, 
but he also generally aims to help those around him and has committed no wildly terrible acts 
that resulted in a great deal of pain or suffering.  So this is the situation that we are presented 
with. 
 In such a situation, in a single-universe model, one would or at least could, possibly 
expect an omnibenevolent God to act to save Griffin from the pain and certain death that he is 
faced with.  It would be effortless for God to lift the boulder off Griffin in order to allow him to 
recover from his injuries and go on to live out the rest of his life.  In the multiverse, however, 
we must remember that there are countless universes other than U¹ in which a counterpart of 
Griffin is in the same exact situation.  Across this range of universes every possible situation 
relating to the situation of Griffin (or a Griffin counterpart) is played out through natural 
processes not requiring the intervention of God.  In some other universe, U², perhaps a 
counterpart of Griffin is aided by a passerby, whereas in some other universe, U³, yet another 
counterpart of Griffin is able fashion some sort of tool from nearby objects to help free himself, 
while in U⁴ a Griffin counterpart dies suddenly after the boulder lands on him, and in U⁵ a 
further Griffin counterpart receives no help, is unable to free himself, and dies a slow and 
painful death.  Of course these are only several examples of the possible courses of events that 
could come to play out with Griffin and his counterparts, but it goes to show that there is a 
wide range of possible outcomes that are all being actualized at some place within the 
multiverse.  While for Griffin, in U¹, his situation is the only real situation and he may feel that 
an omnibenevolent God ought to help save him, this saying something like ‘my situation is the 
only real one’ is merely indexical.  For God, all Griffins and all of his counterparts across all of 
the universes are equally real.  For God to act on Griffin would be to, as was discussed above, 
bring about a state of affairs that is already happening through natural processes elsewhere 
within the multiverse.  No matter what course of action God takes, there will still remain 
countless universes in which Griffin or his counterparts are able to go on to live, as well as 
countless universes in which Griffin or his counterparts die from injuries related to being 
crushed by the boulder.   
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One potential way of getting around this problem of arbitrariness is to suggest that 
God’s love for Griffin would act as a motivating factor, allowing God to act to save Griffin.  But 
this response does not quite do the trick since God’s love for Griffin is both maximal and equal 
to the love that He has for all of Griffin’s counterparts across the multiverse.  So if He were to 
save Griffin in this one particular universe then it would still be an arbitrary decision, because of 
the equality of His love for all Griffins. Given that this is the case, it seems that God would have 
to make an arbitrary decision as to which would be the universe in which He would save Griffin 
or his counterparts if that is something that is going to happen and, as we have already seen, 
the idea of arbitrariness is not compatible with God.  The best solution, in this case, would be to 
let the universes carry on as they would without any divine intervention and allow all possible 
realities to be realized across the multiverse. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to lay out some specifics of the nature of the deistic God that I 
argue for.  In Section 4.1 I discussed some of the different conceptions of deism that have been 
current at various times.  I concluded that, given the overall lack of literature and lack of clarity 
as to the nature of God in that literature, the nature of the deistic God is one that is extremely 
vague and open to interpretation.  Because of that, and for reasons of simplicity, I have opted 
to argue for a deistic God whose attributes do not differ drastically from those of the God of 
classical theism.  Section 4.2 contained a discussion of omnipotence as it relates to a deistic 
God, beginning my discussion on the overall nature of the deistic God.  I opted for a kind of 
omnipotence similar to the kind that Mavrodes (1963) argues for in which His actions are 
limited to those permissible by logic and there are some tasks that, while they contain no 
inherent contradiction within them, are not logically possible for God to perform.  The inability 
to perform such tasks, however, is of no detriment to the doctrine of omnipotence.  I went on 
to argue that, included among these tasks that are not logically possible for God to perform, are 
any tasks which are contrary to His nature and any tasks that require Him to perform with 
anything less than perfect efficiency.   Section 4.3 discussed some of the results that could 
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follow from adopting various interpretations of what it means for God to want the best for His 
creations in the multiverse.  In Section 4.4 I discussed some considerations relating to God’s 
omniscience, timelessness, immutability and necessity.  Again, I intentionally left the general 
interpretation of these attributes open so as to allow for an inclusive account, because it is not 
clear that any particular reasonable interpretation of any of these attributes is wholly 
incompatible with multiverse deism.  And finally, in Section 4.5, I discussed how all of these 
attributes come together in the case of a deistic God.  This section allowed us to see a more 
full-fledged idea of the kind of God that I propose, rather than a segmented view as was 
presented in the previous sections.   
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Chapter 5 
Why Being a Deist May Not Be So Bad 
 
Up to this point I have tried to show how the acceptance of a certain kind of multiverse theory, 
along with the desire to maintain the existence of God, entails the existence of a deistic God 
rather than the God of classical theism.  While I have made the case for an entailment that is 
logically consistent, I have done little to show why such an alternative to classical theism might 
be beneficial or preferred over the God of classical theism.  The deistic conception of God is one 
that has been largely dismissed for the past several centuries and has not been given much 
recent consideration as a plausible alternative to classical theism.  The current attitude and 
outlook on deism, however, I believe is due to its dismissal by many thinkers several hundred 
years ago.  I also think that a new look at the overall conception with fresh eyes and mind is 
needed in order to legitimately evaluate not only the plausibility of such an account but also to 
evaluate the potential benefits or deficiencies of it given the current state of philosophical and 
theological discourse.  Given the virtual non-existence of deism within academic philosophical 
and theological discussion, it seems that deism may carry with it some sort of negative 
connotation or idea of implausibility.  I believe that, if this is the case, it is unfairly so.  With the 
recent influx of new arguments both for and against atheism there is now a chance to take a 
more in-depth look at the viability of deistic thought within the overall context of the 
philosophy of religion.  As we have already seen that deism seems to be a better fit with certain 
multiverse theories than classical theism is we can now move on to explore how deism holds up 
against some of these contemporary arguments for atheism.  We can also look at whether or 
not deism fares better against these arguments for atheism than classical theism does, and 
whether deism is compatible with some of the common arguments for theism. 
 In Part I, sections 5.1 through 5.3, several arguments for the existence of God will be 
discussed in order to show that a deistic conception of God is compatible with teleological 
arguments, ontological arguments, and cosmological arguments.  In Part II, sections 5.4 through 
5.6, there will be a look at several of the stronger and more well-known contemporary 
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arguments against God’s existence that may pose problems for the classical theistic conception 
of God; the argument from divine hiddenness, the problem of evil, and some problems 
surrounding the issue of miracles.  Finally, section 5.7 discusses how a generic deistic 
conception of God may be able to get around some of the difficulties that classical theism faces 
in dealing with these atheistic arguments and shows that deism may be able to adequately 
respond to some of these atheistic arguments.  Before moving forward I will note that the 
brand of deism that I will be referring to in this chapter is a generic one,50 which simply entails 
that God is not active in the natural world.  This generic conception contains no explanation or 
specifications as to how or why God is not active, it simply puts forth that He is not.  The reason 
for this is to show that, while a simple deistic account is not only compatible with arguments for 
God’s existence but may also be able to provide a better response to some atheistic arguments 
than classical theism can, it is simply a move in the right direction and it cannot go all the way in 
addressing some of the issues that are raised by each specific argument.  So, this generic deism 
will serve as a starting or reference point for varying deistic accounts that will all, in principle, 
be able to stand up to various atheistic arguments yet still be compatible with common theistic 
arguments in their own specialized ways.  Specific versions of each argument for or against 
atheism will, for the most part, not be discussed here, rather general families of kinds of 
arguments will be discussed.  That is to say, arguments from divine hiddenness will be discussed 
as a whole without narrowing the focus on one particular version of the argument from divine 
hiddenness.  Likewise, the group of arguments for atheism that deal with miracles and divine 
intervention will be discussed, and so too will arguments that deal with the problem of evil.  In 
some cases, a specific argument will be mentioned but this is only done in the event that that 
particular argument can generally be taken to be a paradigm case of what the remainder of the 
arguments in that family aim to show, and it will save both time and space simply to discuss 
that particular argument in a general sense. 
Part I: Arguments for God’s Existence 
                                                          
50 Save for the few specific interpretations of some of the divine attributes that were discussed in Chapter 4. 
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It is important to note that my aim here is not to conduct an investigation into or evaluation of 
whether or not these theistic arguments are ultimately successful in arguing for God’s 
existence.  It is quite possible that some or all of these arguments are ultimately unsuccessful, 
or at least unconvincing, and that is fine, for my purposes here.  My aim here is simply to show 
that if these arguments are successful then they give at least as much support to deism as to 
theism.  
5.1 Teleological Arguments 
Teleological arguments are empirical, bottom-up arguments that can vary in form but which 
generally aim to show that some or all objects in nature appear to be objects of intelligent 
design, then inferring that this intelligent designer is God.  Typically, teleological arguments 
utilize reasoning from seemingly intentionally-structured features of the observable world to 
the existence of one or more supernatural designers (Manson, 2003, p. 1). Similarly, a 
proponent of the teleological argument will often argue that multiple phenomena in nature 
display such intricacy in terms of overall structure, function and/or interconnectedness with 
other phenomena that to view these processes as a result of deliberate design is simply natural, 
if not altogether inescapable…and this deliberate design is typically taken to be supernatural, 
and prior to nature (Ratzsch, 2010), essentially making the claim that, rather than individual 
aspects of nature, nature in its entirety appears to be an object of intelligent design.  Since the 
designer of an object must be an entity external and prior to it, the designer must be a God-like 
entity.  Arguments of this family  
...begin with a...specialized catalogue of properties and end with a conclusion 
concerning the existence of a designer with the intellectual properties 
(knowledge, purpose, understanding, foresight, wisdom, intention) necessary 
to design the things exhibiting the special properties in question.  With that in 
mind, however, these kinds of arguments do not typically reason directly to God 
as the creator so other, additional, arguments are needed in order to make that 
step (Manson, 2003, p. 1).   
In broad outline, then, teleological arguments “focus upon finding and identifying various traces 
of the operation of a mind in nature's temporal and physical structures, behaviors and paths” 
(Ratzsch, 2010). 
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 There are several ways by which the theist is able to go about making his teleological 
argument.  Del Ratzsch subdivides the teleological family of arguments into three different 
Schemas into which particular arguments within the family will fall (Ratzsch, 2010).  In the first 
case, which we can call, Schema 1, it is a simple analogical argument in which one object in 
nature appears to be similar in some relevant way to another object that we know is the 
product of intelligent design and therefore it is reasonable to infer that both objects are 
products of intelligent design.  In the second case, Schema 2, the teleologian makes a similar, 
yet different, claim regarding the origin of design-like objects found in nature.  He argues that 
the occurrence of design-like or higher-order properties cannot come about from non-
intentional, natural processes.  This version of the argument does not say that higher-order 
cognition and design-like properties found within nature cannot be seen as products of natural 
processes, but that even if this is not the case then it is the natural processes themselves which 
are products of intentional design. And finally, in Schema 3, an inference to best explanation is 
employed to explain the appearance of intelligent design in nature.  In this final case the 
teleologian draws a connection between the apparent design-like features of various aspects of 
nature and the assumption that the best explanation for these design-like features is 
intentional design.  Because the best explanation for the design-like features of nature is the 
act of intentional design, we are justified in believing that there exists a designer. 
 Similarly, Neil Manson differentiates between design51 and cosmological arguments52 
within the family of teleological arguments.  He argues that, while both types rely on a 
posteriori premises to forward their claims, cosmological arguments rely on premises that are 
“highly general and apparently incorrigible” (Manson, 2003, p. 2), which is not the case with 
those premises utilized by design arguments.  Premises in design arguments tend to pluck out 
much more specific aspects of the observable world and use them to make the case for an 
intelligent designer.  Elliot Sober goes on to further differentiate between different types of 
design arguments, classifying them as either organismic design arguments or as cosmic design 
                                                          
51 Of course, the most well-known version of the design argument is Paley’s, which appears in Paley (1848). 
52 The most well-known version of the cosmological argument is William Lane Craig’s Kalam Cosmological 
Argument that appears in Craig (1979).  More discussion on the cosmological argument can also be found in Rowe 
(1975). 
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arguments (Sober, 2003, p. 27).  With that classification in place, however, he still goes on to 
note that the thread common to all design arguments “…is that design theorists describe some 
empirical feature of the world and argue that this feature points towards an explanation in 
terms of God’s intentional planning and away from an explanation in terms of mindless natural 
processes” (Sober, 2003, p. 27). 
 In all of the various cases of teleological arguments discussed above it does not seem 
evident that there are any contradictions or inconsistencies if we are to look at them from a 
deistic viewpoint.  Ratzsch, Manson, and Sober, all seem to be classifying arguments in ways 
compatible for deism, for the arguments make claims regarding only the origin of objects in 
nature or, more importantly, regarding the origin of nature itself rather than about any present 
or future divine interactions within nature they all seem perfectly in-tune with deism.  None of 
the versions of teleological arguments presented above is concerned explicitly with any 
continued supernatural presence or activity within nature, rather each is essentially concerned 
with the primary cause or creation of various objects within nature or of nature itself.  So too is 
deism.  This means that any teleological argument either already is, or can be reduced to, a 
version that is compatible with a deistic conception of God.   
 In addition to teleological arguments being compatible with multiverse deism, it is also 
possible that they work better with multiverse theories than they do with single-universe 
theories when it comes to making the case for the existence of God.  Given that the proponent 
of teleological arguments will typically argue that the complexity of our universe implies a 
designer, it could be argued that the multiverse (since it, necessarily, contains more than one 
universe) is exponentially more complex than any single universe.  Because of this potentially 
higher level of complexity might perhaps point towards the existence of a designer just as 
much, if not more, than any single-universe model.  And then, of course, the argument that this 
designer is God will have to be made in addition.  So while some may see the multiverse as 
undercutting some of the strength of teleological arguments, it is also a viable option to see the 
multiverse as the perfect fit for teleological arguments.    
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5.2 Ontological Arguments 
Ontological arguments argue for the conclusion that God exists through the use of premises 
that are derived from sources other than external observation.  That is to say, ontological 
arguments are composed of analytic, a priori, necessary premises that all lead to the conclusion 
that God exists.  Dating back to the 11th century when an argument of this type first appeared 
in Anselm’s Proslogion, other philosophers such as Descartes, Aquinas, Hume, Kant, Hegel and 
Plantinga have followed suit and gone on to advance their own unique ontological arguments.53  
To show the myriad of different kinds of arguments that fall under the umbrella of the 
ontological argument family, Graham Oppy (1995) differentiates between 8 different types of 
ontological arguments.  While I will not go into detail describing what each of these 
differentiations specifically entails, the list itself illustrates that the family of ontological 
arguments is broad enough to include: definitional ontological arguments; conceptual (or 
hyperintensional) ontological arguments; modal ontological arguments; Meinongian ontological 
arguments; experiential ontological arguments; mereological ontological arguments; higher-
order ontological arguments; and ‘Hegelian’ ontological arguments. 
 
While not quite easily defined, ontological arguments generally rely on a priori knowledge 
or claims that are used to argue for God’s existence.  Because of the a priori nature of the wide 
variety of ontological arguments, that do not rely on any “real world” evidence, it is not evident 
that there is any tension between arguments of this sort (generally) and deism.  The more 
common ontological arguments tend to be definitional or conceptual, so while there may be a 
few instances where a particular ontological argument may seem to be incompatible with 
deism, these incompatibilities will not be clear-cut and one can often argue that they are in fact 
mere consequences of adopting different definitions.  While there is the possibility of particular 
ontological arguments being formulated that are not compatible with deism (e.g. One that 
argues that God is a supremely perfect being, that being causally connected to and active 
                                                          
53 Harrelson (2009) provides a historical account of various versions of the Ontological Argument.  While it focuses 
primarily on arguments from the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, it highlights the subtle differences present between 
arguments in the same family.  A similar type of historical discussion can also be found in Barnes (1972). 
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within the natural world is a perfection, therefore God ought to be causally connected to and 
active within the natural world), these are merely specific cases of an ontological argument.  In 
a case such as this, the incompatibility only arises due to a certain interpretation of what 
exactly it is that perfection entails.  It will only be on certain interpretations of this term that an 
inconsistency will arise, meaning that it is not the structure or type of the argument as a whole 
that is not compatible with deism, rather it is in a definitional interpretation of that argument 
that leads to the apparent incompatibility.  It is possible for deism to be incompatible with 
particular instances of the ontological argument but that does not entail incompatibility with 
the family of arguments as a whole.  And in cases where there is an incompatibility between 
deism and a particular version of an ontological argument then this simply, at worst, renders 
deism on a par with classical theism, since they both will require further explanation and 
justification in terms of defining and conceiving of the divine attributes. 
 
5.3 Cosmological Arguments 
As is the case for ontological arguments, cosmological arguments are less a particular argument 
than they are a type of argument, and they have recently shown a tremendous resurgence 
within the philosophy of religion (Nowacki, 2007, p. 14).  Cosmological arguments, as briefly 
mentioned in the discussion of teleological arguments, use a general pattern of argumentation 
that infers the existence of God from certain alleged facts about the natural world 
(Reichenbach, 2012).  Some of these initial alleged facts are that (1) the universe, at least in 
various of its aspects, is contingent and/or causally dependent, (2) that certain events and 
beings in the universe are contingent, and (3) that the universe came into being at some point.  
From these facts, the proponent of the cosmological argument will infer, either deductively, 
inductively, abductively or by inference to the best explanation that God exists (Reichenbach, 
2012).   
 As we saw with ontological arguments and teleological arguments, cosmological 
arguments can be further divided up into subgroups; a task that was undertaken by William 
Lane Craig in 1980.  Craig argues that cosmological arguments fall into one of three categories, 
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(1) those based on the impossibility of an essentially ordered infinite regress, (2) those that 
argue that an infinite temporal regress is impossible because an actual infinite is impossible 
(which he calls the kalam argument), and (3) any cosmological argument that is based on the 
Principal of Sufficient Reason (Craig, 1980, p. 282).  In the first case, an argument based on the 
argument for the impossibility of an essentially ordered infinite regress would look something 
like this: 
1. A contingent being (a being such that if it exists it could have not-existed or could cease 
to) exists. 
2. This contingent being has a cause of or explanation for its existence. 
3. The cause of or explanation for its existence is something other than the contingent 
being itself. 
4. What causes or explains the existence of this contingent being must either be solely 
other contingent beings or include a non-contingent (necessary) being. 
5. Contingent beings alone cannot provide an adequate causal account or explanation for 
the existence of a contingent being. 
6. Therefore, what causes or explains the existence of this contingent being must include a 
non-contingent (necessary) being. 
7. Therefore, a necessary being (a being such that if it exists cannot not-exist) exists 
(Reichenbach, 2012). 
An example of the second case, the kalam argument,54 would be something along the lines of: 
1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence. 
2. The universe began to exist. 
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence. 
                                                          
54 Nowacki (2007) provides substantial discussion on Craig’s Kalam Cosmological Argument. 
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4. Since no scientific explanation (in terms of physical laws) can provide a causal account of 
the origin of the universe, the cause must be personal (explanation is given in terms of a 
personal agent) (Reichenbach, 2012). 
It is easy to note that in the first case there is a denial of the possibility of an actual infinite, 
whereas in the second case the primary concern is with the temporal nature of the explanation 
of the universe.  Finally, in the third case, an argument based on the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason can be seen, arguing that there is generally a simple explanation behind everything.  
That is to say that if something unexplained is to occur, then the explanation for that 
occurrence is likely to be the simplest plausible explanation rather than some other complex 
option.  Since the complexity of the universe is unimaginably high, and so too would be the 
scientific explanation of the origin and creation of that universe, we ought to look at the far 
more simple, theistic account of the origin of the universe as our explanation. 
 Most cosmological arguments argue for an initial cause or explanation for the existence 
of the universe or some phenomena within the universe.  That is to say, cosmological 
arguments generally do not tend to make claims regarding the ongoing nature of the universe, 
apart from the claim that the universe functions in a particular way because of the will of some 
willful designer.  Very few, if any, cosmological arguments make claims regarding the ongoing 
causal connection and activity of a creating being within the universe, leaving the main concern 
of the argument to be the origin or explanation of the universe.  In this, cosmological 
arguments are largely compatible with deism, and are perhaps the most compatible with deism 
out of the three kinds of arguments for theism that have been discussed thus far.  The reason 
for this is that both deism and cosmological arguments are concerned primarily with the initial 
cause of the universe, with both tending not to make any further substantial claims regarding 
the operation of that universe.    
 
Part II: Arguments Against God’s Existence 
5.4 Divine Hiddenness 
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There are a range of different versions of arguments for atheism from divine hiddenness, each 
with their own unique details and subtleties.  The common thread that runs through all of them 
however, is that God is absent from our lives and the world in ways that we should not expect 
Him to be, and because of that absence, or hiddenness, we can infer God’s nonexistence.   
 One particular version of the argument for atheism from divine hiddenness argues that 
holding a personal relationship with God is the greatest possible good and that since God is 
omnibenevolent He should always want the best for all of His creatures, but that many of us 
who desire a personal relationship with God do not have one.  Therefore, since God is not 
present to actualize this greatest of all goods then He surely is not all-loving, and in fact does 
not exist.  That is to say, in being absent from people’s lives in this respect, God is not 
exemplifying His omnibenevolence, which means that He, as classical theism describes Him, 
does not exist.  
 One of the most well-known arguments for atheism from divine hiddenness comes from 
J.L . Schellenberg’s 2004 essay “Divine Hiddenness Justifies Atheism.”  The argument put forth 
by Schellenberg in this essay is that God is hidden from us in that we are witness to “the 
absence of convincing evidence for the existence of God, or, more specifically, to the absence 
of some kind of positive experiential result in the search for God” (Schellenberg, 2004, p. 31), 
which leads us to the conclusion that we are justified in holding reasonable non-belief in the 
existence of God.  That is to say, there are numerous people who seek out some sort of 
interactive experience with God, be it simply some sort of communication or validation, a 
healing or helping hand, or some other sort of revelation, but these kinds of interactions 
between God and those who desire them are all too often non-existent.  If it is the case that 
there exists a God who has the power and desire to maximize happiness for all of His creatures, 
God as described by classical theism, then we would not be able to reasonably expect the kind 
of absence of God that we do see given certain situations.  Because we do see such an absence 
in areas where we would reasonably expect an omnibenevolent and omnipotent God to act 
Schellenberg argues that we are justified in believing in the non-existence of the classical 
theistic God.  Furthermore, this is exactly the kind of justified non-belief that God would not 
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allow, and definitely not allow in such prevalence, so this provides us with one more reason for 
suspecting that He does not exist. 
While this kind of argument may pose problems for the classical theistic conception of 
God, a deistic conception of God will not face those same issues.  Since a deistic God plays no 
ongoing causal role within the world it cannot be expected of Him to continuously create or 
maintain personal relationships with His creatures.  Classical theism argues for a personal God 
who interacts not only with the natural world, but with us as well, yet deism explicitly denies 
this.  For this reason, an absence of God’s knowable activity may pose some problems and raise 
questions for a classical theistic conception, whereas the same cannot be said for a deistic 
conception.  Arguments such as Schellenberg’s are structured in such a way as to derive 
reasonable non-belief from a lack of displayed divine characteristics that ought to be readily 
observable to us.  More specifically, divine intervention by way of fostering loving and personal 
relationships with those who desire them.   In a deistic conception of God, the possibility of 
causal interaction from God is not expected and is, in fact, precluded, so to mount an argument 
for atheism based on a lack of such an interaction does nothing to harm deism.  In a case such 
as this, when applying a Schellenberg-type argument to any deistic account of God, the 
argument does no damage in that it is trying to justify reasonable non-belief based on the 
absence of an expected behaviour which is explicitly denied by that particular conception of 
God.  It is almost akin to criticizing a human for not being able to breathe underwater.  It is not 
something that we would expect of him in any circumstance, so to criticize him because he 
cannot breathe underwater simply does not harm to him, just as the argument from divine 
hiddenness does no direct harm to a deistic conception of God.  Even on weaker versions of 
deism, such as epistemic deism,55 God would still be “hidden” from us in that His work would 
not be epistemically accessible to us, so an argument from divine hiddenness of this sort would 
not harm this version of deism, nor would it harm a stronger version of deism where God’s 
causal interaction within the natural world is not a metaphysical possibility. 
                                                          
55 Epistemic deism is an alternative kind of deism that is discussed in Chapter 6.  It argues that God is able to act in 
the natural world but only at the subatomic level, in areas that are fundamentally beyond our epistemic limits. 
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Although Schellenberg’s argument is often taken to exemplify the argument from divine 
hiddenness, other types that do not explicitly call for the kind of divine intervention seemingly 
required by Schellenberg’s argument may pose more of a problem for multiverse deism.  In 
another type of argument from divine hiddenness, one might argue that while direct divine 
intervention should not be expected, we should expect that if God exists we should all have a 
clearer picture in our minds of His nature and the overall type of being that He is.  Since we do 
not have consensus at all on what God’s nature is or what type of being He is, He does not exist 
because such a powerful and loving being would not allow us to be in such darkness regarding 
His nature, and He surely would not allow people to hold belief that He does not exist.  
Similarly, the argument could be based on morality, its reasoning being that the key to living a 
good and meaningful life comes from living a morally good life, and that moral prescriptions 
come from God.  But there is tremendous debate about the nature of morality, and if God 
existed He surely would not allow for such murkiness in understanding such a crucial issue.  In 
response to these types of arguments from divine hiddenness the multiverse deist could 
respond by claiming that we simply happen to be in a universe in which we do not have a clear 
picture of God’s nature, or morality, but that there are other universes in the multiverse in 
which their inhabitants do have clarity on such issues.  It could very well be the case that 
inhabitants of other universes have their minds composed in such a way as to be born with, or 
come to develop clear, concise and unified views about the true nature of God or morality.  We 
just happen to be in a universe in which we do not have the capacities to have true clarity on 
God’s nature or certain moral issues.  Of course, whether such alternatives are possible or 
plausible will vary depending on different conceptions of multiverse construction, but this is 
simply one possible response that the multiverse deist can give.  In cases such as this, the 
multiverse deist will often be able to appeal to responses that appeal to the indexical nature of 
the words ‘our universe’ and to the logical possibility, or necessity, of the existence of other 
universes where things are other than they are in ours. 
While the kinds of weaknesses that arguments from divine hiddenness point out in 
classical theism do not apply directly to deism, some other difficulties with deistic theories 
come to light.  Even if a deistic God does not reveal Himself to us occasionally, then perhaps the 
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advocate of the argument from hiddenness is justified in asking how come God did not create a 
universe in which His existence is manifest to us, or at least more obvious to us, in some way 
other than through direct divine interventions, but we have seen how the multiverse deist may 
go about responding to such an argument.56  Arguments from hiddenness could also cast a 
shadow of doubt on the omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient nature of God, and so 
the deist would have to do some work in explaining whether these divine attributes are to be 
maintained in a world in which God does not have any occasion to demonstrate these qualities 
and, if so, how it is possible to maintain these divine attributes.  Furthermore, if it is not the 
case that God exemplifies these omni-qualities, then the deist must also show how it is the case 
that He is in fact a God rather than, at best, a natural process or cause of the universe.  So it 
does not seem that Schellenberg-type arguments from divine hiddenness pose any substantial 
threat to the multiverse deist, but other types of arguments from divine hiddenness may, 
minimally, cause the multiverse deist to provide an added level of explanation as to why the 
existence of God, or some aspect of Him, is not clearly available to us.  On this, the multiverse 
deist at least calls for the proponent of arguments from divine hiddenness to reframe his 
argument to attack the specific account of the multiverse that he is working with.  The 
requirement to reframe the argument is already more than classical theism requires of 
arguments from divine hiddenness, so it seems that multiverse deism is preferential to classical 
theism in such cases. 
 
5.5 The Problem of Evil 
Often similar to arguments from divine hiddenness (Schellenberg, 2006), both in the argument 
itself and in the nature of response that can be given by the deist, are arguments from evil.  
Arguments of this kind try to point out that there seems to be a great deal of gratuitous evil, 
harm and pain in the world that is caused to creatures both through the actions of other 
                                                          
56 For example, perhaps God imparted self-sustenance qualities in all entities of the universe, thus requiring no 
need for His existence to be manifest to us in any way.  Or, perhaps, that such a manifestation of His existence is 
simply superfluous and unnecessary for the overall operation of the world.  
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creatures and through natural processes of the world.57  The argument sets out to make the 
point that if a God existed who was truly omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent then 
these evils would not exist, for a God who exemplified all of these attributes would surely 
either prevent all of these gratuitous evils from occurring or not allow all of these continually 
happen (Dougherty, 2011, p. 563).  Essentially, arguments from the problem of evil tend to cast 
doubt on one or more of the divine attributes, arguing that God must be either ignorant of the 
evils that we endure (aimed at omniscience), that He does not have adequate power to stop 
these evils (aimed at omnipotence), or that He simply is disinterested in stopping them (aimed 
at omnibenevolence).  J.L. Mackie summarizes the problem in saying that “In its simplest form 
the problem of evil is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists.  There 
seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them 
were true the third would be false” (Mackie, 1978, p. 18).58  In response to arguments of this 
type the classical theist must somehow convince us that all of the aforementioned divine 
attributes can be maintained while at the same time allowing for the apparent abundance of 
gratuitous evils that we see in the world, or else deny that there are gratuitous evils in the 
world, arguing that there is some greater good that must come from all of the suffering that we 
see and experience.  M.B. Ahern speaks of the theistic solution to the problem of evil in saying 
that “[t]here are certain ways in which theists can avoid the problems of evil.  They can be 
avoided by giving certain accounts of God’s power or goodness…In each case, however, there is 
a price for theists to pay” (1971, p. X).  He goes on to say that almost every theistic response 
carried with it the “cost of rejecting the usual Christian and Judaistic concept of God” (Ahern, 
1971, p. XI).  The adoption of multiverse deism is a perfect example of the rejection of the 
traditional God that Ahern speaks of.   
Arguments from the problem of evil can be further differentiated into either evidential 
arguments from evil or logical arguments from evil, with the aforementioned Mackie and Ahern 
                                                          
57 The differentiation here is between moral and natural evil, where moral evil comes as a result of exercising free 
will, whereas natural evil does not. 
58 Arguments from evil need not necessarily argue for the non-existence of God, rather they can also take the more 
modest version and argue that the existence of evil renders the existence of God probably untrue, as seen in Rowe 
(2006, p. 80). 
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exemplifying the logical arguments from evil.59  In either case the classical theistic conception of 
God is attacked on the grounds that there are gratuitous evils that occur and that the existence 
of such gratuitous evils is incompatible with the existence of God, as He is traditionally 
conceived.  Where logical arguments will refer to evil in a broad sense,60 not picking out any 
specific evil in particular, like the needlessly suffering fawn described by Rowe (1979),61 to 
demonstrate how its existence is incompatible with the existence of God, the evidential 
arguments62 will pick out specific instances of evil and try to demonstrate how the existence of 
that particular instance is not compatible with the existence of God.   
 For the multiverse deist, the evidential problem of evil does not directly pose much of a 
problem since it largely attacks God because of His either allowing or failing to prevent a great 
number of the gratuitous evils that we see or experience.  These two points of attack that could 
be areas of difficulty for the classical theist are not ones for the deist, since the two aspects 
referred to by the proponent of the argument from evil, allowing and/or failing to prevent evil 
acts, are both actions (or, at least, behaviors) required of God in the natural world, which are 
precluded by deism.  Even in the sense in which the action terms are used here would require a 
passive behavior by God, which is could potentially be construed as activity, nonetheless.  Evils 
in the world are either caused by God, or else they are allowed by God through His permitting 
processes that lead to moral and natural evils (allowing free will, allowing natural laws to 
operate in certain ways, etc.).  Many theists would deny the possibility that God could explicitly 
cause the evils that we see in the world, but that still leaves them vulnerable to the arguments 
that stem from God permitting (rather than actualizing) evil in the world.  The deistic account, 
however, does a better job in dealing with the argument from the permission of evil than the 
                                                          
59 Ahern (1971, p. 2) further differentiates between, what he calls, the general problem of evil, the specific abstract 
problem of evil, and the specific concrete problem of evil.  The former two seem loosely to relate to logical 
arguments for the problem of evil, while the latter is more in line with the evidential argument for the problem of 
evil. 
60 Some key readings on the logical problem of evil include Almeida (2012) and Mackie (1978). 
61 Rowe (1979, p. 337) imagines a fawn being trapped and horribly burned in a lightning-caused forest fire.  After 
days of laying in agony, burned and trapped in this forest fire, the only thing that finally relieves the fawn of its 
pain and fear is death.  Rowe takes this situation to exemplify a case of gratuitous evil from which no greater good 
could possibly come. 
62 Some key readings on the evidential problem of evil include Rowe (2006), Rowe (1996), Howard-Snyder (1996), 
and Rowe (1979).   
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classical theist does because, again, permitting something seems to entail that God is taking an 
active role in the world and that is explicitly precluded.  Because of this, from the deistic 
perspective, we simply cannot expect that God would either allow or fail to prevent any kinds 
of evil that we may experience in our world because either one of those two options would 
entail God’s activity.  In the case of the logical problem of evil, however, the multiverse deist 
may face more difficult circumstances due to the more broad nature of the particular 
arguments that fall under it.  That is, when employing a logical argument from evil, there need 
not be reference to a particular actual or potential example of gratuitous evil in order for the 
argument to work, so the multiverse deist will not be able to simply respond to that one 
particular example, rather he will have to respond to a more general and abstract argument 
about the compatibility of God’s nature with certain states of affairs.  With that said, however, 
multiverse deism is still able to avail itself of more potential responses to logical arguments 
from evil than can the classical conception of God in a single-universe model.  In either case, 
the multiverse deist will, at the very least, fare no worse than the classical theist when 
confronted by logical arguments from the problem of evil, and he still holds the opportunity to 
offer superior and more varied responses than classical theism can. 
 While God’s failure to prevent evils does not provide the opponent of deism with any 
very damaging argument against the deist, there are still aspects of the argument that will need 
to be addressed.  As is a problem that the classical theist has to face, the presence of gratuitous 
evils in the world seems to be inconsistent with one or more of God’s omnipotence, 
omniscience and omnibenevolence, from the deistic perspective.  Despite the fact that the 
deist argues that we cannot expect God to act to stop the occurrences of these evils, the above 
divine attributes can still be questioned by arguing that if God is the creator of the universe or 
multiverse, whether He is active in it today or not, if these divine attributes are to be 
exemplified then God would have known how to create, have been able to create, would have 
desired to create, and would indeed have created a world in which none of these gratuitous 
evils exist.  The multiverse deist, however, is not limited to providing responses from the deistic 
perspective but he can also avail himself of a number of responses that stem from the 
multiverse aspect of his ontological view, by arguing that evil events are metaphysically 
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possible and thus are necessarily instantiated within the multiverse, for example, which is 
something that the proponent of a single-universe model cannot appeal to.  So in addition to 
any deistic responses to the problem of evil, other responses appealing to a greatness in variety 
of kinds of universes, certain arguments against treating our universe as particularly important 
just because it is ours, and the like can be provided instead of or in conjunction with any of the 
deistic responses provided.  This deistic amendment to the problem of evil still, however, leaves 
the deist with some questions to answer regarding the existence of evil and its apparent 
incompatibility with three of the divine attributes, or whether or not these three divine 
attributes are even exemplified by God, and if so, to what extent. 
 
5.6 Issues with Miracles 
Miracles and divine intervention are often appealed to by classical theists as evidence for the 
existence of their God, however various aspects of reports of miracles, religious experiences 
and divine intervention have been scrutinized and employed as different arguments against the 
existence of God.  Various aspects of divine intervention are used to highlight supposed 
inconsistencies or weaknesses within the classical theist’s account of either particular religious 
experiences or of religious experiences as a whole.  One hurdle that theists must overcome is 
that, when arguing for the validity of a miracle,63 the theist must prove not only that the 
particular laws of nature were, in fact, operational laws of nature, but also that these laws were 
actually been broken by this miraculous act which took place.  These seem to be two 
contradictory tasks that must co-exist with each other, posing a problem for proponents of 
miracles.  If an event such as a miracle occurs then either the supposed natural laws were not 
the real laws working, the earlier state was not as it was supposed to be, or the system was not 
closed, meaning that the supposed miraculous event did not actually break the supposed or 
purportedly relevant law of nature.  The stronger the law of nature is, the more improbable an 
event contrary to it would be, thus giving it maximal improbability.  It is this maximal 
improbability that make the event miraculous, but it is also this maximal improbability that the 
                                                          
63 The sense in which “miracle” is being used here is to be defined as a non-repeatable violation of a law of nature.   
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testimony or perception of the event in question must overcome (Mackie, 1982, p. 21-25).  That 
is to say, the presence of the laws of nature discount any reports or even experiences of a 
miracle, while the presence of a miracle discounts the strength of the relevant laws of nature, 
and for any event to be deemed a true miracle it requires that neither of these two things be 
discounted in any way, posing problems for the proponent of miracles.  That is to say, for an 
event to be a miracle not only must the law of nature be guaranteed wholly, but so too must 
the event that violated that law of nature. 
 One of the more well-known arguments regarding miracles is that of David Hume 
(1985), which argues that we ought to proportion our belief to the amount and quality of the 
evidence, and that since our evidence that suggests that miracles do not occur is far stronger, in 
both respects, than our evidence that suggests that miracles do occur, we are not justified in 
believing that miracles occur.64  That is to say, throughout our lives we constantly experience 
things that reinforce our understanding of natural laws, and we have an enormously large 
number of instances and experiences that we have already experienced that are in accordance 
with, and reaffirm, those beliefs.  A miracle, or event which seems to break a natural law, would 
be only a one-time counterexample of these natural laws.  Because of the sheer volume of 
instances that confirm that natural laws are in operation and cannot be broken, we ought to 
believe that these natural laws cannot be broken.  We cannot change our beliefs about the way 
the natural world operates simply because of one potential counterexample, and we must hold 
onto our beliefs that carry a large amount of justification with them.  While Hume’s argument 
does not specifically argue against the occurrence of miracles, it argues against our ability to 
hold reasonable justification that miracles occur.  An argument such as this poses problems for 
classical theism because much of classical theism is based on the occurrence of miracles.  
Miraculous events play a large role in the historical aspects of classical theism, in that many 
religions come to be based on some sort of revelation at the beginning, while the subsequent 
scripture is often based on or includes a variety of different revelations and miraculous events.   
                                                          
64 Hume’s argument concerns itself primarily only with the testimony regarding the occurrence of miracles, but it 
can easily be expanded to include first-person experiences of miracles as well. 
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Miracles thus play a significant role in both maintaining old and attracting new followers to 
particular faiths. 
 A final common issue that can be raised regarding miracles and divine intervention is 
that different revelations are often claimed by various religions and belief-systems, each of 
which argues that one or more particular revelations give credence to the “truth” of their 
religion.  This poses a problem because there are a number of different religions that all claim 
to be the one and only true religion, and the evidence that each religion cites for such claims is 
always of the same type.  That is to say, religion A will argue that revelation A¹ proves that 
religion A is the true religion, while at the same time religion B will argue that revelation B² 
proves that religion B is the true religion.  Simultaneously, religion A will argue that revelation 
B² ought to be discounted and provides no evidence for the truth of religion B, whereas religion 
B will argue that revelation A¹ ought to be discounted and provides no evidence for the truth of 
religion A.  One arguing that it seems sensible to protest that since there are many alleged 
miracles and revelations that all seem to point at various incompatible truths, and we have no 
way of determining which of these truths is “right”, could claim that we ought to discount the 
evidential value of all miracles and revelations. 
 Each of above arguments for atheism that deal with revelations and miracles poses 
problems for the traditional theistic account of God and His action within the natural world.  
While they may not prove to be knock-down arguments, they certainly bring to light certain 
issues and inconsistencies that ought to be resolved in the traditional theistic account of God.  
These issues, however, are not issues that will have to be faced by the kind of multiverse deistic 
account that I propose, nor are they issues that will need to be resolved in some way by the 
deist.  This is because of the nature of the multiverse model that I have argued for, in which any 
divine intervention would be superfluous and unnecessary, and because of the nature of deism, 
as I have described it as being an ontological view that specifically precludes the intervention of 
God in the natural world.  So, while the multiverse deist may not be able to avail himself of any 
of the potential benefits of claiming the existence of miracles to point towards the existence of 
God, he will also not be susceptible to any of the objections that the acceptance of miracles 
carries with it.  Given the difficulty of proving that a miracle has actually occurred, I think that 
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the trade-off of denying miracles in return for not having to deal with any of the objections that 
come with them is beneficial for the multiverse deist, and ultimately puts multiverse deism in a 
stronger position than classical theism. 
 From the first argument discussed, which brings to light the difficulty of balancing the 
need for proof both that a particular action breaking particular laws of nature has occurred, and 
that the very same laws of nature have never and can never be broken, it is evident how this 
could prove to be a daunting task for the traditional theist to overcome.  Any deistic account, 
however, while in some respects it may be concerned with proving the strength of the latter, 
will absolutely never find a need or desire to argue for the strength of the former.  It is simply 
not an available possibility, within any deistic account, that any external supernatural force play 
any active role whatsoever within the natural world.  So, for the deist it is not a viable 
explanation, for any event, to say that God made it happen by breaking or suspending some 
particular law or laws of nature.  In the case of a so called “miraculous event” the deist would 
likely argue that rather than any kind of natural laws being broken, there is simply a 
misunderstanding of one or more aspects of what really happened.  That is to say, rather than a 
metaphysical issue it would be an epistemic issue.  The deist would argue that perhaps we are 
unclear of certain relevant details or aspects of the event in question, or that we do not have a 
clear and complete understanding of the relevant natural laws and how exactly they operate.  
 A similar type of response can be given to the second atheistic argument discussed.  
While Hume’s argument does not specifically rule out the possibility of miraculous events 
happening, it calls into question whether or not we can justifiably believe that such events have 
actually occurred, and whether or not we should base any of our beliefs on these allegedly 
miraculous events.  Of course, for the classical theist, there is a lot that comes not just from the 
occurrence of the miracle itself but also from being able to reasonably believe that the 
miraculous event occurred and from the ability to provide believable testimony of that 
miraculous event.  But for the deist these questions, again, pose no problems because of the 
demand for causal closure that deism entails.  With Hume’s argument, we are to proportion our 
belief to the evidence, and Hume argues that our evidence that natural laws are never broken is 
far stronger than any evidence that we have that states otherwise, therefore we ought not to 
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believe in any event that appears to have broken any natural laws.  The deist, along with Hume, 
would argue that there are a wide variety of aspects that need to be examined before a 
particular event can be deemed a miracle, and that if these aspects are scrutinized to the extent 
to which they ought to be, there will ultimately be a naturalistic explanation for each and every 
event, be it extraordinary or not.  Some of these aspects will include things such as examining 
the particular laws of nature in question and determining whether they are, in fact, laws.  It will 
need to be determined whether or not these laws in question are actually the relevant laws of 
nature that should have been operational in that particular event.  We will have to determine 
whether there was something faulty in the perception of the witnesses of the event, whether 
the initial starting points of various aspects of the event were truly as they were reported or 
perceived as being, and so on.  If we are unable to find a sufficient naturalistic explanation for 
the entirety of the event in question, then the deist would deem the problem would be an 
epistemic one rather than a metaphysical one, arguing that there ought to be some sort of 
naturalistic explanation that is simply epistemically unavailable to us.  We would not need to 
appeal to some external deity to explain an event that we cannot explain, we would simply 
acknowledge our own epistemic limitations and attribute the event to some unknown 
naturalistic laws or a misinterpretation of the current laws or of the perception of the event in 
question. 
 Finally, consider the objections that the various competing religions cannot each and 
every one of them be pointing at miracles that prove it to be the sole correct religion. This 
objection, clearly, would pose no real threat to the deist.  He would simply argue that the so-
called miracles were merely rare and misunderstood naturalistic events, so none of them can 
be taken as legitimately revealing any kind of theistic truth.  Because of this, there are no 
inconsistencies or contradictions with regard to miracles within deism as I have described it 
because, quite simply, deism denies the possibility of any miracles or supernatural revelations 
within the natural world.  On the other hand, to get around this argument for atheism the 
classical theist would have to demonstrate not only that the miracles pertaining to his 
particular religion are veridical but he would also have to clearly demonstrate what it is that 
differentiates miracles pertaining to his religion from those that pertain to other religions.  So 
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the dilemma that this argument for atheism poses for the classical theist is that he must 
somehow show that only a certain kind of miracles ought to be believed, and that all other 
kinds are to be disbelieved.  This would seem to be a very difficult task for the classical theist to 
accomplish, and is he fails to accomplish it then he remains faced with the potential problem of 
miracles of varying religions competing with one another.  
 
5.7 Conclusion and Prescription 
As is evident through the discussion above the deistic responses to many of the atheistic 
arguments aimed at classical theism are very similar, if not the same.  Since all of the atheistic 
arguments discussed above poke at problems that classical theism must address surrounding 
some aspect or another of God’s action in the world, they do not directly harm multiverse 
deism since deism precludes any such actions.  Additionally, the multiverse deist has another 
route to get around many of these atheistic arguments, by appealing to multiverse responses.  
The ability to appeal to responses both from the deistic standpoint and from the standpoint of 
believers in a multiverse provides the multiverse deist with a great variety of potential replies 
to different arguments for atheism.  The kinds of answers that come from a multiverse deistic 
standpoint are simply conversation-stoppers, in that once they are issued there really is not 
much that is left to be said on either side of the argument since none of these atheistic 
arguments apply to multiverse deism.  Such general and simple answers do little to further any 
discussion on the matter or to advance any knowledge on the subject.  What is needed, rather 
than a generic multiverse deistic account that simply supplies the same generic response to any 
atheistic argument, is one that provides a certain level of detail and complexity.  An account 
which specifies in what sense God can remain Himself with all of the divine attributes that He is 
classically said to possess while still being causally disconnected from the natural world, and 
one that specifies the exact make-up and composition of the multiverse.  Details need to be 
given with regard to how and if any of the divine attributes are maintained or sacrificed within 
any particular deistic view, and how this relates to the maintenance or denial of the other 
divine attributes in light of various arguments for atheism, and whether or not this has any 
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bearing God’s status.  Through answering some of these questions many, if not all, of the 
indirect arguments against deism that have arisen from atheistic arguments against classical 
theism discussed above can be addressed and ultimately dismissed.  Only when a specified 
version of multiverse deism is presented, in which these kinds of details are discussed, can we 
move from deistic responses to atheistic arguments acting as conversation-stoppers, towards 
detailed multiverse deistic responses that begin to act as conversation starters for further 
inquiry and dialogue. 
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Chapter 6 
Possible Alternative Version of Deism 
Up to this point I have discussed and argued for the possibility and plausibility of a certain kind 
of deism that results from the adoption of a particular kind of multiverse model.  While I have 
discussed varying accounts of multiverse models and varying interpretations of certain divine 
attributes, this has been done largely to show the range of compatibility between of the brand 
of deism that I ultimately argue for and a broad range of other theological considerations.  
Since the vast majority of the discussion has been aimed at showing just what viewpoints are 
consistent and compatible with the kind of multiverse deism that I argue for, this chapter will 
present a family of accounts called “noninterventionist special divine action” (which I call 
epistemic deism) that represent an alternative to the kind of multiverse deism that I propose.  
One detail that I will make clear at the beginning of this chapter is that I have not yet come 
across any noninterventionist special divine action theories that make any specific mention of 
the possibility of a multiverse or discuss how any such theory would operate given the 
existence of a multiverse.  For that reason, the forthcoming discussion is limited in the sense 
that little to no references will be made to a multiverse even though my overall position argues 
for a multiverse deism.  Despite there being no direct discussion of application to or operation 
within a multiverse, we can extend the discussion below that refers to a single universe to 
range over any and all universes that exist within a multiverse in the same ways that the kind of 
deism that I argue for does.  This is possible because it is not clear that such an extension is 
incompatible with any of the noninterventionist special divine action theories in their original 
form. 
 I ultimately go on to argue that epistemic deism, while it may be an available 
alternative, is one that is far more complex and carries with it a substantial number of 
difficulties that make it a less-favorable ontological viewpoint than the multiverse deism that I 
present.  As will be discussed below, epistemic deism requires a large number of qualifications, 
all of which require further explanation in themselves, and the sheer number of qualifications 
and “exceptions to the rule” are so numerous that epistemic deistic theories become far more 
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difficult to accept (if they can even be considered as acceptable) than other potential deistic 
accounts. 
 Before beginning this discussion it is important that I point out, however, that none of 
the noninterventionist special divine action theories that I discuss below are explicitly deistic in 
any sense, rather that it is only my claim that they can be construed as deistic in nature.  The 
reason that I am discussing these views, in addition to how I think these views can be construed 
as forms of deism, is two-fold.  The first reason is that noninterventionist special divine action 
theories may act as motivators for the development of other views of deism.  That is, they may 
open up windows into forms of deism that vary from deism in the traditional sense, allowing us 
to further investigate the true nature of deism.  The second reason is that the 
noninterventionist special divine action theories that will be discussed below differ as much 
from classical theism as does deism of the kind that I ultimately argue for.  Because of this, they 
provide alternative approaches to theism while still maintaining many of the traditional ideas of 
God, which is similar to what I have set out to do.  
 
6.1 Noninterventionist Special Divine Action as Epistemic Deism 
While there are, of course, a number of possible theistic alternatives to the kind of deism that I 
argue for, one position that has recently emerged is belief in “noninterventionist special divine 
action” (Monton, 2012, p. 134).  Though the specific views that fall within this position will vary, 
the overall position posits that  
[o]ne way for God to [act in the world without intervening] is by acting at the 
indeterministic quantum level.  For example, if there’s some quantum process 
that has a 10% chance of yielding outcome A, and a 90% chance of yielding 
outcome B, God can, in a particular instance of this process, decide which 
outcome will result, without violating any laws (Monton, 2012, p. 134).   
That is to say, there are particular aspects of nature, typically at the subatomic level, that are 
not subject to deterministic laws of nature.  These areas, where laws of nature are either non-
existent or are indeterministic, are places where God’s intervention can fit in with minimal or 
no obstruction to the laws of physics that guide the rest of the natural processes.  I interpret 
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such views to be loosely related to the type of deism that we have discussed thus far, but in a 
way that is distinctly different.  For that reason, and for reasons of clarity, I will refer to the 
deistic position that I have argued for, in which God has no interaction with the natural world 
post-creation, as “metaphysical deism” while I will refer to this alternative possibility as 
“epistemic deism” and use this term interchangeably with “noninterventionist special divine 
action.”  There are two reasons for this change in terminology.  The first is that 
noninterventionist special divine action generally tends to maintain the appearance of 
traditional or metaphysical deism,65 even though that is only because of our epistemic 
limitations.  Thus, given our epistemic limitations, noninterventionist special divine action 
appears deistic in nature.  That is, it is an account of divine causation that relies largely on our 
epistemic limitations, and I think that this reliance should be reflected in the terminology.  The 
second reason is that there seems to be some incompatibility between the terms 
“noninterventionist” and “action” as they appear in the name of the account.  It is not clear in 
my mind how the two can plausibly coexist since to act seems to entail intervention, whereas I 
do not think that the same problem persists in the term “epistemic deism.”  The traditional 
account of metaphysical deism, as we have seen, is one in which God does not intervene in 
natural events, thus precluding any sort of miracles or divine intervention.  This view generally 
argues that the universe in its every part, whether material or immaterial, was created by God 
in the beginning, but that God then went on a permanent vacation, leaving the universe to 
operate without His intervention.  
There is an expanding literature of different varieties of epistemic deism, but I have 
chosen to focus my discussion on three papers whose versions of it are, I think, representative 
of its various varieties.  Nancey Murphy, Thomas Tracy, and Bradley Monton develop similar yet 
distinct accounts of epistemic deism that allow God to intervene in the world without breaking 
any natural laws.  These accounts argue that it is possible, and in some cases necessary, for God 
to intervene in the natural world through subatomic processes, but that because these 
                                                          
65 While both metaphysical deism and epistemic deism are both metaphysical ontological views, metaphysical 
deism is an ontological view that is concerned only with the metaphysical, whereas epistemic deism concerns itself 
both with the metaphysical and with the epistemic. 
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interventions occur at the subatomic level God is able to act without breaking any natural laws.  
Following from the premises that God acts without breaking any natural laws by keeping His 
actions at the subatomic level and that miracles are violations of laws of nature, no miracles 
have occurred and the integrity of the deistic model is maintained.  
 Murphy and Tracy both seem to subscribe to differing views of epistemic deism.  In 
discussing the general viewpoint of Murphy, Robert Larmer writes “[t]he indeterminacy that 
characterizes quantum processes has seemed to some thinkers to suggest a way whereby God 
can be conceived as acting in creation without abandoning belief in the causal closure of the 
physical” (Larmer, 2009, p. 550).  That is to say, because of the seemingly unpredictable nature 
of quantum processes, Murphy thinks that it is possible, or perhaps even necessary, that God is 
intervening in order to facilitate these processes, but that since there are no deterministic laws 
of nature that govern the processes at the subatomic level, God’s intervention cannot be said 
to be defying any such laws of nature, meaning that the processes facilitated by His 
intervention cannot be considered to be miraculous, thus maintaining the causal closure of the 
physical and preserving the deistic viewpoint.  
 Tracy, on the other hand, argues that because of the indeterministic nature of quantum 
processes, there are multiple equally possible outcomes that can result from any particular 
quantum starting point.  Because of this, God is able to act at the quantum level in order to 
realize whichever of these possible outcomes He desires without being “miraculous” or “actions 
tampering with the causal structure of nature” because each outcome was equally realizable, 
so that God would merely ensure that one particular outcome (that might have arisen anyway) 
is realized instead of a variety of other equally possible outcomes. 
 And thirdly, Bradley Monton presents a version of noninterventionist special divine 
action in which God can localize “hits” on particular parts of subatomic particles which, in turn, 
alters the makeup of each particle by changing its mass, density, energy concentration, or some 
other key aspect of it.  The particle would now have altered its composition and/or position, so 
that it could have become a particle of a different substance in a different location.  That is to 
say, God can “hit” the particle in such a way that He can effectively change it from a particle of 
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substance A to a particle of substance B, and move it from location A to location B, if He so 
desires.  Monton thinks that if the particle can be hit in great volume and quickness then it 
allows for God to bring about almost any state of affairs without having to intervene in the 
world. 
 In this chapter I will discuss Murphy’s account of God’s interventions at subatomic 
levels, and provide several reasons why I find her view to be inadequate and ultimately 
unsuccessful, barring extensive revision and substantial explanation supplemented by an 
advancement in scientific knowledge of the causal relations between subatomic processes and 
processes that we see at the macro-level.  I will then go on to discuss Tracy’s account of God 
acting on the subatomic level, and show how it falls prey to many of the same faults as 
Murphy’s view.  Thirdly, I will provide a more detailed account of Monton’s view and discuss 
how, while I find it to be a more complete view than the ones presented by Murphy and Tracy, 
it still leaves far too many questions unanswered in order for it to be considered a plausible 
account of God’s activity (or lack thereof) in the natural world.  Finally, I will go on to discuss 
how all three of these views fail to address many of the basic distinctions required to create an 
adequate deistic account of God, and highlight some of the problems that any account of 
epistemic deism will face. 
 
6.2 Nancey Murphy’s Views 
Nancey Murphy’s paper aims to “provide an alternative account of causation and divine action 
that is both theologically adequate (consistent with Christian doctrine and adequate Christian 
experience), and consistent with contemporary science” (Murphy, 1995, p. 326).  The position 
that she ultimately develops is that 
In addition to creation and sustenance, God has two modes of action within the 
created order: one at the quantum level (or whatever turns out to be the most 
basic level of reality) and the other through human intelligence and action.  The 
apparently random events at the quantum level all involve (but are not 
exhausted by) specific, intentional acts of God.  God’s action at this level is 
limited by two factors.  First, God respects the integrity of the entities with which 
he cooperates – there are some things that God  can do with an electron, for 
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instance, and many other things that he cannot (e.g., make it have the rest-mass 
of a proton, or a positive charge).  Second, within the wider range of effects 
allowed by God’s action in and through sub-atomic entities, God restricts his 
action on order to produce a world that for all we can tell is orderly and law-like 
in its operation (Murphy, 1995, p. 339).   
That is to say, Murphy puts forth a bottom-up account of causation, divine action, and 
determinism, arguing that God acts in events at the subatomic level which in turn affects 
the events at the macro level.  Because of the apparent randomness of most subatomic 
events, argues Murphy, we are left with two options to explain them.  Either they are 
completely random, or they are determined by God.  Because of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason, we ought to reject the idea that the processes and events are random, thus 
leaving only the option that they are determined by God (Murphy, 1995, p. 341).  Since 
there are no natural laws in operation at the subatomic level, God is able to act at that 
level, which ultimately influences or determines events at the macro level, without the 
events being miraculous, thus maintaining the deistic ideal of causal closure as well as the 
scientific perspectives of causation and natural laws at higher levels.  
 
6.3 Thomas Tracy’s Views 
Tracy, like Murphy, sees subatomic processes as providing and arena in which God may 
well choose to act.  He writes of “explanatory gaps” that open up when we try to account 
for those processes.  Such gaps appear in cases in which we must admit that we do not 
have viable and adequate explanations to questions raised by scientific inquiry, or when 
particular theories entail that we will not in principle be able to give sufficient 
explanations for some events that are within the scope of those theories (Tracy, 1995, p. 
290).  Tracy is not in favor of “God of the gaps” kinds of theories, arguing that God is not 
to be found in what we don’t know, rather He is to be found in what we do know.  In most 
“God of the gaps” theories the progress of science entails a push-back of the defined role 
of God in the world, which Tracy feels leaves us with no adequate account of God and His 
actions.  While this may be the case, Tracy believes that there are still some aspects of 
nature that will, in principle, never be knowable by human minds or scientific 
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advancements, thus allowing a spot at which to insert God as a causal agent without the 
risk of having the progression of science force Him out of that position.  Of quantum 
processes, Tracy claims that some  
…are so extraordinarily sensitive to their initial conditions that arbitrarily close 
starting points for these processes can produce dramatically divergent 
outcomes.  The results will be unpredictable in principle, since it will not be 
epistemically possible either (a) to specify the initial conditions with full 
accuracy or (b) to predict their result by considering the operation of the 
system under similar, yet slightly different, initial conditions (Tracy, 1995, p. 
312). 
Tracy notes that, in many cases, trying to provide an account of divine intervention, 
concessions will often have to be made either on the scientific side or on the theological side 
but, he goes on to argue, that if it is the case that the unpredictability of indeterministic chance 
at the quantum level and the chaotic unpredictability in the system that magnifies the quantum 
effects are both confirmed “then it is open to us to propose that one way in which God may act 
in history is by determining at least some events at the quantum level” (Tracy, 1995, p. 318).  
That is not to say, however, that God determines the outcome of each and every quantum 
event, or that He randomly chooses what outcome will result from each subatomic process, 
“[r]ather, God will realize only one of the several potentials in the quantum system, which is 
defined as a probability distribution” (Tracy, 1995, p. 318).  In other words, the initial starting 
point of the quantum process is one open to multiple equally realizable outcomes, and the 
intervening role that God plays, on Tracy’s account, is that He determines which of these 
equally realizable outcomes is actually realized in this particular case. 
             The key aspects in which Tracy’s view differs from Murphy’s is that, for Tracy, only some 
quantum processes and events are intervened in by God whereas for Murphy, at least on the 
surface, it seems as if God’s action is required in order for any quantum process to be carried 
out.  Secondly, while it seems that, on Murphy’s account, God has absolute power in 
determining what the outcomes of each quantum process will be, the same does not seem to 
be the case on Tracy’s view.  For Tracy, God’s ability is limited to a finite (and perhaps small) 
number of potentialities that He is able to realize for each respective quantum process. 
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6.4 Bradley Monton’s Views 
The main goal that Monton sets out to accomplish in his paper “God Acts in the Quantum 
World” (2012) is to show that although noninterventionist special divine action theories confine 
God’s active ability to the subatomic world, this does not mean that what God can accomplish 
through His actions is limited in any sense.  Monton aims to show that, even by acting only on 
subatomic particles, God is still able to accomplish great things such as parting the Red Sea or 
turning water into wine (Monton, 2012, p. 133). 
 Monton’s overall account relies on the GRW theory, which he describes as follows: 
…the GRW theory [named after its proponents, Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber] is 
an indeterministic version of quantum mechanics that allows for 
indeterministic ‘GRW hits’ to happen on the wave function of a particle, thus 
localizing the wave function.  This means that a majority of the mass density of 
the particle is in a small region of space, but the wave function has tails that go 
to infinity, so the mass of the particle is also spread out throughout this infinite 
region of space.  The GRW hit can happen anywhere that the wave function is 
non-zero, so the GRW hit can happen anywhere in space, concentrating most 
of the mass density for the particle in that region where the GRW hit happened 
(Monton, 2012, p. 137). 
 Given Monton’s acceptance of the indeterministic nature of subatomic processes, God’s 
activity can be inserted into this level without the risk of violating any particular laws of nature.  
Because of the nature of the indeterminacy of the GRW theory, Monton goes on to argue that, 
for those who want to maintain the existence of an active God,  
…[w]ithin the constraints of the laws of the GRW theory, God can make a GRW 
hit happen anywhere, on any particle, or collection of particles.  This gives God 
the power to move particles around, anywhere in the universe.  And moreover, 
God can do so arbitrarily quickly, just by making the GRW hits happen in an 
arbitrarily small amount of time (Monton, 2012, p. 137). 
 So unlike Murphy and Tracy, Monton does not argue that it is necessary that God 
intervene in order to facilitate all or some subatomic processes, rather he only aims to show 
that God acting in a particular way at the subatomic level is compatible with the GRW theory, of 
which he is a proponent.  Monton has also attempted to provide an account of how God’s 
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actions at the subatomic level can lead to grand outcomes at the macro level, ultimately making 
God’s active abilities quite expansive.     
 
6.5 Evaluation 
While Murphy’s view has several attractive points, namely that it (a) maintains physics as it is, 
at both the macro and micro levels, (b) eliminates the supernatural at the macro level, (c) 
preserves the causal closure of the physical at the macro level, (d) excludes irregularities like 
miracles, and (e) still allows for the existence and intervention of God, it has received its share 
of criticism, specifically with regards to the scientific aspects of how quantum processes 
actually work, in that processes in the micro world rarely relate to events in the macro world.  If 
this is the case, it raises the ever-present question, in anything relating to God’s intervention in 
the natural order of things, of what the reasoning behind God’s alleged intervention would be.  
Of course, the response that we can never truly hope to imagine God’s reasoning behind any 
action He commits will always be available.  Still, it could well be thought peculiar of God to 
intervene in the natural order of the world in order to facilitate the actualization of some 
subatomic quantum processes that have no translation into anything in the macro world.  That 
is to say, to actualize some subatomic process that has no influence whatsoever on anything at 
all.  To do so would simply seem to be a pointless and a waste of time.  It just seems as if it 
would be out of God’s nature to be constantly intervening in (arguably) meaningless subatomic 
processes that have no effect on the natural world.  Hence Murphy needs to do more work in 
demonstrating, scientifically, the causal connections between events at the micro level and 
events at the macro level. 
 Of course, the previous objection can be challenged on several grounds (as noted 
above), but even in the case that that objection is refuted, it still remains that God’s 
intervention in the world, be it at a subatomic level or not, is an intervention nonetheless, 
which is fundamentally contrary to the view proposed by metaphysical deism.66  The key 
                                                          
66 Again, none of the discussed authors explicitly subscribe to deism, rather I make the claim that their views can 
be construed as deistic. 
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component of Murphy’s argument, one that encourages her to call herself a deist, is that there 
are no laws of nature governing subatomic processes; hence, she thinks, God can intervene in 
those processes without doing anything miraculous.  Murphy’s position is not quite 
metaphysical deism, but also not quite epistemic deism.  She seems to be arguing for a very 
narrow kind of metaphysical deism in which causal closure is demanded, but in which the 
definition of causal closure is an odd one, where it simply means that no natural law has been 
broken. 
 Murphy’s idea is that God acts on and affects macro-level events by acting on micro-
level events, creating a bottom-up causal connection.  Murphy argues that there is a 
scientifically proven connection between micro and macro-level events, while Larmer argues 
that it is scientifically proven that there is no such connection.  Given this lack of clarity, 
regardless of whatever the actual case may be, we are left with two options: either (1) there 
are no causal connections between micro and macro-level events, or (2) there are causal 
connections between micro and macro-level events.  If the first is the case, and there are 
ultimately no meaningful causal connections between micro-level and macro-level events 
(which is a view that Murphy would object to), then there would be no reason to think that the 
principle of sufficient reason should apply to micro-level events simply because it applies to 
events at the macro-level (which is, itself, arguable).  This would leave open the possibility that 
the apparent randomness of quantum processes is just that, random.  This raises a secondary 
question of whether or not “randomness” should be considered a sufficient reason under the 
principle of sufficient reason, because while it seems that Murphy would say that it should not 
be, others may argue that it should be, and if the latter were even a possibility then this would 
mean that Murphy has stricken a completely viable option that is consistent with the principle 
of sufficient reason, a principle that she argues so heavily for.  Lastly, as mentioned earlier, a 
disconnection between micro and macro events would also mean that any actions performed 
by God at this level would be utterly pointless (at least to us) since they would in no way 
influence anything taking place at the macro-level.  Again, this is not the view that Murphy 
would take, but I am simply presenting it to show what the consequences would be for 
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Murphy’s view should it turn out that, for scientific reasons, there had to be such a 
disconnection. 
 On the other hand, if there does exist a causal connection between micro-level events 
and macro-level events, as Murphy argues, then since macro-level events display law-like 
behaviour, it seems hard to believe that such law-like behaviour would simply stop upon 
reaching the micro-level.  There is simply no reason provided that would lead us to believe that 
everything in the universe would display law-like behaviours and then suddenly cease to 
maintain such behaviours at a certain point, and this is something that Murphy needs to explain 
in order for her account to stand up as a plausible theistic account.  It would seem more likely 
that perhaps the behaviours that these subatomic particles are displaying are adhering to some 
natural laws but, for whatever reason, we are simply not able to discover or understand them.  
The fact that we have not yet discovered or come to understand such laws does not mean that 
they are not in operation.  If it is the case that there are some sort of natural laws governing 
subatomic processes then it would mean that there is no need to invoke the presence and 
intervention of God to explain their causation, and Murphy’s account would fail.  Even if we set 
that aside however, and God does intervene in order to facilitate or actualize subatomic 
processes, it is not entirely clear how Murphy’s God is so different from God as classically 
conceived, apart from His being limited to acting only at the subatomic level.  This seems like 
something that proponents of the classical conception of God would be opposed to since it, at 
least on the surface, constrains God’s ability, and something that proponents of metaphysical 
deism would oppose because it prescribes God’s intervention in the natural world.  So, in both 
cases, whether there are causal connections between micro-level events and macro-level 
events, or not, we can see how Murphy’s account could be rejected in the first case, or require 
serious revision in the second case.  
 Finally, it seems to me that Murphy is here working with a distorted definition of 
traditional deism, what I call metaphysical deism, in which her view is only deistic at the macro-
level.  While it is true that metaphysical deism precludes miracles, it does not just preclude 
miracles, rather it precludes any sort of intervention whatsoever.  It demands causal closure, 
and whether or not there are any natural laws at play is simply irrelevant to whether or not any 
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kind of external or divine intervention is permitted under metaphysical deism.  Whether a 
particular external intervention happens to find some loophole in which no natural laws are 
operational, thus preventing it from being declared a miracle, is not of concern here.  The main 
concern is whether or not an external intervention defies the causal closure, of the natural 
world that is proposed by metaphysical deism and it seems that any external intervention, 
miraculous or not, would defy that causal closure thus making any view that supports both 
divine intervention and metaphysical deism inconsistent.   Any such view must ultimately be 
dismissed.  On the same note it seems that a scientific account of the world would demand 
causal closure as well, which would pose a large problem for Murphy’s overall project of trying 
to create an alternative account of divine intervention that maintains both theological and 
scientific integrity.  The traditional Judeo-Christian conception of God is one in which He, while 
perhaps intervening in the universe, does not reside in it.  That is to say, while He impacts it, He 
is not a part of it, which seems entirely contrary to the causal closure of the atheistic model 
generally put forth by modern science.  The two simply do not seem to be able to co-exist, at 
least on this account.  What Murphy has done is presented a theologically inadequate view of 
Christian doctrine, as well as an inadequate view of science in order to create just enough of a 
gap to fit in a theory that attempts to satisfy both the theologians and the scientists. 
 Overall, Murphy’s view appears to be an attempt at finding a way of incorporating 
divine intervention into metaphysical deism.  Murphy would argue, as far as I can tell, that 
metaphysical deism demands a causal closure of the universe, but she proposes a view in which 
certain divine actions are permitted since they would not count as breaking the causal closure 
of the universe, thus allowing for a version of metaphysical deism in which God can freely 
intervene in the universe at the micro-level.  I think that Murphy’s attempt fails in this respect 
because allowing for any kind of divine intervention within a metaphysical deistic theory is 
simply contradictory, and therefore I have tried to look at her view as proposing a version of 
epistemic deism, which seems as if it could be more in line with some of the claims that she 
makes.  If, however, this view is to be interpreted as an instance of epistemic deism, then there 
are a variety of questions that I mention in the opening chapters that must be addressed and 
answered before Murphy’s account can be taken as a complete worldview. 
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 Tracy’s view, while much like Murphy’s, is far closer to what I have described as 
epistemic deism and is subject to several problems as well.  The first problem that arises, which 
seems to be one that is almost inherent in these sorts of theories, is that the introduction of 
God into any explanatory account of nature means that the system on which He is acting 
cannot be causally closed, and that any intervention within that system would be epistemically 
problematic.  That is to say that 
The idea of a direct act of God is unacceptable for us because such an event 
would involve a gap in the order of nature; it could not be sufficiently explained 
in terms of antecedent finite events, and so would constitute “an absolute 
beginning point” for a novel causal series...such an event is not epistemically 
problematic, it is “literally inconceivable,” for the notion of an event without 
adequate finite causes is “quite as self-contradictory as the notion of a square-
circle.”  We must, therefore, rigorously avoid all talk of divine action in history.  
Nonetheless, it is open to us to think of history as a whole as God’s act. (Tracy, 
1995, p. 301). 
So the problem that Tracy’s theory faces is precisely one that he describes at the outset of his 
paper.  Of course, while it is not entirely clear whether or not this is the case, it could be that 
Tracy views his theory as one in which history as a whole is an act of God, in which case it would 
be plausible to think that his view is left untouched by the “absolute beginning point” objection.  
Tracy’s view however, even if it is one that views history as a whole as an act of God, still 
maintains that God makes continual interventions in the world through His manipulation of 
quantum processes.  Despite the fact that God would only be actualizing one of the several 
equally realizable effects of any given quantum starting point, the need for a cause that 
originates within the system itself still remains, otherwise the “absolute beginning point” 
objection stands.  There would still be a series of quantum processes and effects that cannot be 
adequately explained by one or more finite causes within the closed system.   So, much like 
Murphy, Tracy seems to argue for a view in which the macro-level is causally closed while the 
micro-level is causally open. 
 A second problem that Tracy’s view faces is that he needs to figure out how to properly 
deal with the apparent limitations on God’s power in his conception of how and when God acts 
in the world. A difference between Tracy’s view and Murphy’s view is that, in Murphy’s view 
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God seems to have near complete freedom in what effects to actualize for each particular 
quantum starting point, whereas in Tracy’s view He does not enjoy that luxury.  For Tracy, God 
can only actualize one of a limited number of equally realizable potentialities that are already 
associated with each quantum starting point.  It is not entirely clear whether or not this is so 
because God is limited to these options by something other than Himself, or if He chooses only 
to avail Himself of one of these options (and this is something that Tracy needs to clarify), but if 
it is the case that God is limited in His abilities of which outcome to actualize then this would 
indicate a limitation on His powers, which is something that many theists would most likely 
object to, since it would deny God some sort of creative power.  This being the case, Tracy 
needs to do some explanatory work to describe (a) his conception of what omnipotence entails, 
and (b) how this conception can be maintained despite the apparent limitations on God’s causal 
power when it comes to actualizing particular outcomes for various quantum starting points. 
 A final area where Tracy’s view needs further explanation is the discussion of what 
quantum processes God chooses, or is required, to act on.  Tracy’s theory proposes, unlike 
Murphy’s, that God only acts to determine the outcome of some quantum processes, not all.  It 
is not altogether clear why it is the case that God only intervenes in determining the outcomes 
of some quantum processes, and not all, or none.  Let us suppose that there is a 50/50 split 
between the micro-processes that God intervenes in and the micro-processes that are allowed 
to run their natural course according to the natural laws that are in place.  Tracy needs to 
explain why exactly it is the case that God does not simply intervene in the outcomes of all 
quantum processes, as in Murphy’s view, since it would seemingly be no extra “effort” for God 
to make that move and increase His activity in the determination or influence of quantum 
process outcomes from 50% to 100%.  On the other hand, Tracy also does not make it entirely 
clear why God’s intervention is required in any quantum processes at all.  If we are to go back 
to the original 50/50 split, with 50% of all quantum processes being left untouched (directly) by 
God and left solely to operate under the natural laws that are in play, then there needs to be an 
explanation about what makes the other half of quantum process outcomes so special as to call 
for God’s intervention.  Even if it is the case that God has some particular will that can only be 
realized through the specific outcome of a particular micro-process it would still seem that, 
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given God’s omnipotence and omniscience, He could have foreknown each particular situation 
and set up the natural laws in such a way as to generate the desired outcomes of each and 
every quantum process so as to realize any and every desired outcome that He may have.  
Furthermore, He could have done this without being forced to directly intervene in the natural 
order of the world.  With that in mind, it seems almost arbitrary to decide which events are 
those that were influenced by the hand of God, and which ones were purely the results of the 
operational natural laws, and Tracy provides no explanation of how such a distinction is to be 
recognized. 
 Moving on to Monton’s account, I think that he provides a far more complete account 
than either Murphy or Tracy do, in that it is both more detailed and less ambitious in its aims.  
While both Murphy and Tracy argue that it is necessary that God act at the subatomic level to 
actualize some or all subatomic processes, Monton makes no such claim.  He simply aims to 
show that God’s action at the subatomic level is compatible with GRW theory and that despite 
God’s action being limited to the subatomic level the outcomes that arise from it are not as 
limited as one may think. 
 Despite some of the strengths of Monton’s argument, it is still not altogether clear what 
would motivate God to act in such a system.  While this may not have been a specific question 
that Monton aims to explicate in his paper, it is still a question that arises.  It seems as if, with 
the natural laws already in existence within the GRW theory, there is simply no need to invoke 
the activity, or even existence of God.  Granted, this theory may be useful to those who believe 
in God, but unlike the views of Murphy and Tracy where God’s action seems necessary to 
facilitate particular subatomic processes, the same cannot be said for Monton’s account.  So 
one thing that Monton needs to explain is why his view needs an active God, or even a God, at 
all. 
 Another aspect in which Monton’s account can use further explanation is that, while he 
provides a substantial explanation of how God’s action at the subatomic level translates into 
visible outcomes at the macro level, he says nothing about why God’s actions need to be 
limited to the subatomic level.  Other than the fact that it seems to be a prerequisite of 
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noninterventionist special divine action theory nothing is said about why God’s active ability is 
confined to the micro level or why He chooses to restrict His actions to the micro level.  So 
again, it seems that the only motivation for having an account that relegates God’s active ability 
to this level is for reasons related to making them undetectable by us, which is the prime 
component of epistemic deism.  So while Monton’s GRW account makes substantial 
improvements on the views of Murphy and Tracy by (1) providing a substantial explanation of 
the theory of physics of which it aims to demonstrate a compatibility with God’s actions, (2) 
clearly demonstrating how God’s actions at the micro level translate into meaningful events at 
the macro level, and (3) being far less ambitious in its overall argument by trying to show only 
that God’s action at the subatomic level is compatible with rather than required by a particular 
account of physics, there are still questions that remain to be answered.  
 
6.6 Thoughts About the Overall Relation to Epistemic Deism 
Through the discussion of all three views that have been put forth by Murphy, Tracy and 
Monton we have seen that they are each in line with aspects of epistemic deism, in that they all 
generally argue for God’s intervention in the universe, but that these interventions can and do 
only happen at levels and in ways that are epistemically inaccessible to us.  The discussion has 
also gone to show a variety of problems that are present within any theory of this kind, namely 
that there is an enormous amount of explanation that must go into each and every detail within 
the theory.  The reason for that is because any theory that can be reduced to a version of 
epistemic deism is essentially a theory that is based on justifying exceptions within itself by 
showing how God can intervene in a causally closed system.   
 The term deism typically connotes among other things the causal closure of a system, 
but epistemic deistic theories try to posit and justify ways in which divine intervention can be 
permitted yet maintain aspects of that causal closure.  In the case of epistemic deism theories 
the claim is often that divine interaction occurs at levels that are unknowable to us, therefore 
leaving the world (as far as we can and will ever know) as causally closed.  This simply does not 
seem right since it would entail that God’s actions would be limited by and dependent on the 
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intellect of humans, in that He only chooses to do actions that we cannot know about.  With 
our knowledge of science and physics constantly advancing this would seem to result in God’s 
active abilities becoming more and more limited as our knowledge progresses and there is 
something that seems fundamentally wrong about that inverse relation.  Furthermore, it seems 
that we could also say that epistemic deism makes God’s intervention substantially 
undermined, if not altogether pointless in one sense since, on it, we would never know how or 
when God is acting on or in the natural world.  This lack of knowledge of when and how God is 
acting seems to undermine at least one of the points of divine intervention, which is the 
knowledge that the intervention is coming from God.   Of course, these are just some possible 
objections to the overall account of epistemic deism, and the epistemic deist could respond by 
arguing that there is some sort of upper threshold to the limits of human knowledge, but it still 
goes to show that all epistemic deists face an uphill battle in trying to justify how they aim to 
maintain a deistic undertone in their theories that is based on the human capacities for 
knowledge while at the same time allowing God to act but still placing limitations on His 
possible actions.  Furthermore, causal closure is something that either does or does not obtain, 
regardless of whether or not there is some conscious knowledge of it.  It seems that epistemic 
deists are arguing that our ignorance of the fact that there is no causal closure in the natural 
world entails that there is causal closure in the natural world, which does not seem right.  It 
simply does not appear that the epistemic deist will ever be able to satisfactorily and 
completely create a substantial account of how and why certain limitations are able to be 
placed on God, and how or why certain actions that He does do not count against the 
requirement for causal closure of the universe that any theory labelled as deistic should entail. 
 Furthermore, the epistemic deist will need to answer the question of what exactly 
makes his theory deistic in any sense.  Again, since deism generally tends to entail causal 
closure, which is an aspect that epistemic deistic theories lack, it is not entirely clear just how 
these theories can be properly labelled as deistic.  To take it one step further, the epistemic 
deist will also need to answer the question of how his view ought to be distinguished from 
classical theism.  While it appears that the interventions that God makes in the world under the 
epistemic deism framework would generally tend to be very subtle and, by definition, 
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unknowable to us, it is not clear that this kind of action would be inconsistent with a version of 
classical theism.  Some versions of classical theism could, in theory, argue that God is active 
only in ways that are unseen by us, so the epistemic deist would have to provide some amount 
of explanation to differentiate his view from such a version of classical theism.   
 Finally, as alluded to earlier, for any account of epistemic deism there is a need to 
describe what kinds of limitations are placed on God and His activity within the universe.  The 
common thread, as noted, that will be present is the epistemic boundary of God’s actions.  The 
epistemic deist will have to detail exactly what kinds of limitations, if they are to be more 
complex than the simple “unknowability” of them, are placed on God and his creative ability, 
since epistemic deism entails limitations on God’s creative ability be it in scope or method.  The 
epistemic deist will also have to detail why exactly these particular limitations are relevant and 
necessary for his particular account, as well as detail how these limitations are able to coexist 
with the absolute nature of most of the divine attributes.   
With all of the problems mentioned above, both those specific to Murphy’s, Tracy’s and 
Monton’s views, and those addressed to epistemic deism in general, it is almost as if each claim 
made within an epistemic deistic theory simply raises more questions than it answers.  Of 
course, each individual theory may be able to deal with some, or even most of these problems, 
but I am not convinced that any version of epistemic deism will be able to adequately address 
all of the questions raised.  Each adequate answer to one question will simply result in pushing 
off some contradiction, counter-intuitive thought, or highly debated claim to the end of the 
line, where eventually it will show itself, weakening if not destroy the plausibility of the 
account.  
 
6.7 Conclusion 
Here we have discussed the views of Murphy, Tracy and Monton as three views that represent 
noninterventionist special divine action.  I have discussed how these views, both individually 
and collectively, can be construed as deistic in nature, but in ways that are markedly different 
from deism in the traditional sense, as well as in the multiverse sense that I propose.  I have 
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argued that neither these three views, nor noninterventionist special divine action theory as a 
whole, are satisfactory theistic67 ontological views in that there are substantial difficulties that 
they each must overcome.  Ultimately, the views rely on justifying a series of exceptions so as 
to allow for God to act in certain ways within the world, and no reasonable justification has 
been shown or hinted at to allow these exceptions, with the result that each view a skewed 
version of traditional (metaphysical) deism or else a skewed version of classical theism. 
 The examination of these views, despite their overall implausibility, allows us to 
investigate them in comparison to both deism and classical theism, raising questions about the 
exact nature of each and how much room there is for movement within each respective view.  
If we are to reject these noninterventionist special divine action theories because they are 
incompatible with classical theism or deism then the classical theist and deist must solidify their 
conceptions of their own views, demonstrating and explaining how noninterventionist special 
divine action theories are in conflict with the ontological details of their respective theories.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
67 Theistic only in the sense that they posit the existence of God. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Potential Difficulties and Further Lines of Inquiry for the Multiverse Deist 
Up to this point I have provided an account that details how the acceptance of a multiverse 
theory that posits the existence of all possible realities entails a deistic God (if we are to 
maintain the idea that God exists) rather than the God of classical theism.  I have argued for the 
plausibility and potential advantages of multiverse deism but have largely done so with little to 
no mention of any of the potential pitfalls that the multiverse deist may have to overcome in 
order to make the case for the plausibility of his view.  To leave the discussion without mention 
of any possible disadvantages or hurdles that still must be overcome would be to provide an 
incomplete discussion and paint an unrealistic picture of multiverse deism.  To be sure, there 
are a number of other potential drawbacks and points of debate to be faced by multiverse 
deism, as there are with any theistic viewpoint other than the few that I will mention here.  The 
remaining potential difficulties that I will present are ones that I think are most pressing for the 
proponent of multiverse deism, and the key difficulties that someone ought to strongly 
consider in determining whether they think such a view is plausible and ultimately worthy of 
adoption.  Notably, the potential difficulties that will be discussed can also serve as a starting 
point for further research and inquiry within the topic.  I do not think that any one of these 
difficulties that will be presented is particularly devastating to the overall account of multiverse 
deism, rather I have deemed that each one of these problems is essentially beyond the scope of 
this particular project, and that a brief acknowledgement of them as well as a call for further 
inquiry into them is sufficient for now.  There are two main reasons why each of these potential 
problems is beyond the essential nature of this project.  The first is that, because of the broad 
sense in which I have described the kind of multiverse deism that I argue for, there are a great 
number of replies that can be offered to each potential difficulty, all of which are dependent on 
the particular conceptions of God or the multiverse that are being assumed.  That is, a 
multiverse in which each universe comes to pass in some sort of cyclical model of big bangs and 
big crunches will yield a different response to some objections than will a multiverse in which 
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each universe coexists simultaneously with all others.  Similarly, various interpretations of 
God’s necessity will yield different responses to certain objections.  Secondly, the objections to 
be discussed are, in many cases, linked to wider and bigger issues than those explicitly 
contained within the objection itself.  It is not as if these objections can be dismissed rather 
easily or with a quick note of clarification, rather some will require substantial explanation and 
elucidation of the nature of God and/or the multiverse in order to provide a full-fledged 
response. To cover each potential response and to fully treat the broader implications to which 
each of these objections is linked is simply not a practical undertaking in a project such as this, 
and so will have to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis given the specifics of each particular 
viewpoint.   
Each one of the forthcoming subsections in this chapter could be likely be expanded to 
cover a full paper, chapter, or even research project, but to leave a philosophical discussion 
about the nature of God and the universe without any unanswered questions, while a worthy 
endeavor, is likely unachievable.  It is important to remember that, while many of these 
potential problems are framed in a way as to specifically address proponents of the multiverse, 
deists, and multiverse deists, they are often not problems faced exclusively by members of 
those groups.  Rather, within the difficulties that will be discussed below are questions that 
persist within any kind of theological thought.  They need to be approached with the help of 
insight from across the disciplines of philosophy and theology, not just left for the multiverse 
deist to address.  Because of the nature of many of these potential difficulties, they will also 
serve as areas in which further lines of thought can be explored.  Each of these difficulties 
generally tends to call for more in-depth discussion and detail on a particular aspect concerning 
multiverse deism and, as such, while potentially being seen as an objection can also be seen as 
an opportunity to provide a response that allows for deeper elaboration on particular aspects 
of multiverse deism.  The overall result of this further discussion will be a more substantial 
understanding both of multiverse deism and of the nature of the particular objection to which 
it is responding.   
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 Several difficulties for the theist in accepting a multiverse theory alone have been 
discussed in Chapter 3, but these difficulties will be revisited in section 7.1.68  Moving through 
the subsequent sections there will be discussions on difficulties that may arise for the 
multiverse deist from explaining a deistic God’s role in creation of the universe, the need to 
determine the location of a deistic God within the multiverse, the need to abandon the idea of 
a personal relationship with God as the greatest possible good, reconciling the idea of a non-
active God with the biblical accounts of an active God and, finally, accounting for the various 
miracles and religious experiences that have been reported throughout history.          
 
7.1 Revisiting Difficulties for the Theist in Accepting a General Multiverse Theory 
As was discussed in section 3.2, the theist already faces several difficulties just in the 
acceptance of a general multiverse theory, and these difficulties arise even before any of the 
added potential problems of accepting a deistic multiverse theory are introduced.  Since this 
chapter is devoted to the difficulties that will be faced through the acceptance of the overall 
account of multiverse deism, I feel it is a good idea to quickly revisit some of the ideas and 
difficulties that were discussed in Chapter 3. 
 The first issue that was discussed dealt with the numbers or kinds of universes that 
populate the multiverse.  The strongest theistic multiverse view, as I see it, is one that is not 
only theologically and logically consistent, but one that is also supported by a certain degree of 
scientific evidence.  That is to say, for a multiverse theory to contain no logical inconsistencies 
and to be compatible with theology, while it may confer possibility, is not enough to confer 
plausibility on any particular multiverse model.  Some level of scientific evidence for the 
physical viability of such an account is required in order to supply, or raise, a level of possibility 
for any given multiverse account.69  The potential problem for the theist arises in that the 
                                                          
68 For some additional objections to the multiverse see Holder (2006). 
69 The possibility of which is disputed by Rodney Holder, who states that “[f]or a start, these [other] universes 
[within the multiverse] are completely unobservable.  A theory is only really scientific if it makes predictions about 
things we can observe and the multiverse fails this test disastrously.  The problem is that we cannot even in 
principle have any contact with the other universes” (2006, p. 56).  Judging from this, Holder seems to think that 
our ability to confer any level of scientific proof to the existence of a multiverse is extremely low, if existent at all. 
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scientific accounts of the multiverse often call for a large amount of universes, generally 
including universes that the theist may not want to accept as being metaphysically possible. 
 Scientific accounts of the multiverse generally concern themselves only with the 
physical possibility of existence of specific individual universes when determining whether or 
not they ought to be included as part of the multiverse.  Science considers only things such as 
physical constants in determining the possibility of a universe, leaving out other considerations 
such as moral value, overall happiness, presence of sentient life, and so on.  These latter 
considerations, the ones typically ignored by scientific approaches to the multiverse, can often 
play very large roles in theistic accounts of the multiverse.  That is to say, whereas the physicist 
will set his threshold at a point for inclusion in the multiverse at a place that represents only 
physical possibility of existence, the theist will instead choose a point determined not only by 
physical possibility of existence, but also by various ethical considerations, various life-form 
considerations, or a whole host of other theological considerations that would be required by 
his faith to confer worthiness and plausibility on any given universe.  The consequence of that is 
that the scientific case for the multiverse will almost always call for a multiverse that is 
populated with more universes than any theistic case, and this is simply because of the varying 
conceptions of what the word “possible” means when evaluating the existence of possible 
universes.70  What this means is that if the theist hopes to strengthen his position on the 
existence of a multiverse by appealing to scientific evidence then he is likely to have to make 
some concessions to the theological aspect of his account, since there will be some tension 
between the scientific side and the theological side in deeming what universes can be included 
as members of the multiverse.  So one thing that the proponent of the philosophical multiverse 
needs to determine is, if he has hopes of maintaining any kind of threshold below which a 
universe’s existence is not possible, not only if his particular account is compatible with a 
scientific account of the multiverse, but also more generally of if any philosophical multiverse 
account that posits a value-based threshold is compatible with any scientific multiverse. 
                                                          
70 Both Kraay (2012, p. 149) and Johnson (2014, p. 452-3) discuss issues related to the vagueness of thresholds for 
inclusion within a theistic multiverse. 
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 The second potential issue raised is that the acceptance of a multiverse theory by a 
theist undercuts, if not altogether completely denies, design arguments (Megill, 2011, p. 133).  
Design arguments are typically aimed at showing, in one way or another, that our universe is 
ordered in such a way as to prove that it is the product of intelligent design.71  The arguments 
aim to deny the idea that the universe could have simply come to be the way that it is out of 
chance or simply as the result of unguided natural processes.  Since design arguments are 
typically predicated on highlighting the uniqueness of our universe, when taken in conjunction 
with a multiverse account, the overall strength of the arguments seems to diminish.  This 
difficulty is one that is expressed by Roger White in his writing  
[many] who write on the subject suppose that M[ultiverse] and D[esign] are 
more or less on par; both can solve the puzzle of life’s existence, so our 
preference for one over the other must be based on other grounds.  If what I 
have argued is correct, this is a mistake.  While both hypotheses, if known to be 
true, would render life’s existence and indeed my existence unsurprising, only 
the design hypothesis is confirmed by the evidence.  The multiple-universe 
hypothesis may indeed undermine the argument for design, but only to the 
extent that we have independent reasons to believe it (2003, p.  247). 
What is important to note about White’s words, aside from his opting in favor of design 
arguments over multiverse theories, is his claim that the two do not seem to be able to co-exist, 
at least not in their strongest forms, stating explicitly that the multiverse undermines design 
arguments.72   
 The multiverse deist has several options here.  What the multiverse deist will have to do 
in this situation in order to get around the problem of the potentially undercut design argument 
is either to discount the overall need for the design argument in arguing for his case, by 
appealing more heavily to other kinds of arguments both for the existence of God and for the 
existence of the multiverse, or else to show how the multiverse is compatible with design 
arguments.  The first approach, if the multiverse deist chooses to take it, would be to convey 
the message that the loss of strength in the design argument is minimal to his overall case 
                                                          
71 For a more detailed discussion and examples of different kinds of design arguments see Ratzsch (2010). 
72 This is a claim that Saward (2013) specifically argues against, claiming that such a statement, while perhaps 
correct in some cases, does not apply to all multiverses. 
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because it was never a key factor in arguing for the existence of a deistic multiverse in the first 
place.  To lose a small piece of argumentative ammunition is no big problem, in that there may 
still remain multiple other, stronger, pillars on which the deistic multiverse account is perched.  
The second approach that can be taken by the multiverse deist is to reframe the design 
argument in such a way as to support the existence of a multiverse.  By arguing that the 
complexity of a multiverse far exceeds the complexity of a single universe, the multiverse deist 
may be able to claim that the existence of a multiverse points more to an intelligent designer 
than does the existence of a single universe.  Holder, who is firmly against the evidence for the 
existence of a multiverse, even acknowledges, if at least minimally, that “…there is…the logical 
possibility that God designed and created infinitely many universes” (2006, p. 57).  
 Many multiverse accounts argue for a multiverse that is comprised of all possible 
universes.  While the ideal of just what “possible” entails may vary from multiverse account to 
multiverse account, we can typically say that this would entail a vast number of universes.  
Given the size of that number, making our universe just one of a hugely many universes, then it 
would seem that the existence of our universe was simply inevitable.  Regardless of the 
construct of the multiverse, be it one that ranges infinitely into time, one that ranges infinitely 
into space, or both, the existence of each and every possible universe, including ours, is 
guaranteed to occur at either some time or some place within the multiverse.  If that is the case 
then it appears that any evidence of intelligent design displayed in our universe is merely the 
result of chance being actualized, rather than evidence of a specific intentional plan of God.  
This leaves the theist with several options.  On the one hand he can proceed to support his 
theism with a design argument whose strength is now diminished, appealing more heavily or 
exclusively, to other arguments for God’s existence.  On the other hand, he can proceed with 
his argument for a theistic multiverse and try to amend or re-conceptualize the design 
argument in such a way so that it also applies to a multiverse with a comparable level of 
strength that it enjoys when applied to a single universe. 
 The final issue mentioned was one surrounding ethics and morality within a multiverse, 
which is a problem also faced by modal realists, as addressed by Robert Adams (1979) and Yujin 
Nagasawa (2015).  This is a potential problem for theists who aim to adopt a multiverse model 
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that both allows for individual counterparts to exist in different universes within the multiverse 
and also posits that every possible state of affairs is or will be realized within the multiverse.  
That is to say, this is a potential problem for advocates of multiverses that posit that a 
particular individual can exist in universe U¹, have a counterpart who exists in different universe 
U², still another counterpart in universe U³, and so on throughout the rest of the universes in 
the multiverse in which each possible outcome will be realized.  The problem that arises is that 
if there is a multiverse populated with a great number of individuals and their counterparts, 
then the level of individual responsibility and accountability to “do the morally right thing” 
given certain situations is decreased because of the idea that elsewhere within the multiverse 
their counterparts will do what is morally right if they themselves do not.  Yujin Nagasawa 
summarizes the problem faced by modal realists and, in turn, multiverse deists in saying that 
The problem for modal realism is that the view appears to discourage us from 
acting morally because whether or not we act morally and prevent evil in this 
[universe] evil is instantiated in some other possible [universes] anyway.  This is 
because, given the claim of modal realism that all possible [universes] exist, the 
total sum of good and evil does not change whether or not we act morally in 
this [universe] (2015, p. 187). 
The problem discussed by Nagasawa, while directed at modal realism, can clearly be applied to 
multiverse deism as well, or any multiverse account, for that matter.   
 If it is the case that every possible outcome shall arise within the multiverse then 
whether or not I choose to do a good act in this particular universe is trivial, from a moral 
perspective, since my refusal to do said good act will simply make it necessary that one of my 
counterparts in another universe actualize that good act.  Similarly, if I do carry out that good 
act then it will prevent that act from being actualized in the same situation by my counterpart 
elsewhere in the multiverse.73  Since it is not clear that the same good deed enjoys any more 
moral worth in one universe than another, the personal responsibility of making morally right 
choices seems to be diminished, if not altogether lost.   
                                                          
73 This would mean that God, in creation, would have had to make the decision of which universes would suffer 
more than others.  This is a further potential problem that the multiverse deist may need to provide an answer to. 
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This problem is not insurmountable, as we have seen a reply from David Lewis (1986, p. 
127),74 rather the multiverse proponent will just have to formulate, in addition to a standard 
view of morality and ethics, a way in which his view of ethics can be applied to a multiverse in 
such a way as to counter the objection that the existence of counterparts could seem to make 
moral decisions trivial.  One way of going about this, for example, may be to make an argument 
for the value of indexical considerations in moral and ethical judgements.  That is to say, as 
Lewis would argue, whether or not a doing a morally praiseworthy act will be actualized 
elsewhere in the multiverse, it is still best if this action is carried out in this particular universe.  
Of course, there are a number of considerations that need to be taken into account in such a 
claim, but the basic idea remains: that it is better to have a good act occur here and now than 
in some other universe at some other time.  So the multiverse proponent must either adopt or 
generate a view on morality that accounts for such issues, or else explain why he does not think 
that that these are issues for his account of the multiverse. 
 
7.2 God’s Inactivity Despite Having Acted Once 
We can now move on to discuss some issues that will be faced by the multiverse deist in 
particular.    The first potential problem, from this standpoint, to be discussed is the problem of 
explaining why it is the case that God acted only once in creation and then subsequently 
refrained from and continues to refrain from undertaking any subsequent actions.  Whether we 
see a divine inactivity because God does not know that He needs to act, He does not have the 
ability to act, He does not have the desire to act or because He does not have the need to act 
there still seems to be, at least on the surface, there seems to be some incompatibility arguing 
for a non-active God and arguing for a God who created the multiverse.  That is to say, the 
multiverse deist needs to ask what makes it acceptable for one to believe that God acted in one 
very particular and specific case, while simultaneously holding the belief that it is unacceptable 
to posit that God acts at any other time subsequent to that initial act?   
                                                          
74 Almeida (2015) also offers a brief reply to the worries of Adams (1979). 
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 One who discusses the establishment of and explains a similar distinction is Niels 
Gregersen (2008).  Kile Jones (2010) summarizes Gregersen’s position in saying  
that the distinction between special divine action (SDA) and general divine 
action (GDA) cannot be maintained.  SDA is the idea of an action committed by 
God that brings about specific and unique physical consequences.  GDA is 
closer to…the fall-back position – history as a whole as a single act of God.  
Gregersen thinks this distinction cannot be maintained because ‘any divine 
action must be treated as both special and yet as falling within the over-all 
pattern of divine self-consistency’ (Jones, 2010, p. 582-3). 
The kind of distinction that Gregersen and Jones discuss is slightly different from the distinction 
that I have made, but they agree that the multiverse deist does need to make a distinction 
between various types of divine action.  So while Gregersen discusses a distinction between 
what he calls special divine action and general divine action (2008, p. 179), the way that I have 
set the difficulty out is that there needs to be a distinction between two different kinds of 
special divine action.  Whether the former or the latter kind of distinction is more difficult to 
make, I am unsure,75 but it is a problem that must be solved nonetheless.  
 Of course, the problem of explaining creation and the activity of God (or lack thereof) is 
not exclusive to multiverse deism, rather it is a problem that all theistic viewpoints must face.  
Because of this, it is not altogether clear that explaining the process of creation is one that is 
unique to multiverse deism, or that it is even a problem at all.  The difficulty for the deist arises 
in explaining what differentiates this particular act from acts of any other kind that God could 
potentially carry out.  While many theists will not take it as a point of debate, rather as a brute 
fact, that God created all that exists out of nothing, I am not wholly satisfied with this answer 
provided by theism and so the multiverse deist, as well as any other kinds of theists, ought to 
do a bit more explanatory work in describing the various potential methods by which God came 
to create all that exists.  The classical theist, assuming that he subscribes to a view arguing that 
God created the universe(s) ex nihilo faces the task of explaining just what that means and how 
it is possible.  Similarly, the multiverse deist will likely have to provide the same explanations 
but, in addition to this, he will then have to go on to explain why this single act of creation by 
                                                          
75 Jones (2010, p. 583) does not think that the former is a substantial problem that cannot be solved. 
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God (if it is deemed an act) can be accepted under a worldview that is based so heavily on the 
idea of a God who does not act on the natural world.  So, while providing an explanation for 
creation is not solely a problem for multiverse deists, there is an added level in which the 
multiverse deist must explain what it is about the specific initial act that makes it different from 
any other subsequent divine acts: the kinds that it precludes. 
So, the task of the multiverse deist is one that is markedly different from and more 
difficult than the task of the classical theist.  In addition to providing an account of how the 
multiverse was created (presumably ex nihilo) the multiverse deist must also either (a) come up 
with an explanation for why God’s initial act of creation cannot truly be deemed an act, (b) 
come up with an explanation for why God’s initial act of creation was not an act on the natural 
world, or (c) come up with an explanation for why God’s initial act of creation was an act on the 
natural world but is permissible in, or does not contradict, an ontological view that precludes 
God acting on the natural world.  The common thread that can be found in each of these three 
options is that the multiverse deist must provide an account of how the initial divine act of 
creation is to be distinguished from any kinds of subsequent divine acts in such a way as to 
allow it to be consistent with the overall deistic viewpoint while still maintaining that any 
subsequent divine acts are inconsistent with the viewpoint.  
 
7.3 Determining the Location of God 
The task of determining where exactly God is to be placed within a deistic multiverse theory is a 
difficult one and could be carried out in many different ways.  Of course, the ways that are 
available will vary depending on the particular kind of multiverse to which the multiverse deist 
subscribes, but for our purposes here we will keep with the multiverse that consists of a large 
number of spatio-temporally isolated universes that collectively exhaust all possible realities.  
Even in taking for granted that God is a necessary being, the overall problem can be reduced to 
a question about how exactly we are to interpret God’s necessity.  Whether God can be located 
in time or at a specific location is a question that any theistic account will have to deal with, but 
the insertion of a multiverse theory simply adds one more level of complexity to this already 
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difficult topic.  Paul Sheehy (2006) worries about this precise problem as it relates to modal 
realism.  Of a realist, multi-universe theory that posits the existence of counterparts, Sheehy 
says “God is not reductively analysable into entities present in [universes] or the relations in 
which they stand.  Talk of God as a necessary being thus eludes elucidation in the realist 
framework of modality” (2006, p. 318).  He goes on to say that 
Even if we accept that a unique individual possessed of great-making properties 
exists at every possible [universe], a radical revision of the classical conception 
is required.  For, now there is a single God for each [universe].  Is the object of 
worship in the actual [universe] our God alone?  Or is it the mereological sum 
or set of Gods?  The former view seems to violate too much the sense in which 
God is unique and the latter undercuts any clear sense in which God is unitary 
(Sheehy, 2006, p. 319).   
While Sheehy’s discussion is specifically aimed at modal realism, his concerns still apply to 
multiverse deists, and he has raised several key issues that must be addressed.  And as he has 
framed it, with only two options available, neither of these two options is particularly attractive 
for the theist in that they each require substantial undesirable concessions be made about the 
overall nature of God. 
 The distinction between whether or not God necessarily exists for the multiverse and 
whether or not God necessarily exists for each universe is something that will have to be 
considered by the multiverse deist.  If God only necessarily exists for the multiverse, then there 
is the possibility of having a great number of universes in which God does not exist.  It may be 
difficult for some theists to accept a notion like that, not wanting to concede the possibility that 
this universe is one in which God does not reside.  Similarly, if God necessarily exists for each 
universe, then the multiverse deist will have to detail exactly  how it is possible that God exist 
(presumably simultaneously) in a number of spatio-temporally disconnected universes.  For 
this, explanations will have to be given as to the sense in which God exists within each universe.  
For example, whether He is in one location within the universe, whether His existence 
permeates the entire universe, whether He is part of the universe or whether the universe is 
part of Him, and so on.  Crafting such an explanation is no easy task, for this is an aspect of the 
discussion of God that will cut across a wide range of other considerations such as the 
interpretations of God’s eternality, timelessness, essential nature, and so on.  So to decide on a 
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particular conception on how to locate God is quite complex and can shape, or be shaped by, 
other attributes of God in very significant ways. 
 A further consideration is that, if God is not located within or among any or all of the 
universes in the multiverse, then an account will have to be provided of where there is space 
for Him to reside either within or outside of the multiverse.  That is to say, the multiverse is 
thought to be composed of only universes so there would, theoretically, be no space between 
any of these universes in which God could situate Himself.  The totality of the multiverse is 
exhausted by the universes of which it is comprised, so it is not clear how anything can exist 
outside of a universe yet still remain in the multiverse.  If there is such a space, then the 
multiverse deist would have to provide an account of just what this mysterious space between 
these many universes is, and what differentiates this space from the space that we would find 
within the bounds of a typical universe.  Similarly, if God is to be placed outside of the 
multiverse, essentially looking in from outside, since the multiverse is thought to contain all 
that exists, the multiverse deist will have to explain how it is possible that anything (even God) 
can exist outside of the multiverse.  This would seem to require that God be either spatially or 
temporally distinct from some or all of the multiverse.  And if it is the case that God can reside 
on the other side of the multiverse limits there needs to be an explanation of why this does not 
leave open the possibility for other beings, things or entities to also reside on the other side of 
the multiverse boundary.  In this case however, the multiverse deist will again have to find a 
way of dealing with the fact that many of the universes within the multiverse do not, in the 
simplest sense, contain God.  One potential way of getting around this problem is to construct 
some sort of explanation as to how God’s presence, despite the fact that He may be centrally 
located elsewhere, essentially permeates all points of the multiverse.  Or perhaps some theory 
such as pantheism could help to defer the problem.  This would allow the multiverse theory to 
maintain at least some sense in which God can be said to ‘exist within’ each universe, though it 
may have to be a weak sense, one that the deist may not accept with much enthusiasm. 
 This task of locating God, for the multiverse deist, is no small task.  As we have seen 
there are a variety of considerations and factors that ought to be considered, both practically 
and theologically, if he has hopes of providing a satisfactory account of where God is located in 
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relation to the multiverse.  Ross Cameron (2009) offers a reply to the worries about the location 
of God expressed by Sheehy (2006) by arguing that God can be conceived of as a universal, 
putting Him at a level comparable to numbers, which would allow Him to be present 
completely in every location but confined to no specific location at all times.  Whether such an 
account is reasonable is another question, but it does show that there are some potential 
avenues that can be taken by the multiverse deist in the hopes of addressing the problem of 
locating God. 
 
7.4 Abandoning the Idea that a Personal Relationship with God is the Greatest Possible Good 
One of the things that both theists and atheists alike have done their best to maintain is the 
idea that a personal relationship with God is the greatest possible good.76  Religious theists 
often use this claim to call for increased levels of worship from their followers, saying that 
nobody will be in a personal relationship with God unless living a life entirely devoted to Him.  
You must, in essence, put yourself in the proper position to experience the greatest possible 
good, and such a position can only be entered into via faith, prayer, church attendance, and so 
on.  The reward for all of this sacrifice and devotion is a potential taste of that greatest possible 
good, a personal relationship with God.  Many theists would, and do, find this trade-off well 
worth it.77  Atheists, on the other hand, argue that if it is the case that the greatest possible 
good is a personal relationship with God then we should expect to see far more people enjoying 
that relationship.  That is to say, an omnibenevolent God would want the best for all of His 
creations, and we clearly see many people who want and strive to achieve a personal 
relationship with God, making what seem to be the requisite sacrifices and putting themselves 
in the proper position to experience Him, but that personal relationship never comes.  The 
atheist would claim that surely there cannot exist an omnibenevolent God who would fail to 
provide so many of His creations with the greatest possible good.  Therefore, argues the 
                                                          
76 Or at least an extremely highly valued good. 
77 The idea of this trade-off was popularized by Blaise Pascal, who argues that it is in one’s best interest to believe 
in the existence of God and to act accordingly, regardless of whether or not we know that God actually exists.  This 
is discussed by Janzen (2011), Jordan (2006), Sobel (1996), Chimenti (1990), Brown (1985), Rescher (1985), Hacking 
(1972), and Webb (1929). 
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atheist, since we see a lack of personal relationships with God, He, as we conceive of Him, does 
not exist. 
 The multiverse deist, or any deist (for that matter), will not only have to abandon the 
idea that a personal relationship with God is the greatest possible good, but he will also have to 
abandon the idea that a personal relationship with God is a good at all.  Since the possibility of 
having a personal relationship with God would seem to entail some sort of reciprocity between 
the subject and God, such a reciprocity would entail God acting in the world in some sense, 
which is clearly something that is precluded by multiverse deism.  For an ontological view to 
place such a high value, or any level of positive value at all, on something that it precludes is 
nonsensical.  For that reason, the multiverse deist who denies the possibility of a personal 
relationship with God must also deny the idea that such a relationship carries with it any sort of 
positive value as well.  There is no doubt that many theists would see this as a massive 
concession, one that they would not want to make.  So this is potentially the biggest hurdle for 
the multiverse deist to overcome, since this is probably the place where most theists will make 
the decision not to get on board with multiverse deism, even if they find it plausible in other 
areas. 
 The reason why abandoning the idea of a personal relationship with God would be such 
a problem for the multiverse deist is that so many theists have for centuries emphasized the 
great value of such a relationship and emphasizing it remains central to Western religion today.  
Many people throughout history who have purported to have enjoyed a personal relationship 
by God have often been viewed and treated as god-like in their own right, often going on to be 
greatly celebrated and admired both by the church and by their followers.78  Of course, that is 
not to say that all those who claim to have had a personal relationship with God have gone on 
to develop celebrated celebrity status, but the fact remains that those who enjoy such 
relationships, and have these relationships confirmed or approved by the church or their peers, 
                                                          
78 Fales (1996) has argued that the hope of being similarly admired, for reasons that are similarly faulty, is what has 
motivated people to claim that they have had religious experiences, and Gellman (1998) and Harper (2014) have 
objected to this by saying that there is no way of proving that these motivations had causal roles in all, or even 
most, claims of religious experiences throughout history. 
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are often thought more highly of.  That is because, regardless of the actions or character of the 
individual, the value of the good of a personal relationship is looked on so high that he who 
claims to be fortunate enough to enjoy such a good is often elevated in status.  The foundation 
of many faiths is based on one or more individuals being touched, in one way or another, by 
God and going on to spread His message to followers.  So to deny the good of such a 
relationship is essentially to deny the foundation of many religions. 
 Clearly, the denial of a personal relationship with God as being a good which, in turn, 
brings into question the foundation of many different faiths, poses a problem for the 
acceptability of multiverse deism for any theists who already subscribe to faiths in which the 
possibility of such a relationship is central.  As was discussed at the outset of chapter 4, one of 
the attractive points of the conception of God that I propose is that His attributes do not vary 
substantially from the attributes of the God of classical theism, thus making the possibility of 
transferring from belief in classical multiverse theism to multiverse deism an easy one, in 
theory.  This problem, however, is the road block in making that easy transition from classical 
theism to multiverse deism.  Because of that, the multiverse deist will need to find some way of 
creating a pathway to allow for many classical theists to abandon or reconsider the cherished 
idea of a personal relationship with God, if there is any hope of gaining mass acceptance based 
on a transition from another theist viewpoint.  
 A way of dealing with this difficulty could be to make a slight change in what is meant by 
having a personal relationship with God.  That is to say, maybe there is some hope for the 
multiverse deist in crafting a conception of a personal relationship that does not entail 
reciprocity from God towards us.  Multiverse deism does not explicitly preclude a personal 
relationship with God, rather it precludes a reciprocal relationship with God, and there is a 
chance that that distinction provides enough space for the multiverse deist to maintain the 
long-held ideal that a personal relationship with God is inherently good.  If able to do that then, 
while perhaps not giving classical theists as much as they would like, he would still be offering 
them something that they would prefer to an outright denial that such a relationship is possible 
or holds any good whatsoever.  Similarly, the multiverse deist may be able to hold some ground 
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by maintaining that a relationship with God is the greatest conceivable good while still denying 
the attaining it is ever in fact possible,. 
 
7.5 Abandoning the Literal Interpretation of the Bible 
Very closely related to the abandonment of the belief that a personal relationship with God is 
the greatest possible good is the abandonment of the literal interpretation of the Bible, or any 
religious scripture, in cases that call for direct divine intervention.  Of course, religious 
scriptures are often very important and serve as a foundations for many religions, so to 
demand that certain aspects of these scriptures be interpreted in a particular way or even 
ignored altogether is no small request. 
 While it is certainly the case that some theists take the accounts of God’s intervention in 
the world, as depicted in scripture, to serve merely as analogies or stories that do not truly 
make claims about God’s interaction with the world, there still do remain a great number of 
people who interpret those scriptural accounts literally.  For some, to make the claim that 
certain aspects of scripture ought not to be taken as veridical is to make the claim that all 
scripture is not to be taken as veridical,79 and so to expect wholesale acceptance of the 
abandonment of literal interpretation of scripture is a very lofty ambition.  The common reason 
for wanting to deny such a request, I would imagine, would be something along the lines of 
making the claim that the removing or ignoring the relevant sections of scripture would have 
serious and negative ramifications across the entire faith.  That is to say, those cases of divine 
intervention that are described in scripture are essential to the faith itself, and to ignore, 
remove or devalue them is to alter other aspects of the religion as well, things such as ethics 
and morality, the nature of God, and so forth. 
 Thomas Jefferson, an American deist, undertook the task of removing nearly all mention 
of miracles and divine intervention from the New Testament in the early 19th century.  In 
constructing his book “The Life and Morals of Jesus of Nazereth,” often referred to as the 
                                                          
79 Of course, logically, this is not the case.  In practice, however, this is a substantial issue.  
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Jefferson Bible, Jefferson (2007) used a razor and glue to cut and paste together sections of the 
New Testament.  The result was, essentially, a condensed version of the New Testament that 
was devoid of all mention of miracles by Jesus Christ, any supernatural activity, and any 
mention of Jesus Christ as divine.  To undertake such a task as simply removing any kind of 
supernatural discussion from scripture is not very difficult, as we see, it can be done simply with 
a piece of scripture, a razor and some glue.  But the real question that remains is whether or 
not the new, altered version of the scripture, such as Jefferson’s Bible, carries with it a 
drastically different meaning or proposes different values than the original scripture.  It is not 
altogether clear what Jefferson’s intention was, in constructing the Jefferson Bible, but one 
could imagine that his goal was to create a document that still maintained the core 
prescriptions, doctrines, values and ideals of Christianity without having to appeal to instances 
of divine intervention or miracles.  To demonstrate that we need not hold on to all of these 
accounts of alleged divine interaction in order to have a fully-functioning religion in which we 
can still have faith and that can still guide us to live our lives in a moral way.80  Of course, 
whether or not this was Jefferson’s true intention is unknown, and if it was, whether or not he 
was successful in achieving this intention is open to interpretation.  With that in mind, this is 
exactly the task that the multiverse deist will have to undertake if he hopes to be successful in 
persuading people to abandon classical theism.  He must do something similar to what 
Jefferson did, then showing that the revised scripture is at least as valuable as the original.  
 Of course, it is not clear that a great number of people adopt a literal interpretation of 
The Bible or any scripture, for that matter, so this may not be as big a problem for the 
multiverse deist as initially thought.  But even with that being the case, this is not a potential 
problem that multiverse deist can simply dismiss.  While it may not be the case that a great 
number of people wholly interpret scripture literally, since many people taking particular 
sections to represent analogies, life-lessons, and so on, they may interpret other sections in a 
literal sense.  So while the number of people who interpret The Bible completely literally may 
be minimal, the number of people who interpret the sections relevant to the proponent of the 
                                                          
80 Whether the religion was guiding people in a moral way to begin with is another question altogether but, for the 
sake of argument, let’s say that it was/is. 
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deistic multiverse (sections involving divine intervention or revelation) literally may be far 
greater, and that is where the potential problem arises for the multiverse deist.  William 
Bristow writes that “a deist typically rejects the divinity of Christ, as repugnant to reason; the 
deist typically demotes the figure of Jesus from agent of miraculous redemption to 
extraordinary moral teacher” (Bristow, 2010).  Given the deist’s outlook on the status of Christ, 
he is tasked with trying to persuade others to accept that and other similar claims. 
 The different ways in which people interpret the same scripture has always been a topic 
of debate within theology and the church, but more importantly for the multiverse deist will be 
exploring ways in which a single individual may come to interpret different parts of the same 
piece of scripture in competing ways.  That is to say, one thing that may need to be investigated 
is the way in which, and the reasoning behind why an individual may interpret certain sections 
of a particular piece of scripture literally, while he will interpret different sections of that same 
piece of scripture as metaphors or analogies. 
 
7.6 Accounting for the Miracles that Have Been Reported Throughout History  
Depending on how one looks at it, it may or may not seem outlandish to see a good number of 
people admit that they do not believe that miracles or religious experiences actually happen in 
today’s world.  Given the level and accessibility of modern science, it seems that more and 
more people are inclined to accept that, even though they may not have knowledge of what 
the particular explanation is, there is some sort of naturalistic and scientific explanation for 
many or all of the unusual or unexplainable occurrences that they may come to witness or 
experience.  While it may be the case that people are increasingly attributing present-day 
events to naturalistic causes, it may be a much more difficult task to get the same number of 
people to attribute many alleged miracles and religious experiences of the past to naturalistic 
causation. 
 It is not clear exactly how many miracles have been claimed or confirmed by organized 
religion over time, but it is fair to say that there are a good number of miraculous events on 
record and that at least several of these alleged miracles serve as cornerstones of belief.  While 
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the “…church, through time, has become more open and progressive in light of the challenges 
posed by modernity…this is not to say that the change has come easily” (Jones, 2010, p. 575) 
and there is no doubt that organized religion, as a whole, would like to maintain the credibility 
of as many miracles as possible, be they cornerstones of as many miracles as possible, whether 
or not belief in them is crucial.  For the multiverse deist, not only does he have to deny that any 
miracles are currently taking place, but he also has to deny that any miracles have ever taken 
place, including those that have been confirmed by the Church and taken to be pillars on which 
the faith stands.  So while the average person may be able to be persuaded that no miracles are 
currently taking place, essentially accepting the causal closure of the world, he may be 
reluctant to accept that no miracles have ever taken place.  This is the problem facing the 
multiverse deist: how to allow for the acceptance of his view to range into the past to cover all 
time periods, not just the present.  There just seems to be something different, and more 
difficult, about retroactively applying today’s scientific explanations to past miraculous events.  
It is simply more difficult to ask that people abandon the belief in some of these core events, 
even if the occurrence of these past events is in direct conflict with their current beliefs.  So 
while we may find an individual who would say it is preposterous to assume that today we can 
see the resurrection of a man as proving that he was God’s incarnate, this same person may 
also simultaneously hold the belief that Jesus was the human instantiation of God and that he 
returned from the dead.  And that is the problem that the multiverse deist may have to face: 
how to allow people to accept multiverse deism in the light not only of present-day happenings, 
but also of each and every preceding event in history. 
 One avenue of inquiry into a topic such as this may be to explore the relation between 
perception and belief as they relate to time.  In cases such as the one described above it seems 
that there is no difference in the kind of event taking place, and the only difference is the 
perception of the possibility of the event given the different historical times in which each took 
or will take place.  Just because something is historical, does it require less intellectual scrutiny 
before being accepted as veridical?  If so, we need to explore what the other relevant factors 
are that make one claim of resurrection worthy of belief while another claim of resurrection is 
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not.  Once questions like this are answered then perhaps the multiverse deist will be able to 
move one step closer to providing a theory that applies to events at all times. 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen some of the issues that will need to be addressed by the 
multiverse deist if he hopes to provide a complete ontological view.  A view ranging from 
removing the discrepancies between the kinds of universes that will populate the multiverse on 
scientific accounts and the kinds of universes that will populate the multiverse on philosophical 
accounts, dealing with the issue of having the design argument undermined, tackling problems 
of how with morality can operate when individuals have counterparts, differentiating God’s 
initial act of creation from other potential subsequent acts, determining the location of God 
within the multiverse, conceding that a personal relationship with God cannot be the greatest 
possible good, calling for the abandonment of the literal interpretation of certain aspects of The 
Bible to, finally, accounting for all of the miracles and acts of divine intervention that have been 
reported throughout history.  While these issues are certainly not exhaustive of the list of 
additional considerations that the multiverse deist will have to consider, they are some of the 
most pressing.  Furthermore, I have deemed that none of these issues are fatally damaging to 
multiverse deism as a whole, and that there are a number of ways in which each of them can be 
replied to.  I have simply noted that to provide responses to each of these issues is beyond the 
scope of this project because of the sheer number of individualized responses that will need to 
be given according to the specific type of deistic multiverse that is being argued for. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Practical Considerations and Concluding Thoughts 
 
The preceding discussion undertaken in this project has dealt with the argument for, and pros 
and cons of, multiverse deism as a viable alternative to classical theism.  Much of this discussion 
focused on philosophical and theological conceptions, logical entailments, and other 
considerations that do not necessarily make their practical consequences obvious.  This chapter 
addresses some of the practical considerations that arise from the adoption of multiverse 
deism in favor of classical theism, and discusses how such a reconsidered ontological view can 
have real-world effects that are not purely confined to the pages of academic papers or to the 
informal discussions in the hallways of university philosophy and theology departments.  The 
first half of this chapter will address these practical considerations.  The second half of this 
chapter will simply provide some concluding thoughts and offer a summarized view of the ideas 
and issues presented up to this point.    
 
Part I: Practical Considerations 
 
8.1 A Shift in Arguments for Atheism 
The acceptance of multiverse deism as a plausible alternative to classical theism would not 
simply mean that there is one additional ontological view to add to the list but with that 
addition may come some changes in the ways that philosophers of religion think about, and 
ultimately construct, arguments for atheism.  Many of the current arguments for atheism are 
designed for, and directed against, the traditional conception of God rather than a deistic God 
or the God of a multiverse.  And this is with good reason.  The traditional conception of God is 
just that, traditional, so it carries with it the richest history and the greatest number of 
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proponents.  So there is no question as to why a great many of the arguments for atheism are 
aimed at bringing into question various aspects of this traditional conception.  Where the 
problem arises is if a plausible alternative to the classical conception of God emerges, one to 
which the vast majority of existing arguments for atheism are inapplicable.  This is where the 
practical consideration shows itself for the philosophers of religion, particularly those who aim 
to dispute the existence of God. 
 As was seen in Chapter 5, several of the predominant families of arguments for atheism 
(divine hiddenness, problem of evil, problems with miracles) pose significantly less of a threat 
to multiverse deism than they do to classical theism.  The result of this is a two-pronged attack 
on arguments for atheism as they are currently formulated.  On the one hand, if the plausibility 
of multiverse deism is taken seriously and adopted by a substantial number of people then the 
atheists will need to come up with new arguments that specifically address and attack 
multiverse deism.  To be fair, there are substantial arguments for atheism and substantial 
arguments against the existence of a multiverse but none that I know of specifically address 
multiverse deism.  Yet even though many of these particular arguments do not directly address 
multiverse deism, some aspects of them may still apply to it, and if that is the case then those 
who wish to oppose multiverse deism will need to, minimally, reframe many of the current 
arguments for atheism or against the multiverse so that they are suitably aimed at and apply to 
multiverse deism specifically.  Of course, expecting the wholesale acceptance of multiverse 
deism rather than classical theism is slightly ambitious, so it is not clear that such a drastic 
measure of reformulating all atheistic or anti-multiverse arguments to be directed at multiverse 
deism is a task that atheists will have to deal with any time soon but it is still something that will 
need to be considered, as multiverse deism could still be a potential reply to an atheistic 
argument by somebody who aims to maintain the existence of God. 
 The second prong of attack on current formulations of arguments for atheism, while not 
nearly as extreme as the first, is far more likely to be encountered and raises a serious practical 
consideration for atheists and their arguments against the existence of God.  Given the 
resistance of multiverse deism to current arguments for atheism, which we have seen comes 
largely from the specific interpretations of various divine attributes, the classical theist can 
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potentially import some of these specific interpretations into his own conception of God.  What 
I mean by this is that even if one does not see the idea of multiverse deism as plausible or as 
preferable to classical theism, he can still acknowledge that there are aspects of multiverse 
deism that are superior to the corresponding aspects of classical theism.  For example, one may 
accept that the idea of omnipotence as divine efficiency stands up better to certain arguments 
for atheism than does another way of interpreting omnipotence within the classical conception 
of God.  So, in a case such as this, while the atheist does not have to concern himself with 
formulating a whole new atheistic argument directed against multiverse deism, there is still an 
aspect of multiverse deism that has made its way into (at least this particular interpretation of) 
omnipotence within classical theism.  And it is this interpretation of omnipotence that the 
atheist will then have to construct a new argument against, rather than any other traditional 
account of omnipotence that he would have been previously accustomed to.  
 So, whether or not multiverse deism is accepted in its entirety there will be some 
adjustments that will have to be made by the atheist in terms of his arguments against God’s 
existence.  In the first case, where multiverse deism is accepted, it is simply an entirely new way 
of thinking about the existence of and nature of God, so the atheist’s arguments will have to be 
revised in such a way as to attack the plausibility of a different ontological view from which they 
are accustomed to attacking.  In the second case, where multiverse deism is not accepted, it is 
possible that some aspects of it are imported into classical theism, and though atheists will not 
have to restructure their arguments to account for an entirely new ontological view, they will 
have to reframe some of their arguments to account for smaller, specific interpretations of 
specific aspects of God’s nature, such as a particular divine attribute. 
 
8.2 Re-Evaluating What it Means for God to be Praiseworthy 
Determining what exactly it means for something or someone to be praiseworthy, even if we 
limit our discussion to the case of God, is no simple task.  Determining, however, whether or 
not the God of the deistic multiverse is praiseworthy is for another discussion altogether, but 
one that is necessary if we are to consider such an ontological view as plausible.  In the case of 
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the God of classical theism, we can say that He is praiseworthy for a variety of reasons; He is 
able to perform a great many tasks; He is greater than us in any and all respects; praise of Him 
will result in rewards for us later in life or in the afterlife; and so on, but it is not altogether clear 
that these same things can be said about the God of the deistic multiverse.  Depending on the 
emphasis that is placed on each of these factors that can potentially determine 
praiseworthiness, it may turn out that the deistic God is not praiseworthy, or perhaps just 
substantially less praiseworthy than the God of classical theism.  For one who takes reward of 
praise as a key factor in determining whether or not a deity is praiseworthy may not find any 
compelling reason to view the deistic God as praiseworthy, since His abilities to acknowledge 
and reward praise are severely limited, if not altogether nonexistent.  Similarly, if one 
determines that the deistic God is praiseworthy, then he must also determine in what ways to 
praise Him, and determine what, if anything, he hopes to achieve through this praise. 
 So this discussion, while not limited to the multiverse deist, introduces several affairs 
that the classical theist will not have to deal with.  But, given the overall complexity of such a 
discussion, the few additional dimensions that come with a multiverse deistic view should not 
be seen as an overwhelming further complication to the idea of divine praiseworthiness.  
 
8.3 Understanding the Role of Organized Religion 
Somewhat connected to determining what constitutes praiseworthiness is the task of 
determining the role of organized religion if God is the God of deism.  Because, if it turns out to 
be the case that it is against God’s nature to act in the natural world, is there really any theistic 
purpose for organized religion?  That is to say, our lives would be every bit as worth living even 
if we did not engage in the practices of organized religion.  Of course, this presupposes that 
organized religion carries with it, and is heavily based on, the idea that petitionary prayer and 
actions can and will be answered by God, and this presupposition may not necessarily be 
correct.  With that in mind, for the multiverse deist, it would seem that organized religion as a 
vehicle for petitionary prayer would be abandoned.  That would force him to ask whether 
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organized religion could ever have had any value, and if so, then what value it could continue to 
have, and what role it can continue to play in our society.  
 This question seems to be one that turns into a sociological discussion rather than a 
philosophical one, but is still an important consideration nonetheless.  Even among those who 
subscribe to the traditional conception of God and who attend church regularly, some may 
already see organized religion not necessarily as a vehicle to foster some sort of reciprocal 
relationship with God, rather they take it as a social opportunity.  It can be seen as an 
opportunity to meet other people that you may not otherwise meet, to foster a sense of 
community with others, to take the time out to reset the priorities of a busy life once a week, or 
to serve any other practical function that may not be related to God in any way.  The simple 
idea here is that it is not the case that everyone will be forced to abandon all of the goods of 
organized religion through the acceptance of multiverse deism.  Many of these religious 
benefits can still be maintained, and organized religion can still play an important and positive 
role in the lives of many people despite the belief that a reciprocal relationship with God cannot 
be formed.  The simple fact is that for many, however, the overall theistic motivations and 
purpose of which many of these other sociological goods are merely a by-product will have to 
be substantially revised. 
 
Part II: Concluding Thoughts 
8.4 Overview of the Discussion 
The overall argument that I have made in this research project came in the form of a multi-part 
conditional.  I argued that if we accept the existence of a multiverse model that calls for the 
existence of all possible realities, and if we aim to maintain the idea that God exists, then this 
entails the existence of a deistic God rather than the God of classical theism.  Furthermore, I 
have argued that a deistic God is to be preferred to the God of classical theism when we want 
to counter various arguments for atheism. 
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 I began by presenting an overview of the discussion of the multiverse, in Chapter 2, 
from both the philosophical and scientific perspectives.  This showed that the multiverse is 
being developed by a good number of reputable individuals, people whose expertise comes 
from many disciplines, so that it deserves serious consideration. It also highlighted the variety 
of different types of multiverse that are currently being discussed by philosophers and 
physicists, and I was able to specify that the kind of multiverse model that I was going to be 
operating with for the remainder of this research project was a multiverse composed of 
universes that collectively exhaust all possible realities.  While I noted that I specifically did not 
want to include any kind of threshold for conferring possibility within such a multiverse 
structure, throughout the remainder of the discussion of this project it should be clear that 
such a threshold, minimally, includes the specification that there exists no universe in the 
multiverse in which God is active.   
Moving into Chapter 3, I outlined several of the difficulties that the theist will have to 
confront if accepting a multiverse theory that calls for the existence of all possible universes.  
Some of these difficulties would not be exclusive to theists, rather they will apply to anyone 
accepting that brand of multiverse.  Section 3.2, addressed the overall thesis of this research 
project, and detailed how the theistic acceptance of a multiverse theory that calls for the 
existence of all possible universes entails a deistic God rather than the God of classical theism.  
And finally, Section 3.3, discussed what roles could be played by free will and determinism in 
the multiverse, if God is the God of deism, showing how various conceptions and combinations 
of free will and determinism are compatible with the deistic multiverse theory that I ultimately 
argued for. 
Chapter 4 began with a discussion on vague nature of the deistic God, and some of the 
potential reasons behind that lack of clarity throughout history.  Because of the lack of explicit 
divine attributes or interpretations of these divine attributes within the historical literature of 
deism, which was discussed in Section 4.1, I took the overall conception of the deistic God to be 
open.  This openness allowed me to, moving into Sections 4.2 and 4.3, discuss my 
interpretations of omnipotence and omnibenevolence of the deistic God.  In Section 4.4 I 
discussed omniscience, timelessness, immutability and necessity, as these were some of the 
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divine attributes that did not seem as crucial the overall deistic conception as those discussed in 
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 but still needed to be addressed in a discussion such as this.  Finally, 
Section 4.5 discussed how each of the particular interpretations of the divine attributes 
discussed up to that point ultimately factored into the overall conception of the deistic God 
that I presented. 
Chapter 5 was divided into two parts. In Part I, sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, I discussed the 
teleological argument, the ontological argument and the cosmological argument in order to 
show how a deistic conception of God is compatible with these common arguments for the 
existence of God.  In Part II, sections 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6, I discussed the problem of divine 
hiddenness, the problem of evil, and problems with miracles as several of the stronger and 
more well-known contemporary arguments against God’s existence that generally pose 
problems for the classical theistic conception of God.  Finally, section 5.7 discussed how a 
generic deistic conception of God may be able to get around some of the difficulties that 
classical theism faces in dealing with these arguments and to show that deism may be able to 
adequately respond to some of these atheistic arguments.   
In Chapter 6 I presented a possible alternative to the kind of deism that I propose.  This 
alternative was called noninterventionist special divine action, but I referred to it as epistemic 
deism.  I detailed the nature of three different noninterventionist special divine action theories 
and discussed why and how they can all be reduced to epistemic deism.  I went on to describe 
how epistemic deism as a whole is an unviable ontological view and is ultimately inferior to the 
kind of deism that I argued for in this project. 
Finally, in Chapter 7, I discussed some potential difficulties and further lines of thought 
that the multiverse deist will need to address at some point, but that are ultimately not within 
the scope of this project.  In Chapter 3 I had discussed several difficulties that confront any 
theist who accepts a multiverse theory without combining it with deism.  I now revisited them.  
After that there were discussions of difficulties that the multiverse deist may have in explaining 
the role of a deistic God in the creation of the multiverse, the need to determine the location of 
a deistic God within the multiverse, the need to abandon the idea of a personal relationship 
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with God as the greatest possible good, reconciling the idea of a non-active God with the 
biblical accounts of an active God and, finally, accounting for the various miracles and religious 
experiences that have been reported throughout history.  The goal of this chapter was simply to 
mention some of the other lines of research that can be carried out, as a result of the work that 
I had done to that point.   
In conceiving of and completing this project, while I made several arguments for the 
existence of a deistic God and for some particular interpretations of His nature, the overall goal 
was simply to open the discussion on, what I felt was, an under-discussed ontological view.  
Coming into this project I felt that deism could have been a plausible ontological view with 
some potential upsides and, in moving through my research, I think that I have not only 
confirmed that feeling, but was also able to point out specifically why it is plausible, where the 
upsides to deism are, when compared to classical theism, and I have brought to light some 
areas where multiverse deism is potentially weak as an overall view and could use further 
elucidation to clarify some of the problems that are faced by both multiverse deists and theists, 
alike.  My hope was that, in bringing up this under-discussed topic of deism, and discussing it in 
relation to the multiverse, which is one of the most active areas in the philosophy of religion 
today, that I could rekindle some sort of interest in this ontological view as a plausible 
alternative to classical theism.  This work will, hopefully, serve as the starting point for much 
more research and discussion on deism, either as it relates to the multiverse, or as a stand-
alone ontological view. 
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